Biblioteca digitale Progetto Agorà
In the ‘New system of the nature of substances’
l’union qu’il y a entre l’âme et le corps. Par M.D.L’, Journal des Savants (Paris), 27 June 1695, no.
23, pp.
294-300; 4 July 1695, no. 24, pp. 301-306 (Amsterdam edn vol. 23, pp. 444-462).
licly announced his hypothesis that the ‘union of
the soul with the body’ is
to be explained and understood in terms of a ‘mutual
relationship, arranged
in advance’ between events in the soul and events in the
body.
A month or so afterwards, in the so-called ‘Third explanation of the
new
system’ Journal
des Savants (Paris), 19 November 1696, no. 38, pp. 451-455
(Amsterdam edn vol . 24, pp. 687-693).
come to call a ‘pre-established harmony’, in
terms of two clocks which were
made ‘with such skill and accuracy that we could
be sure that they would
always afterwards keep time together’.
Some years later, in 1703, the Jesuit Réne Joseph de Tournemine, in the
course of
his ‘Conjectures on the union of the soul and the body’, Journal de Tré- voux: Mémoires pour
l’Histoire des Sciences et des Beaux Arts (Trévoux), May 1703, art. 91,
pp.
864-875 (continued, as ‘Suite de conjectures...’, in June 1703, art. 106,
pp. 1063-65).
that, as an account of that union, Leibniz’s
hypothesis of pre-established
harmony is insufficient and just will not do. ‘For
after all’, he said, ‘ corre -
spondence , or harmony , does not make a
union [ union ],
or essential connec-
tion
[ liason essentielle] .
Whatever parallels we imagine between two clocks,
even if the relation between
them were perfectly exact, we could never say
that these clocks were united [ unies ],
just because the movements of the
one correspond to the movements of the
other with perfect symmetry’. In
the pre-established harmony, says Tournemine,
‘[t]here is, if you like, a per-
fect correspondence; but there is no real
connection [ liason réelle ]’,
there is
no ‘genuine union’ [ veritable union].
About four years later Leibniz published a reply to Tournemine’s
‘Con-
jectures’.
Mars 1704’, Journal de Trévoux (Trévoux), March 1708, art. 35, pp.
492-496. Having noted that
Leibniz’s reply gives the date of Tournemine’s
article not (as in note 5) as May 1703, but as
March 1704, it has been
suggested that the reference is simply a mistake or is to the actual as
op-
posed to the merely nominal date of the article’s appearance (see Adams,
p. 295, n. 42; AG, p.
196; Garber, p. 110, n. 60; Rutherford a, p. 285, n.
23). The discrepancy actually stems from the
fact that there are two editions of
the Mémoires de Trévoux. In the first, published in
Trévoux it-
self, the bibliographical details of Tournemine’s article are as
in note 5 above; whereas in the Pro-
testant, second, edition published in
Amsterdam and evidently the edition Leibniz read, its details
are vol. 7, art.
16 (March 1704), pp. 231-239.
objection to him. What the pre-established harmony, as
explained in terms
of the simile of the clocks was meant to do, Leibniz said, was
‘only to give
an explanation of the phenomena, that is to say of the relation we
perceive
between the soul and the body’. And, in merely giving ‘an explanation
of
the phenomena’, it was not meant to give an explanation of any
‘metaphysi-
cal union [ union métaphysique ]’
between the body and the mind. Such a
metaphysical union would be
additional to the perceived phenomenal rela-
tion between soul and body, and it
is not anything with which, so Leibniz
says, his pre-established harmony was
meant to deal.
The phrasing of Tournemine’s objection in terms of a ‘metaphysical
union’ of soul
and body is Leibniz’s; Tournemine himself speaks rather
more informally, in terms
of a ‘real connection’ or a ‘genuine union’. More-
over, Leibniz says nothing
more here about what might be meant by there
being a ‘metaphysical union’ between
soul and body, or about what the dif-
ference between there being or not being
such a union might amount to.
But something more about what Leibniz was saying the pre-established
harmony did
not provide emerged later, in the Theodicy , in
retrospective
references he made to the exchange with Tournemine.
In the Theodicy , referring explicitly to the ‘metaphysical
union’ of his
reply to Tournemine, Leibniz speaks of that union as one which
would
make of the soul and the body a ‘suppositum’. And in a later passage he
again speaks of it as something which produce a ‘suppositum’, and also
as
something which would make ‘a single person’. Tbeodicée : GP 6, p. 45/H, p. 69; GP, 6, p. 81/H, p. 104.
The ‘metaphysical union’ of the
reply to Tournemine crops up also in a letter
to des Bosses of April 1709 (GP 2, p. 371/L, p. 598;
see also Leibniz to des
Bosses, 8 Sept 1709 (GP 2, p. 390), and Leibniz to de Volder, 19 Jan 1706
(GP
2, p. 281/L, p. 538-539). The wider topic under discussion is the Eucharist and
Leibniz ma-
kes a link between ‘presence’ in that connection and the presence
of the soul in the body - a link
which was hinted at in Leibniz’s reply to
Tournemine (p. 494/WF, p. 250). Questioning whether
and in what sense souls
can be said to be in the body. Leibniz says that some would say that the
soul
is in the body in that it operates on it, or ‘speaking according to the new system
of pre-esta-
blished harmony, that they are in a place only through
correspondence’. However, he continued,
given a ‘real metaphysical union’
between the soul and the body, a union which, he remarked, fi-
gured in his
reply to Tournemine, then it ‘can be said that the soul is truly in the body’. So
a fur-
ther thing that ‘metaphysical union’ between the mind and the body
amounts to is that, given it,
the mind not merely ‘acts’ on the body, or,
better, is in pre-established harmony with it, but also
is ‘truly in’ it.
In recent discussions of the Leibniz-Tournemine exchange Robert
Adams glosses
‘suppositum’ as ‘complete individual substance’, and Donald
Rutherford
understands it as something in which the soul and body form a
‘per se unity’ or a ‘composite substance’.
In what he says to Tournemine, and in the Theodicy , Leibniz is
not
completely clear about his attitude towards what he calls a
‘metaphysical
union’. The evidence is rather mixed whether he really thinks the
idea
makes much sense, and whether much turns for him at that time on
whether
or not the soul does make a single per se
unity with the body.
ff., Rutherford b, pp. 156 f.
But, whatever his attitude towards it, Leibniz could not have
been
clearer in replying to Tournemine that a pre-established harmony
between
body and soul does not of itself mean that there is
a ‘real metaphysical
union’ between the two, a union sufficient to make ‘a
single person’, a per se unity of the body and the
mind.
Commentators have discerned a change in Leibniz’s mind here, a
change in two
connected respects. It has been suggested that at the time of
the ‘New system’ and
earlier, in the 1680s, Leibniz was quite positively for
the
idea that human beings are single, per se, substantial
unities.
been suggested that despite what Leibniz later
conceded to Tournemine, he
nevertheless, at the time of the ‘New system’, thought
that the pre-estab-
lished harmony does not merely amount to a ‘perfect
correspondence’ be-
tween body and soul, but that it underwrites and is sufficient for the claim
that
a person is a single entity, a per se unity.
Recently, however, Marleen Rozemond has tried to resolve this ‘ten-
sion’
hypothesis of
pre-established harmony for explaining the ‘union of the soul
with the body’, on
the one hand, and his relaxed candour to Tournemine
about its limits, on the
other.
Rozemond suggests that between the time of the ‘New system’ and the
time of the
reply to Tournemine there is no change of Leibniz’s mind about
the possibilities
of the pre-established harmony. It is rather, in her view,
that there are
different things at issue at the different times. One is the
question whether
there is a ‘union’ of the soul and the body in the sense of
there being
interaction and connection between them - she uses here the
analogy of a ‘union’
of a computer and the printer with which it is united.
The other is the question,
not so much whether there is a union of this kind
of soul
and body, but rather how or whether soul and body form a per se
unity , and make one thing - something which, despite their being
con-
nected and united, the computer and its printer do not. Rozemond
suggests
that at the time of the ‘New system’, when Leibniz puts forward the
pre-es-
tablished harmony, ‘he routinely proposes it as a solution to the problem
of
interaction rather than the problem of per se unity’.
However, she says,
Leibniz took Tournemine ‘to be interested in the other issue,
which con-
cerns the per se unity of the body-soul
composite’.
Despite her view that Leibniz’s earlier pride in the pre-established har-
mony is
focussed on what it will do for union , Rozemond allows that
he
might also, in a marginal and less optimistic way, have thought it
provided
an account of unity too.
justified, and she is critical of a suggestion of Adams’ that the
pre-estab-
lished harmony contains features which would support the claim that a
per-
son is a single entity, a per se unity.
It seems to me that Rozemond’s distinction between soul and body
union and soul
and body unity, is an immensely useful one for thinking
about the whole issue of
the relation of mind and body in the thought of
the early moderns. But I think
there is something to be said in support of
Adams’s suggestion and against her view that Leibniz was right
to concede
to Tournemine that the pre-established harmony does not underwrite a
unity of, but merely a union between
soul and body.
Before proceeding it is worth recording that Leibniz’s concession to
Tournemine,
that a pre-established harmony between soul and body does
not amount to a
‘metaphysical union’ between them, perhaps misses what
Tournemine was looking
for.
Tournemine’s objection was that all Leibniz has provided between
body and mind is
correspondence but no real connection, and that what is
required is a ‘union
which is not superficial but intrinsic’.
ready
noted that the description of a ‘not superficial’ and ‘intrinsic’ union
of this
sort as ‘metaphysical’, is Leibniz’ s gloss on the matter. And
it must
be added that, when Tournemine counter-replies to
Leibniz,
Leibnits’ (as in note 7
above).
and forthrightly says that he was not actually
looking for something so
grand. The union he has in mind is not, ‘as he [Leibniz]
claims, a meta-
physical idea’. What he wants, Tournemine says, is some account
according
to which ‘[t]he body is really, physically united to the soul, more
united
than are two perfectly identical clocks’.
What Tournemine wants, as he explained in the first place, is ‘a princi-
ple
which shows that there is between a certain body and a certain soul a
connection
so natural, so essential and so necessary, that no soul other than
mine could
animate my body, and no body except mine could be animated
by my soul’. He wants
‘a certain body [to be] united to a certain soul [...]
because it has an
essential need of that soul in order to be maintained in an
arrangement which is
suitable for human functions’. He wants it to be that
the soul is united with the
body, ‘not only because the soul acts on the
body’, but also ‘because its action
on the body is, on the one hand, so es-
sential to the body that without it it
would not be a human body, and, on
the other, so specific to the soul that no
other created thing could produce
it by its natural powers’. And, as he said of
his own system, which he then
went on to expound, ‘my system sets up between the
body and the soul not
a simple correspondence, but a genuine union, which is as
real and perfect
as the union between a machine and the single spring which is
able to make
it work’.
Given all of this, one might wonder whether Leibniz had really read
Tournemine’s
initial article through before he replied to it.
counter-reply certainly
indicates that at any rate he thinks that Leibniz’s
talk of ‘a metaphysical
union’ is somewhat off at a tangent.
The question whether Leibniz was right, as Rozemond contends, to
concede to
Tournemine that pre-established harmony does not underwrite
‘metaphysical union’,
or per se unity, is not, then, the only possible line
of
investigation. One could also wonder, given a fuller reading of
Tournemine,
whether the pre-established harmony actually does provide what he
was
wanting - however that should be described.
conceptual resources and complexity of the hypothesis of
pre-established
harmony go far beyond what is captured by the ‘Third explanation’
simile
of the two clocks, a simile which, quite possibly, represents the limits
of
Tournemine’s knowledge of the matter. So it is perhaps not obviously
out
of the question that the pre-established harmony, when fully detailed,
does
provide something interestingly like what Tournemine, as properly
under-
stood, was wanting all along.
they are united’ (A 6, 3, p. 240/RB, p. 240), and that ‘every created
intelligence has an organic
body, whose level of perfection corresponds to
that of the intelligence or mind which occupies the
body’ (A 6, 3, p. 307/RB,
p. 307) certainly find an echo in some of what Tournemine (as quoted
above)
says.
I shall shortly look at some of that further detail - not, however, with a
view
to deciding whether it after all provides what Tournemine was really
wanting, but
rather with a view to the question provoked by Rozemond, the
question whether the
pre-established harmony can, after all, underwrite a
substantial, per se unity of soul and body.
Adams’s suggestion is that, to an extent, it can do this -
specifically
when seen as a supplement to and support for a scholastic conception of
per se unity according to which a substantial unity is one
whose constituents
are, ‘incomplete’ by themselves.
conceptions of incompleteness found in Leibniz and the scholastics are
very
different, and [...] the differences are crucial to the question of the
unity of
corporeal substances’.
In expounding the scholastic account of how the body and the soul,
each one
incomplete by itself, complete each other in substantial unity,
Rozemond explains that, for the scholastics, the soul needs the body and
is
incomplete without it in that it ‘cannot exercise its functions without it’;
for
them, she says, the soul ‘needs the body in order to exercise its
functions’.
To take one specific case, they thought, she says, that ‘the human
intellect
cannot operate without the imagination [...] because it cannot
understand
anything without forming images’.
ments to the effect that souls ‘are independent from body and causally
self-
contained’, and that ‘the soul alone is the subject of its states and it
oper-
ates entirely independently of the body’.
talk
of incompleteness, as in a letter to Damaris Masham, has a quite differ-
ent
meaning from what it had for the scholastics. His explanation of why
Caesar’s
soul does not exist apart from a body is different from their’s, for
it is spelt
out to Masham simply in terms of the demand for richness and
perfection in the
world.
p. 356/WF, p. 214).
Adams is of the view that this explanation, which is ‘tantamount to de-
mands of
the goodness of God’, is ‘surely not weaker than the natural apti-
tude that
matter and substantial form have for each other according to
Suárez’, and
Rozemond agrees that ‘if body and soul imply each other’s ex-
istence in virtue
of God’s goodness the reasons for this mutual implication
are indeed very
strong’.
of the body and soul
forming one thing is concerned, ‘these reasons are not
the right kind of reasons : there is nothing about these
reasons that explains
how body and soul constitute a genuine unity’.
In what follows, then, I want to make at any rate the beginnings of a re-
sponse
to Rozemond and to offer some support to Adams. In doing so I
shall concentrate,
as Rozemond does, on the question of the incompleteness
of the soul without the
body, rather than that of the body without the soul.
I want to point out that
there is more to say on Leibniz’s behalf about in-
completeness than he says to
Masham, and that the pre-established har-
mony does provide something of what
Rozemond calls the ‘right kinds of
reason’ for speaking of the incompleteness of
the soul without the body.
We need to see, then, that the pre-established harmony has rather more
to offer
than she acknowledges about respects in which the soul and the
body imply each other’s existence, and to begin to see this we need to re-
mind
ourselves that the ‘Third explanation’ simile of the clock leaves out
much of the
conceptual complexity of the pre-established harmony.
That simile as Tournemine reports it, says no more than that soul and
body in
their pre-established harmony, are like two clocks which, first, tell
the same
time, and, second, do so, not because there is some mechanism
connecting them,
not because someone continually adjusts them, but be-
cause they have been
reliably regulated in advance.
Leibniz’s important denial of any direct causality or ‘influence’ between
soul
and body is certainly captured by this. His anti-occasionalist notion
of
substances having their own complete natures and internal causality
(their
own original constitutions’) is also, though less explicitly, captured.
But
what is completely left out is something which is catered for by
other,
fuller, accounts of the pre-established harmony - namely, that there
are,
nevertheless, dependencies between soul and body, and that these are of
an
internal and not merely external nature.
As a background to this, consider Descartes’s account in The
Passions of the Soul of the relation between body and soul. As might
naturally have
been expected, it is part of that account that some events in the
soul (per-
ceptions of outside bodies, for example) have their causes in the body
(the
effect of light on the retina), and that some in the body (our legs
moving,
for example) are consequences of causes in the soul (our willing to
walk).
Now ‘telling the same time as’ is a symmetrical relation between the
two clocks.
So, to mirror the asymmetrical causal dependencies between
body and soul such as
were naturally recognised by Descartes, it would
need somehow to be built into
the clock simile, and in a way that does not
renage on Leibniz’s denial of causal
connection between the clocks, that
one clock strikes eight (for example) not merely when but because the other
does, while the other
strikes one (for example) not merely when, but be- cause
the first does.
But how the clock simile might actually be developed is a secondary
matter. The
important fact is simply that as it stands it really is not sophisti-
cated
enough, for, as indeed one would have hoped, it is part of Leibniz’s
hypothesis
of pre-established harmony, just as much as it is of Descartes’s
account, that
there are asymmetrical dependencies between body and soul.
Of course, Leibniz
does not explicate these, as does Descartes, in terms of
extensional, efficient
causality. His appeal is, rather, to the intensional no-
tions of
‘representation’ or ‘expression’. So, in the ‘New system’, for exam-
ple, the ‘mutual relationship, arranged in advance’ between body and soul
is not
simply a matter of their ‘keeping time together’, even though what
arises in the
soul does ‘from its own original constitution’, and even though
what happens in
the body is ‘according to the laws of the bodily mecha-
nism’.
trical ‘telling the same time as’ relation
between soul and body would cali from the pre-establi-
shed harmony for some
notion such as ‘expression’ or ‘representation’. What, otherwise,
could
‘telling the same time as’ mean’?
the other. On the one hand, what arises in
the soul is as it is through its
‘representational nature (its ability to express
external things which are in
relation with its organs)’; and, on the other hand,
the parts of the body have
‘exactly at the right moment the motions which
correspond to the passions
and perceptions of the soul’ and to the soul’s willing
it to act.
Now, that the soul represents the body and, in its turn, is expressed by it
goes
some way to supporting the idea that for Leibniz, just as for the scholas-
tics,
the functions of the soul, such as its sensitive and intellectual ones,
‘can-
not’, as Rozemond puts it, ‘be exercised in separation from the body’.
Leibniz speaks more often of the soul’s representing the body. Indeed
it is, he
says, the very ‘nature of the soul to represent the body’.
p. 519/WF, p. 81; GP 4, p. 523/WF, p. 84; GP 6, p. 617/L,
p. 649; GP 7, p. 410/L, p. 710.
true that when Leibniz’s
statements about the soul’s being independent of
the body provoked Simon Foucher
and Damaris Masham into suggesting
that ‘the bodily organs serve no purpose, if
the soul is self-sufficient’, his re-
ply is merely ‘that God wanted there to be
more substances rather than
fewer, and he thought it best that these
“modifications of the soul” should
correspond to something outside’.
‘Reponse de M.S.F. à M. de L.B.Z sur son
nouveau système...’, Journal des Savants (Paris), 12
Sep-
tember 1695, no. 36, pp. 422-426; ‘Eclaircissement de nouveau
système...’, Journal des Savants
(Paris), 2 Aprii 1696, no. 14, pp. 166-168, 9 Aprii 1696, no. 15, pp.
169-171.
tion carries the
implication of there being a conceptual unnaturalness in the
idea of a soul
without a body.
As the word ‘represent’ implies, the relationship between the soul and
body is
not a merely external one as is that of efficient causality. While it is
of the
nature of the soul to represent or perceive the corporeal world it is
necessary
that it does not represent it clearly and objectively, but, rather,
confusedly
and from a point of view. Otherwise ‘there would be no distinc-
tion among souls’ and ‘each would be a divinity’. Monadology
para. 60 (GP 6, p. 617/L, p. 649).
confused or subjective perception is met by the soul’s having a
body,
which, as it were, places it within the corporeal world. While the soul
rep-
resents or perceives the whole corporeal world ‘it is an expression of
the
phenomena of all other bodies in accordance with the relationship with
its
own’.
Coste, 4
July 1706 (GP 3, p. 383/WF, p. 135 n. 12), Monadology ,
para. 62 (GP 6, p. 617/L, p. 649).
from its own depths’ and it does not ‘adapt itself
[...] to the body’ with
which it is merely in harmony, nevertheless the soul is,
in a sense, necessar- ily embodied, and is ‘the form of
its body’. Monadology,
para. 62 (GP 6, p. 617/L, p.
So the pre-established harmony between soul and body does more than
provide a
mere analogue to the external relation of efficient causality. It re-
places it
with something different and richer. The relationship between the
perceiving soul
and the body is an internal one. The soul is incomplete
without a body in that an
understanding of its essential function of repre-
senting involves an essential
reference to it.
sis of
pre-established harmony goes beyond the Cartesian picture is, of course, that for
Leibniz
everything that goes on in the body has some representation in the soul
(Letter from Leibniz to
Arnauld, 9 October 1687 (GP 2, p. 112/M, p. 143).
The cases where, rather than the soul’s representing the body, it is ex-
pressed
by it, lend even more support to the idea that the functions of the
soul have an
internal reference to the body, so that it would be incomplete
without it. There
are two kinds of such case.
Of the most obvious kind are those which correspond to the Cartesian
cases where
the soul acts causally on the body. Willing is an example. In will-
ing, the soul
wants the body to act and, as a result, the body does act. Cases
like this are
referred to in the ‘New system’ when, as quoted earlier, Leibniz
says that the
parts of the body have ‘exactly at the right moment the motions
which correspond
to the passions and perceptions of the soul’ when it desires
it to act. They are
referred to again in his exchanges with Pierre Bayle where
Leibniz says that
‘[e]verything that ambition or whatever other passion pro-
duces in Caesar’s soul
is also represented in his body’.
Histoire Critique de la République des Lettres, art. 4,
voi. 11, 1716. Quotation from GP 4,
p. 559/WF, p. 112.
Asymmetical correspondences of this kind between soul and body sup-
port the idea
that for Leibniz the soul requires the body and is incomplete
without it. For it
is plainly Leibniz’s thought that the relationship between
the soul’s willing and
the body’s acting is not the merely external and con-
tingent one it is for
Descartes, who holds that the relation is causal. It is,
rather, internal and
necessary. As the word ‘expression’ implies, it is clearly
Leibniz’s thought that
will is ‘embodied’ in the bodily action. There would
be an abnormality, an
unnaturalness, in the soul’s willing without being
ex-
pressed. In willing it bears an internal relation to it and
requires to be ex-
pressed by it.
Cases of the second kind in which the soul gets expressed by the body
show even
more how the Leibnizian soul requires completion by the body.
For these are cases
which go beyond the boundaries of Descartes’s causal
account of the mutual
dependencies of the soul and the body.
It is a feature of Descartes’s picture of the relationship between soul
and body
that the soul has, as it were, some ‘life’ apart from the body. For
him, pure
abstract thought, unlike acts of will, has no causal effect on the
body (nor, of
course, is it caused by it). So, for Descartes, not every mental
event has a
corresponding bodily event which is to be explained or under-
stood by reference
to it.
fect in the
body, is taken over into Cartesian occasionalism. However, and perhaps invited to
do
so by the clocks analogy, Tournemine appears not to notice this and
explicitly says that the Carte-
sians hold that ‘to each change in the body
there corresponds a change in the soul, and in the
same way to each change in
the soul there corresponds a change in the body’ (‘Conjectures’, p.
866/WF, p.
247.
some bodily event
corresponding to it. For Leibniz, all aspects of the
active
life of the soul require embodiement in and expression by the body.
Thus, Leibniz tells Bayle that ‘the body is so constructed the soul never
makes
any decisions to which bodily movements don’t correspond’. ‘[E]ven
the most
abstract reasonings’, he says, ‘having their place there, through the
symbols
which represent them to the imagination’.
GP 4, p. 563/WF, p. 117; A 6, 3, pp. 77, 116/RB, pp. 77, 116; GP 6, p.
532/L, p. 556).
Again, it must be stressed that the relation between abstract reasoning
and the
corresponding ‘bodily movements’ is not a merely external one.
For, first, the
bodily correlates are nothing like brain traces or somesuch -
rather they are
written characters which express and embody the reasoning.
Secondly, the abstract
reasoning requires to be expressed.
says Leibniz, ‘have abstract thoughts which have no need
of something sen-
sible’. Indeed, as he goes on to say, this is an essential feature of the
soul
and the body being in harmony: ‘If sensible traces were not required,
the
pre-established harmony between body and soul [...] would not obtain’.
In her exposition of the Scholastics’ account of the mind’s being in-
complete
without the body Rozemond says that for them ‘the human intel-
lect [...] cannot
understand anything without forming images’.
clear that this is no less the case for
Leibniz, and that the pre-established
harmony offers more than she acknowledges
of what, objecting to Adams,
she calls ‘the right kind of
reasons [...] to explain how body and soul consti-
tute a genuine
unity’.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ABBREVIATIONS
Adams: Robert M. Adams,Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist (New York &
Oxford,
1994).
CSMK: John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, & Anthony
Kenny
(trans. & ed.), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Cambridge,
1985-91), 3
vols.
Garber: Daniel Garber, ‘Leibniz and the foundations of physics: the middle years’,
TheNatural Philosophy of Leibniz, ed. Kathleen Okruhlik & James R. Brown
(Dor-
drecht, 1985), pp. 27-130.
M: H. T. Mason (trans. & ed.), The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence (Manchester
&
New York, 1967).
RB: Peter Remnant & Jonathan Bennett (trans. & ed.), G. W. Leibniz: New
Essays onHuman Understanding (Cambridge, 1981).
Rozemond: Marleen Rozemond, ‘Leibniz on the Union of Body and Soul’, Archiv
fürGeschichte der Philosophie, 79 (1997), pp. 150-178.
Rutherford a: Donald Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature
(Cam-
bridge, 1995).
Rutherford b: Donald Rutherford, ‘Metaphysics: the later period’, The Cambridge
Com-panion to Leibniz, ed. Nicholas Jolley (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 124-175.
WF: R. S. Woolhouse & Richard Francks (trans. & ed.), Leibniz s 'New System’
andAssociated Contemporary Texts(Oxford, 1997).
Wilson: Catherine Wilson, Leibniz’s Metaphysics(Manchester, 1989).