Biblioteca digitale Progetto Agora
Introduction.
The argument of this paper spirals inward. In pt. 1, p. 299 ff., a
hypothesis
concerned with Diogenes Laertius’ local and temporal coordi-
nates is formulated.
Next, the larger setting of his book is described,
special attention being given to
the complex structure of the Laertian
form of bios, and to
the more systematical treatment according tohairesis and the
more historical treatment according to diadoche
and
biography. Pt. 2, p. 317 ff., is a study of the Cynic-Stoic diadoche as
handled by Diogenes Laertius and of the motives behind the
various
listings of Zeno’s teachers that are to be found in his book. For
Stoic
dialectic, other than Cynic affiliations had to be sought, whereas
no
antecedents are provided for Stoic physics. Pt. 3, p. 328 ff., is about
the
community of doctrines (koinonia) between the two haireseis of
Cynicism and Stoicism which is emphasized by
Diogenes Laertius. Thiskoinonia consists in continuity in
the field of dignified ethics, and the
general Cynic doxography at the end of bk.
VI, to which sections of
the special doxography concerned with Antisthenes may be
added, is
strongly connected with important sections of the doxography of
Stoic
ethics in bk. VII. Apart from this tradition, another view of the
relation
between Cynicism and Stoicism is also represented in Diogenes
Laertius;
this is concerned with the less reputable Cynic elements in Stoic
ethics,
and has been relegated, for the most part, to doxographical
appendixes
to the biographies of Zeno and Chrysippus. Parallels in
Philodemus
and other authors prove that during rather a long period these
two
opposed views of Stoicism were very much in the forefront of
discussion.
App. I, p. 373 ff., compares the calumny and defense of Epicurus
in
bk. X; here too, as with the two views concerning Stoicism, we have
the
contrasting outcomes of divergent historical traditions. The clusters
of references
(laudationes) which are such a conspicuous feature of
bks.
VI, VII, and X, play a crucial part in this inquiry. Pt. 4, p. 351 ff.,
is about the logical doxography in bk. VII. Here it is argued that
in
the important kata meros section (48-82) only chs. 49-53
have been
transcribed from the Epidrome of Diocles of
Magnesia. A minutiose
comparison between the contents of the general and the
detailed account
of Stoic “logic” (in the ancient sense of the word) reveals that
these
cannot derive from one source, and provides the means to assess
the
peculiarities of the kata meros treatment. This section
begins with
epistemology (VII 49-54, in part after Diocles; for VII 75 see App.
II,
p. 379 f.); this should be compared to the eidos
concerned with canons
and criteria (VII 41). Next, “Phonetics”, or Stoic grammar, is
treated
(VII 55-62); the appendix to Stoic grammar at 60-2 should be
compared
with the eidos concerned with definitions (41).
Finally, we have
“Semantics” or formal logic (VII 63-82). The references to authors
and
works to be found in VII 55-82 indicate that the consecutive treatment
of
grammar and formal logic goes back, not to Chrysippus, but to
some of Chrysippus’
pupils and successors. The position awarded to
epistemology seems to be a
post-chrysippean innovation, too. It would
appear that the contents of the kata meros section represent the
introductory courses of logic
as taught in the Stoic schools.
It is not the primary aim of the present investigation to evaluate
the reliability
of Diogenes Laertius as a source for Stoic philosophy,
although obiter dicta will not be avoided. As I worked my way into
the various
labyrinths that constitute his book, I gradually grew more
convinced that our first
objective should be an assessment of the various
traditions which have been
assembled there. Questions of historical
truth can only be solved (in as far as they
can be solved) when the
historical context provided by the tradition at issue has
been understood.
Speculation about the specific sources used by Diogenes Laertius
only
makes sense in some cases, as, e.g., in that of the use of Diocles in
the
logical doxography of bk. VII. As a rule, however, the investigation
of the
tradition or traditions involved is feasible in cases where
speculation about
sources is not helpfulHarder, Quelle oder Tradition?, in Les Sources de Plotin, Entret.
Hardt 5, Vandoeuvres-Genève 1960, pp. 325
ff. Much is to be learned from the
scholarly literature dealing with the
criticism of the New Testament.
Quellenforschung, just as psycho-analysis, is an
heirloom of 19th
century positivism; it was believed that something is understood
if
one knows its origins, or what it is composed of. One could even
argue the
remote influence, or actio very much in
distans, of Presocraticarche-speculation. But we
have since learned also to take the author
and his public into account.
Consequently, I have attempted to display
less interest in Diogenes Laertius as a
person than as an author, and
although one knows little about the sort of early
third-century provincial
public he wrote for, one may at least account for the fact
that the
traditions used by him reflect the feudings among and the
discussions
internal to the philosophical schools, as well as the various ways
of
teaching philosophy or addressing the general public, that evolved in
the
Hellenistic period and later. The way Diogenes Laertius handles
his materials may
reveal certain preferences, but it would be jejune
to hold him responsible for the
information at his disposal.
1. Bios, diadoche, and hairesis.
For obvious reasons, I cannot in the present paper provide an
analysis of Diogenes
Laertius (henceforward Diog. Laert.) book VII as
a whole. The biographical sections
will only be touched on; of the
large and important doxography, physics had to be
excluded, whereas
ethics can only be treated in part. I shall try to make up for
these
deficiencies by putting the treatment of the Stoic school and of
Stoic
philosophy in the larger context of Diog. Laert.’s work. SVF does
not provide sufficient information. Although it would appear
hardly
believable at first blush, it really is a fact that von Arnim not
only
printed much less material from bk. VII than he should have, but
also
hardly strayed beyond this book and thus, for instance, overlooked
an important
passage in the bios of Epicurus (X 26-7, fr. 157 HülserHülser, Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker,I-IV, 6
(Arbeitspapiere Sonderforschungsbereich 99 Linguistik Univ. Konstanz,
Konstanz
1982; revised publ. in book-form announced), have been added only
where a
fragment is not in SVF. Karlheinz Hülser spring 1983 kindly
sent me
his most useful preprints.
which is a sort of double of VII 180-1 (cfr. SVF II
1, p. 1, 13 ff.).
Comparison of these two passages shows that at VII 180, SVF II, p. 1,
19, concerned with a criticism of the way
Chrysippus wrote, one should
read καὶ (μὴ) διορθούμενος (cfr. X 27 ἀδιόρθωτα), thus
filling in alacuna which no one appears to have suspected.
Another most welcome
piece of information to be found at Χ 27 is that not only the
works
written by Chrysippus and Aristotle but also those composed by Zeno
were
full of quotations (καὶ τὰ μαρτύρια [...] Ἀριστοτέλει). Diog.
Laert.’s ultimate
source (Carneades?) is correct about Chrysippus and
Aristotle, so I see no reason to
doubt what it tells us about Zeno. As
far as I know, no other source (not even Diog.
Laert. bk. VII) provides
this information. What should be noted, of course, is that
Diog.
Laert.’s biography (VII 1-35) shows that Zeno used to quote the poets
in
conversation, or during his lectures; one may now believe that this
is also how he
wrote, and that he cited other than poetic literature too.
Of greater importance than the occasional neglected treasure, how-
ever, is the
framework (largely missing in SVF) in which the account
of
the Stoics in Diog. Laert. has been set, viz. that of the Cynic-Stoicdiadoche, and of the κοινωνία (VI 104) between the two
philosophies.
The Cynic-Stoic diadoche itself is part of the
Ionian diadoche,constituting one of its three branches (I
13-5), and should be studied
in this setting. Inevitably, therefore, we shall have
to inquire into the
plan and nature of Diog. Laert.’s work, which is not easy
because
the dedication appears to have been lost, or even never to have
been
written.
First, a word about the local and temporal coordinates. I would
like to argue that
Diog. Laert. was a citizen of Nicaea in Bithynia,
not a centre of learning, and that
he probably worked there. The old
dilemma as to whether IX 109 Ἀπολλωνίδης ὁ
Νικαιεὺς è παρ’ ἡμών
means A. [...] who came from our city» or «... from our
school»,
viz. the Skeptical school, may — pace SchwartzSchwartz, Diogenes (40), in RE V (1905) coll.
760-1, argues that
παρ’ ἡμῶν if translated “from our town” «griechisch heissen
müsste τής
μετέρας πολέως » and that «die andere Erklärung, dass ὁ παρ’ ἡμῶν vom
Standpunkt des Skeptikers gesagt sei, ... den
Sprachgebrauch für sich [hat]».
exists if we follow the manuscripts rather than the editors of
Plato’sSophist: at 242 d, the
Visitor from Elea refers to τὸ [...] παρ’ ἡμῶνOCT) and Diès (Bude) read παρ’ ἡμῖν; in their app. crit., they
point out that ἡμῶν not ἡμῖν is the
reading of the (best) mss, but refer to the
quotations of Eusebius and
Theodoretus for ήμΐν. But according to the app. crit.ad
Eus. p.e. XΙV 4, 8 (ΙΙ p. 265, 24 Mras), the mss of Eusebius
have ἡμῶν.
Mras reads ἡμῖν on the authority of Theodoretus and ... Plato. The mss
ofTheod. cur. aff. graec. ΙΙ 17,
indeed have ἡμῖν, but this reading should not
prevail against the mss tradition
of Plato and Eusebius (presumably, ἡμῖν in
Theodoretus arose from perseveration:
ἡμῖν occurs three times in soph. 242 c).
It is worthwhile
to quote Lewis Campbell’s note to soph. 242 d: «ἡμῶν
is
preferable both as the reading of the best MSS and as the less obvious
reading:
‘the school that came forth from us’». Cfr. Kühnergerth
i, p. 509, and Diels-Kranz ad
Vorsokr. 21 A 29, 31 A 29.
Ἐλεατικόν ἔθνος. Thinking of Diog.
Laert. as a local savant largely
depending on the not wholly up-to-date public
library of an unimportant
town in an outlying Roman province provides some help
towards
understanding why he does not seem to have bothered
about
Aristotelianism as reinvigorated by Alexander of Aphrodisias or about
the
more recent trends and fashions in Platonism
(as in
dialects or in the easternmost and westernmost languages of the Indo-
European
family), but also old books tend to be preserved, whereas innovations
are slow to
percolate. See G. Pasquali, Storia della
tradizione e critica del testo,Firenze 1971[3] (1953[2]) pp. 8, 160 note
1. Peter Steinmetz provided a parallel:
the Bibliotheca Bipontana at Zweibrücken
contains a marvellous collection of
books up to the end of the 18th century, and
only a few odds and ends of
later date. What I say in the text does not imply
that Diog. Laert. does not
contain any Middle Platonist elements at all. The
account of Plato’s physics
at in 67 ff. is at some points related to Middle
Platonist topoi, see J. Dillon,The Middle Platonists, London 1977, pp. 408 ff. But Hippolytus,
working at
Rome, was able to present a standard Middle Platonist version of Plato
at ref. I 19.
also useful to
remember that Middle Platonism is a modern invention,
along with Neoplatonism.
Moreover, I believe it can be argued that
Diog. Laert. has to be dated some time
before Plotinus. That he
was a sort of mild Skeptic, as Schwartz and others have argued, is
not
supported by his admiration for numerous philosophers and phi-
losophical schools,
and above all by his rather fervid appreciation of
Epicureanism.
Tentatively, I would suggest that the temporal coordinates of
Diog. Laert. can also
be determined more precisely. The partly fabri-
cated Skeptical diadoche in the final chapter of bk. IX is unique in
that it is the only
one in Diog. Laert. to continue far into the Roman
period and to provide names for
this continuity. The only parallel, that
concerned with Epicurus’ numerous
successors at x 9, does not provide
names, so one cannot know precisely how far it
reached. The last
person on the Skeptical list to be mentioned, in the final
sentence
of this chapter, is a pupil of Sextus Empiricus (ΙΧ 116): Σέξτου
δὲ
διήκουσε Σατορνῖνος ὁ Κυθηνᾶς. Now Κυθηνᾶς is a vox
nihili; in
their translations, Hicks and Gigante have toyed with the
emendation
Κυ(δα)θηνα(ιεύ)ς. In that case, however, one would have expected
Ἀθηναῖος, τῶν δήμων Κυδαθηναιεύς, cfr. II 18, 48; III 1, 3; IV 1,
16;
X 1. At. IV 21, Ἀθηναῖος) has been restored by editors. At II 104,
121, 122,
123, we have Ἀθηναῖος only, without the demotic. The only
(partial) parallel is V
75, Δημήτριος Φανοστράτου Φαληρεύς. But
Demetrius was a well-known person and
Phalerum a well-known place.
Consequently, I would suggest the emendation ὁ καθ’
ἡμᾶς (found not
infrequently in Strabo at the end of a list of notable persons from
a
town or region) which, as Jonathan Barnes reminds me, was already
proposed by
NietzscheBeiträge zur Quellenkunde und Kritik des Laertius Diogenes(1870), in
KGW n 1, F. Bornmann-M. Carpitella
(eds.), Philologische Schriften(1867-1873), Berlin-New
York 1982, p. 207. On Nietzsche and Diog. Laert. see
further J. Barnes, Nietzsche and Diogenes Laertius, «Nietzsche-Studien»,
XV
(1986) pp. 16 ff.; I am in the author’s debt for a preview of this very
informative
paper.
the
partly fictitious list at IX 115-6 (if we date Aenesidemus to c. 50
BCE) would date
Diog. Laert. to the first decades of the third cent.
CE, which seems fair
enough.
There is another preliminary point. Applying the principle of
charity,
I side with those scholars who argue M. Janáček , Zur Würdigung des Diogenes Laertios, «Helikon», VIII
(1968)
pp. 448 ff.; M. Gigante, Diogene
Laerzio. Vite dei filosofi, rev. ed., Bari-Roma
1983, I, p. IX ff.
some notion of what he was doing and should be taken at
face-value
whenever he appears to speak in his own right. Without denying
that
his work is a compilation, I would like to emphasize (although
exceptions
exist) that his style and vocabulary are fairly uniform, and
especially so when he
appears to speak in his own right. To imagine
him as a pair of scissors attached in
some way or other to the ancient
equivalent of a xerox machine would be unwise. The
book has structure.
The second part of the prologue — esp. the Successions as
listed
I 13-5, which do not match the fuller treatment in the body of
the
workinfra, p. 311 f.
of contents or, worse, the sort of inconsistency to be expected of
a
scissors-and-paste man, but merely as a kind of outline of the things
to be
expected. Diog. Laert.’s intentions may be gauged from his actual
performance. One
should study him the way an anthropologist studies
the customs and traditions of an
alien culture.
The plan of the work as executed may be pieced together from
various passages at
nodal points, as, e.g., the beginning of bk. VIII, where
we read: « having completed
our account of the Ionian philosophy
beginning with Thales as well as of the persons
worthy of note that
belong with it, let us now proceed to tackle the Italian
philosophy
which was started by Pythagoras » etc.
Pythagoras may be compared with the way biographies are inserted into
or
appended to a major bios, cfr. infra, pp. 308 f.
toward bks. II-VII
(Ionian philosophy) and foreward to bks. VIII-X
(Italian philosophy). Whatever the
original title of Diog. Laert.’s work,
its contents have been fairly well described
in the notice found in
several manuscripts (in some, a version thereof precedes a
detailed
list of the persons to be found in the 10 booksRose, Die Lücke imDiogenes Laertius und
der alte Übersetzer, «Hermes», I (1866) p. 370 f. Other
versions have
been printed by J. Mejer, Diogenes Laertius
and his HellenisticBackground, «Hermes», Einzelschr. XL, Wiesbaden 1978,
p. 50 f. note 111, andM. Gigante, op.
cit., p. xcvi.
γνωμῶν τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ
εὐδοκιμησάντων καὶ τῶν ἐν ἐκάστῃ αἱρέσει
ἀρεσκόντων κτλ. Hence it was concerned both
with the “biographies”
and “apophthegms” of the famous “persons” and with the
“doctrines”
of the “sects” (schools). Although I do not believe that a
rigorous
Dielsian distinction between the genres of biography and
doxography
should be assumed Aristotle, Plato, and Preplatonic Doxography and
Chronography,in G. Cambiano (ed.), Storiografia e dossografia nella filosofia antica, Torino
1986.
On this point, I agree with Gigante’s criticism of Mejer in his review of
the
latter’s book, «Gnomon», LV (1983) p. 9 ff.
would be exceptional —, some
differences of course have to be accepted.
Hippobotus wrote both a “biographical”
Philosophon anagraphe and
a “doxographical” Peri haireseon which presumably were fairly
different
works, although the doxographical book can hardly have dispensed
with
dates and affiliations, just as the biographical book will have
presented
information about ideas, and some quotes. In Diog. Laert.
himself, for instance, one
may note that the information that Zeno
invented the concept of the kathekon is found both in the biography(VII
25) and in the ethical part of the doxography (VII 108); von Arnim
printed both
texts at SVF I 230. The doxographical note in the
biography
of Antisthenes, VI 15 (not in SVF; fr. 105 Hülser, Ant. fr.135 B Decleva Caizzi, Socrat.
fr. v A 22 Giannantoni) that Antisthenes
gave the impulse to the apatheia of Diogenes, the enkrateia of Crates,
and
the karteria of Zeno (note the Succession) may be connected
with
the poetical quotations in the biography of Zeno (VII
26-7) illustrating
the fact that he was karterikotatosinfra, note 91.. The Peri
haireseon literature,
the Successions, and the
individual or collective Lives did not
constitute rigidly
distinct domains; the difference is one of emphasis:
historical in the Bioi and Diadochai, systematical in the Peri haireseon.This
is also clear from the remains of Diocles of Magnesia, whose
“doxographical”, or
“systematical”, Epidrome ton philosophon apparen-
tly should
be distinguishedNietzsche,
De Laertii Diogenis fontibus (1868), in F. Bornmann-M.Carpitella (eds.), op.
cit., p. 90, argues that both titles refer to the same work.
But ἐπιδρομή
refers to a (brief) systematical treatment; think of Cornutus’
Ἐιδρομή, and cfr.
J. Mejer, op. cit., p. 80 f. In Diog.
Laert., the title Epid.t. ph. is cited twice, viz.. VII,
which is about a common Stoic doctrine (cfr.infra, pp.
352 ff.), and X 11, ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ τῆς Ἐπιδομῆς, which is about the
Epicurean way of
life in general (however, for the difficult text see A. Laks,
Vied’Épicure, in Études sur
l’Êpicurisme antique (Cah. d. Philol. 1, Lille 1978), 62.
The title Bioi t. ph. is also cited twice, viz. II 54, à propos a
biographical detail
concerned with the sons of Xenophon, and II 82, in relation
with an apophthegm
of Aristippus. See further next note.Bioi ton philosophon; yet it
is occasionally unclear (just as in the
case of Hippobotus) to which particular work
a particular fragment
should be assigned
be
attributed to the Bioi t. ph. because they are concerned with
1) what we would
call biographical detail: VI 13 (Antisthenes), 20 (Diogenes), 99
(Menippus), IX 61
and 65 (Pyrrho), X 12 (Epicurus), or 2) with anecdotes: VI 87
(Diogenes), 91
(Crates), VII 181 (Chrysippus). Because of what is at n 82 (see
previous note),
the apophthegm of Diogenes at vi 36 and the string of apophthegms
(or rather
maxims) of Antisthenes at VI 12 could be attributed to the Bioi t. ph. as well.
This would entail that the passage
about the Homeric chreia ascribed by others
to Socrates
but by Diocles to Diogenes (vi 103) may also belong there; cfr.,
again, II 82
where the title Bioi t. ph. is quoted and the issue is
similar. The
other cases are more doubtful; VII 162 is about Aristo’s secession
from Zeno to
Polemo, 166 about Dionysius’ teachers, 179 about Chrysippus as the
pupil of
Cleanthes. These three items of course would fit the Bioi t. ph., but affiliations
may also have figured in the Epidr. An edition with commentary of the remains
of Diocles
remains a desideratum.De Platone et eius ogmate begins with a brief biography
and
continues with a Middle Platonist doxography dealing with physics
and
ethics
similar situation obtains in the
doxographical part of Diog. Laert. III). The
ps. Apuleian
tract De interpretatione is an autonomous work, cfr. infra, pp. 379 ff.
for Diog. Laert. III. One should also keep in mind that the
extensive
(Neo-)Pythagorean doxography at VIII 24 ff. (Vorsokr. 55Successions of Philosophers.
But the background against which Diog. Laert.’s work should be stu-
died is not
merely the very imperfectly known special literature dealing
with the lives and the
doctrines and the affiliations of individual
philosophers or schoolsop. cit., pt. II,
p. 60 ff.).
literature in general. It can be rewardingly compared
with the literature
περὶ τέχνης, i.e., dealing with or providing an introduction to
a
specific discipline. This more often than not contained a definition
of the
subject, an account of its origins, a short history of the discipline
listing
illustrious workers in the field, and/or of various views held on
its nature and
importance. All these topics are to be found in the
second part of Diog. Laert.’s
prologue (Ι 13-21), which may be set
off against and compared with the introductory
sections of the gram-
matical commentaries edited by Hilgard which are known under
the
misleading name of Scholia in Dionysium Thracem, the
introductions
to various rhetorical treatises published in Rabe’s Prolegomenon sylloge,and especially with the Introductions to Philosophy produced by the
very late Neoplatonists of
Alexandria. More ambitious treatises of
this sort — apart from those of Hippobotus
and Diocles in the field
of philosophy — are for instance the (imperfecdy known)
“biographical”De poetis and “doxographical” De poematis of VarroH. Dahlmann, Varros Schrift 'de poematis’
und die hellenistisch-römische Poetik, Abh. der Akad. d. Wiss. Mainz,
geist.- u. sozialwiss. Kl. 1953. 2,
Wiesbaden 1953, pp. 12 ff.; V. Di Benedetto, Dionisio Trace e
la technē a luiattribuita, «Ann. Pisa», XXVII (1958) p. 171 ff.; M. Fuhrmann, Das
systematischeLehrbuch, Göttingen 1960, p. 144 ff.; O.
Gigon, Das Prooemium des DiogenesLaertios, in G. Luck (ed.), Horizonte der Humanitas,
Festschr. W. Wili, Bern-
Stuttgart 1960, p. 60; D. G.
Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena to
PlatonicPhilosophy, Amsterdam 1962, p. XXV ff.; H.
Dahlmann, Studien zu Varros 'depoetis’, Abh. der
Akad. d. Wiss. Mainz, geist.- u. sozialwiss. Kl. 1962. 10, Wiesbaden
1963, p. 28
ff.; Id., Zur ars grammatica des Marius
Victorinus, ibid., 1970. 2,
Wiesbaden 1970, p. 4
ff.; J. Kollesch, Untersuchungen zu den
pseudogalenischendefinitiones medicae, Berlin 1970, p. 13 ff.; A. C. J. Habets, Geschiedenis vande indeling van de filosofie in
de oudheid, diss. Utrecht 1983, p. 172 ff.
these two different approaches systematically for the whole history
of
philosophy up to a certain date — or rather a variety of dates for
the various
persuasions — may or may not have been Diog. Laert.’s
own idea (we have noticed the
partial precedent of Apuleius’ DePlatone), but one can
hardly deny that the bricks and the mortar for
the imposing edifice were amply
availableMejer, op. cit., pp. 20, 23, has shown
was
further adorned with clusters of (brief) excerpts of various provenance,
which
tend to be inserted at the end of a particular section or
subsection.
one’s while to compare the
so-called introduction to Celsus’ De medicina,
which consists
of two parts: first (§§ 1-12), a brief history of medicine
is provided after the
subject has been defined; the parts of medicine
are mentioned (§ 9). Then the
important names and relative dates
are given, and the concept of Succession plays a
certain part (11 excuius successoribus). Secondly (§§
13-74), the important schools are
described and set off against one another (synkrisis) viz. the
dogmatists and the empiricists, with the
methodists thrown in as an
extra (54 ff.). This second part may be fruitfully
compared with
Galen’s Peri haireseon tois eisagomenois, which
proceeds in the same
way. Galen’s little book is one of the few surviving examples
of
the Peri haireseon literature which, as will appear from
the sequel
of this paper, is of great importance for the interpretation of
Diog.
Laert. J. Mejer,op. cit., p. 75 ff., and
on the medical literature H. vonStaden, Hairesis and Heresy: The Case of the haireseis iatrikai, in B. F. Meyer -E. P. Sanders (eds.), Jewish and Christian Self-Definition, 3: Self-Definition inthe
Graeco-Roman World, London 1982, pp. 76 ff.
(supra, p. 304) can to a
surprising extent be paralleled from the title
of a lost work by Soranus who lived
earlier: the lost Βίοι ἰατρῶν
καὶ αἱρέσεις καὶ συντάγματα βιβλία ι', Sud. ι 4, ρ. 407, 23 f. A. It
is interesting to compare the
Vita Hippocratis secundum Soranum(CMG ιν, p. 173 ff.) to a Laertian biography. A snippet of medical
doctrine
is quoted from another (?) work at Orib., CMG VI 3, p.
132
Raeder: è Σωρανός ἐν ταῖς τὼν Ἰατρῶν διαδοχαῖς.
Furthermore, the notion of what, according to Diog. Laert.,
constitutes
a bios is rather large. At first blush, one would expectbios to refer to the “life”, then also to the “life and works”, of
an
individual person. This is not correct for Diog. Laert. Brief
lives,
including bibliographies, of the Epicureans Metrodorus (X 22-4)
and
Hermarchus (X 24-5) have been inserted into, i.e., are part of, thebios of Epicurus, whose own bibliography follows somewhat
later
(X 27-8). Other followers of Epicurus listed at X 23-6, both pupils
and
successors, are succinctly characterized. What we are able to see
here with our own
eyes is in what way a list of persons may blossom
into a series of biographies. The
formula introducing the inserted
biographies is noteworthy: Μαθητὰς δὲ ἔσχε πολλοὺς
μέν, σφόδρα
δὲ ἐλλογίμους Μητρόδωρον κτλ. (Χ 23). A similar formula is found
at
VI 93, i.e., at what in our editions is the end of the Life of Crates:
μαθηταὶ δ’
αὐτοῦ. The editions then give a new chapter-heading
(Metrocles), and VI 94 begins with: Μητροκλῆς ὁ Μαρονείτης κτλ.
But the
chapter-heading is misleading; read μαθηταὶ δ’ αὐτοῦ
Μητροκλῆς κτλ. The biography of
Metrocles (VI 94-5) and that of
his sister Hipparchia who married Crates (VI 96-8)
are part of Diog.
Laert.’s bios of Crates; indeed, much of
Hipparchia’s life was shared
with Crates. Accordingly, VI 98 φέρεται ... Βοιωτίᾳ
pertains to Crates;
the account broken off at VI 93 is resumed and rounded off at 98
S. Stamatis,
«Platon», XXIX (1977) p. 85 — non vidi; reference
at
M. Gigante, op. cit., II, p. 641
— must be right that γηραιός pertains to Crates.
In bk. VI, the bioi of Menippus (VI 99-101) and of Menedemus (VI 102)
have
been appended; these persons, although Cynics, do not belong
with Diog. Laert.’s
succession Antisthenes-Diogenes-Crates. At VI 103,
a new section begins (103-5),
viz. the common Cynic placita which Diog.
Laert. choses to
treat after the bioi of the individual Cynics (103
καὶ οὗτοι
μὲν οἱ βίοι τῶν Κυνικῶν ἑκάστου).
That bk. X only contained the bios of Epicurus is confirmed
the
list of ἐκάστου βιβλίου τὰ πρόσωπα first published by Rose
however, for vi the list refers
to μητροκλῆς; ἵππαρχος [i.e., -ία].
This is a point I shall revert to shortly.
Other cases of brief lives inserted into an important bios are the
following. In ΙΙ, the lives of Euboulides (11 108-9) and
Diodorus Cronus
(ΙΙ 111-2) are part of the bios of Euclid of
Megara; Rose’s table does
not list them. However, the table for bk. ΙΙ lists
ἀρίστιππος: θεόδωρος,
whereas our editions do not sport a separate chapter devoted
to
Theodorus the Atheist but include him as the final part of the biosof Aristippus (ΙΙ 97-104).
A comparable situation obtains in bk. VII. The
biobibliography
of Zeno’s faithful pupil Persaeus has been inserted into the
biographical
part of the bios of Zeno at VII
36von
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Antigonos von Karystos,
Phil.
Unt. 4, Berlin 1884, p. 108, who however does not enter into the question
of
the practice itself.
remarkably
similar to that introducing Metrodorus’ biobibliography at
X 23, viz. VII 36 Μαθηταὶ δὲ Ζήνωνος πολλοὶ μέν, ἔνδοξοι δὲ
Περσαῖος κτλ.
At VII 37-8, the other pupils are listed (cfr. X 23-6).
Diog.
Laert. explicitly says that he will deal with Sphaerus in «the
chapter on Cleanthes»
(VII 37: καὶ λέξομεν περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ
Περὶ Κλεάνθους).
This promise is kept at VII 177-8, where the
biobibliography
of Sphaerus is preceded by an explicit backward reference
(to VII 37): τούτου [scil. Κλεάνθους], καθάπερ
προειρήκαμεν,
ἤκουσε μετὰ Ζήνωνα καὶ Σφαῖρος κτλ. Our editions, which give
a
separate chapter to Persaeus, appear to be wrong; the Περὶ Κλεάνθους
runs from
VII 168 to 178. At VII 179 a new section begins, which we
may
call Περὶ Χρύσιππου. The separate chapters in our editions concer-
ned with Aristo
(VII 160-4), Herillus (165-6), and Dionysius (166-7),
also convey a false
impression: what we may call the Περὶ Ζήνωνος
runs from VII 1
to VII 167. The biobibliographies of Zeno’s three
dissident pupils belong with the
Laertian bios of Zeno at the end
of which they have been
appendend, the way the biography of
Theodorus has been appendend to and included
into the bios of
Aristippus (which, like Zeno’s at VII 38-160, includes a doxography,
viz. of the Peri haireseon type, at II 86-97). A new bios begins with
Zeno’s successor Cleanthes. One may adduce
the transitional sentences
which introduce and round off the biobibliographies of the three
dissi-
dents: VII 160 ἃ δέ τινες ἐξ αὐτῶν διενέχθησαν ἔστι
τάδε ~ VII 167
καὶ οὗτοι μὲν οἱ διενεχθέντες. διεδέξατο δὲ τὸν Ζήνωνα Κλεάνθης,
περὶ οὗ λεκτέον.
A bios, or section “On X”, in Diog. Laert. may therefore
include
the biographies and even the bibliographies of minor persons
closely
connected with the main person at issue. As we have noticed, it may
also
include a doxography; for this mixing of genres precedents have
been cited supra, p. 306 f. Diog. Laert. explicitly states (VII 38) that
he
will treat the common Stoic doctrines (πάντων τῶν Στωϊκῶν δογμάτων,
cfr. τὰ
[...] δόγματα κοινῶς) «in the bios of Zeno» (ἐv τῷΖήνωνος
[...] βίῳ ) , «because Zeno was the founder of thehairesis». On the other hand, as will be recalled, the common doctrines
of the
Cynics were treated after their individual “Lives” (bioi; VI
103).
In bk. VII, the Stoic doctrines are included after the
biobibliographies
of Zeno and Persaeus and before those of the three dissident
pupils,
and so are placed before the bioi of Cleanthes and
Chrysippus. Diog.
Laret.’s motive, viz. that Zeno founded the Stoic hairesis, appears to
be weak — conversely, why not proceed in
a similar way in bk. VI
and include the common Cynic placita
in the bios of Antisthenes
rather than add them at the end of
the book? This is a point to
which I shall return in parts 2 and 3 of this paper.
What may already
be pointed out, however, is that Diog. Laert.’s locations of the
Cynic
and the Stoic common placita put these as close to one
another as
is virtually possible. This underscores the continuity which
according
to him obtains between these schools — and so it is relevant to
put
the Stoic placita in the bios of
the founder. There certainly is a
measure of method in Diog. Laert.’s arrangement in
this case.
We are now in a position to comment on the part of Rose’s table
which lists the
πρόσωπα dealt with in bk. VII (conveniently printed as
Posidonius T 66 E.-K. = T 24
Th.; however, read (ἑ)κάτων with
Rose and Gomoll). It has often been argued that
this list cannot serve
as a table of contents for bk. VII and
is therefore useless in as far as
the lost part of this book is concerned (the
manuscripts stop halfway
the bibliography of Chrysippus), because it does not refer
to Persaeus
Aristo Herillus Dionysius SphaerusJ. Glucker, Antiochus and the
Late Academy, Hypomnemata
LVI, Göttingen 1978, p. 348. That other Stoics
mentioned by Diog. Laert. in
the surviving portion of bk. VII, or elsewhere, do
not figure in the table is
not an argument against its reliability either, for of
the many Epicureans other
than Epicurus mentioned in bk. Χ and elsewhere, none is
to be found in the
table. It definitely is not an index
nominum.
however, the fact that
it begins with ζήνων : κλεάνθης : χρύσιππος
is an argument in favour of its
reliability. Indeed, Nietzsche already
pointed out that according to Diog. Laert.
himself Persaeus Aristo
Herillus Dionysius belong with the bios of Zeno, as Sphaerus with
that of Cleanthes, and he tells us that
according to Wachsmuth’s
investigation of the manuscripts there are no separate
chapter-headings
for these personsBornmann-Carpitella (eds.), op. cit., pp.
82-3. But Nietzsche spoils
his argument by assuming that the table is a list of
chapters (which is what hiscapita obviously
means).
Rose’s table of
πρόσωπα is correct in as far as the other books are
concerned. The exceptions, as we
have noticed, are: 1) the reference
to Theodorus, whose Life follows in the text
without a break upon
the Cyrenaic doxography in II 97 and who accordingly gets no
separate
chapter in our editions. It is to be noted, however, that Diog.
Laert.’s
treatment of Theodorus is fairly long and substantial. Furthermore:
2)
the references in Rose’s table to Metrocles and Hipparchia do not
square with our
analysis of Diog. Laert.’s bios of Crates. It would
appear
that where the table refers to more persons than one would
expect on the basis of an
analysis of the structure of the relevant
Laertian bioi, the
individuals involved are noteworthy for specific
reasons (think of Theodorus’
atheism and Hipparchia’s funny mar-
riage), and that where persons are not listed —
as in the case of
the five Stoics of the second generation mentioned above — the
text
of Diog. Laert. itself affords sufficient justification. Now Rose’s
table
of the persons treated in bk. VII contains quite a number of names
after
Chrysippus’, viz. ζήνων τάρσευς : διογένης : ἀπολλόδωρος :
βοηθός : μνησαρχίδης
[i.e., presumably, Μνησάρχος] : μνασαγόρας :
νέστωρ : βασιλείδης : δάρδανος :
ἀντίπατρος : ἡρακλείδης :
σωσιγένης : πανάιτιος : (ἑ)κάτων : ποσειδώνυος : ἀθηνόδωρος :
καὶ
ἀθηνόδωρος ἄλλος : ἀντίπατρος : ἄρειος : κορνοῦτος. A rather mixed
lot:
scholarchs (e.g., Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes), other famous Stoics,
and even unknown
persons (e.g., Mnasagoras). That the Succession at
I 15 ends with Chrysippus is not
a good argument against the reliability
of the list, for although the Peripatetic
Succession (ibid.) ends with
Theophrastus, bk. V also
contains the Lives of the scholarchs Strato
and Lyco, followed by two others, viz.
Demetrius of Phalerum and
Heraclides Ponticus; and this is exactly what we find in
Rose’s table
for bk. V. It cannot be a mere list, like the fictitious list of
Skepticaldiadochai and other Skeptics at IX 115-6; at any
rate, nothing in
Rose’s table — which ends with τίμων — for bk. IX
corresponds
with the list at IX 115-6. I am aware of placing myself outside
thecommunis opinio, but do believe that the evidence
warrants the inference
that the other Stoics on Rose’s table were indeed treated in
the lost
part of bk. VII. One may compare the appended lives of Demetrius
and
Heraclides in bk. V and those of Menippus and Menedemus in
bk. VI as well as the
interpolated very brief biobibliographies of Crito
Simon Glaucon Simmias Cebes in II
121-5. Not all the Stoic persons
need have been treated in detail, but what was in
Diog. Laert. must
have been sufficiently explicit.
The last person listed in the table is Cornutus, the friend of the
Roman poet
Persius; so the last Stoic dealt with by Diog. Laert. lived
in the 1st cent. CEMoraux,
Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen vonAndronikos bis
Alexander von Aphrodisias. ii: Der
Aristotelismus im I. und II.Jb. n. Chr., Peripatoi 6, Berlin-New York
1984, p. 592 ff.haireseis for
which Diog. Laert. underscored continuity until well into the
1st-2nd
centuries CE: the Stoic; the Skeptic (IX 115-6); and the Epicurean
(X
9). The renascences of Platonism and Aristotelianism and the equally
interesting
revivals of Pythagoreanism and Cynicism have not been
taken into account by him.
This state of affairs seems to reflect the
Hellenistocentric bias of the traditions
to be found in the literature
on which he based his work.
We may now pass on to the contents of Diog. Laert.’s prologue.
Here,
the sections dealing with the diadochai
(I 13-5), the parts of
philosophy (I 18), and the haireseis (I 18, 19-20), are for my present
purpose the important ones,
since these provide the materials from
which the structural framework has been
constructed. Diog. Laert.’s
history is set out according to the (“historical”) diadochai and the
(“systematical”) haireseis, the former however taking preference over
the latter as a
principle of organisationinfra, note 47 and text thereto.
figure, moreover, the doctrines are given according to the division
of
philosophy into parts.
Diog. Laert. uses only one bipartite system of SuccessionsW. von Kienle, Die Berichte über die Sukzessionender Philosophen in der
hellenistischen und spätantiken Literatur, Berlin 1961,
pp. 9 ff., 32
ff., 79 ff., 92 ff.
(I 13-5), viz. that divided into an Ionian system
(with three subsequent
branches) and into an Italian one — cfr. also VIII 1, cited
supra, p. 303.
He does not refer to the rival tripartite
division into Ionian, Pythago-
rean, and Eleatic streams known from, e.g., Clement
of Alexandria,strom. I 62, 1 ff. On the other hand, he cites
two partly alternative lists
of haireseis·. an anonymous list
(there is no ground for the ascription
to Panaetius) of 10 sects at I 18 (cfr. Ant. fr. 134 a D.C., Socr. fr. I
6 G.), and Hippobotus’ list of 9 sects at I 19 (cfr. Hipp. fr. 1 Gigante;Socr. fr. I 6 G.).
These lists are not in SVF or Hülser. Hippobotus’ list
has
two sects not figuring on the former, viz. the Annicereans and the
Theodoreans; on
the other hand, as Diog. Laert. points out (I 19),
Hippobotus did not speak of the
Cynic, Dialectic, and Elian, sects
figuring on the anonymous list
botus’ reasons for excluding what he excluded or for
not listing what he did not
list. Many scholars, from Nietzsche (in Bornmann-Carpitella (eds.), op.
cit.,p. 179), have believed we do; see now M. Gigante,
Frammenti di Ippoboto.Contributo alla storia della
storiografia filosofica, in Festschr. Piero Treves, Pa-
dova 1983, p. 163
f. M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa, II, Göttingen
19643, p. 10, argues
that the list of 10 sects should be attributed to Panaetius
because Panaetius would
have modified the system of diadochai by converting Socrates’ ethics into a turning-
point. This
argument is based on the in my view false assumption that the 10
sects are
“ethical” (see infra). Pohlenz is
followed by, e.g., G. Giannantoni, Socra-ticorum reliquiae, III, Roma-Napoli 1985,
p. 28.
Laert. treats all the sects figuring on both lists or on one only.
He
adds the Pyrrhonist sect, which he says is not included by the majority
(οἱ
πλείους, I 20); it is given full treatment in bk. IX. This brings
the total number
of sects stipulated in Diog. Laert.’s prologue to 13 —
or rather 14, for we should
include, as he does himself in the appendix
to the prologue (I 21; after the summary
of its contents at I 20, last
sentence) the Eclectic sect not treated in the body of
the work, theplacita of which are briefly summarized here in
the order logic (i.e.,
theory of knowledge) physics ethics. It is perhaps clear why
Diog. Laert.
cited two different lists of sects and only one system of
Successions;
the former permitted him to cast his net more widely, while a
different
arrangement of philosophers would hardly have increased the
material
at his disposal.
For my present purpose the first list, containing both Cynics and
Stoics
(Hippobotus, as we have seen, did not include the Cynics) is
the more important one.
The full list includes the following sects:
Academic; Cyrenaic, Elian, Megarian,
Cynic, Eretrian, Dialectic;
Peripatetic; Stoic; and Epicurean. It is to be noted
that according to
this classification Cynicism is placed among the minor Socratic
schools
and that Stoicism follows much later. By treating the Cynics and
Stoics
in bks. VI-VII Diog. Laert. has removed the Cynics from
among
the Socratics and given preference to the order of Succession as stated
at
I 15. The remaining Socratics are treated in bks. II-III, again accord-
ing to the
Succession (cfr. I 14: Σωκράτης [...] οὗ oἵ τε ἄλλοι
Σωκρατικοί, — bk. II — καὶ
Πλάτων ὁ τὴν ἀρχαίαν Ἀκαδημείαν
συστησάμενος — bk. III). Xenophon (II 48-59) is
thrown in as an
extravon Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, op. cit., p. 330
ff.
from Socrates in the Suda s.v. Σωκράτης, IV p. 404
Adler (cfr. Socr.fr. I 7 G.; not in SVF or Hülser)Schwartz, op. cit., col. 757.
relevant
fragments of Successions, has all the sects to be found in one
or both of Diog. Laert.’s lists at I 18 and 19, except the
Epicureans
(found on both lists in Diog. Laert.), and includes the
Pyrrhonists
just as Diog. Laert. himself had doneSuda are
studied by K. Döring,Die Megariker. Kommentierte Sammlung der
Testimonia, Studien zur antiken Phi-
losophie 2, Amsterdam 1972, pp.
91-9, who defends the view that of the 10 sects
the first 5 are linked up with
immediate pupils of Socrates and the other 5 are
the successors of the first. But
the Academy was not succeeded by the Peripatus
but continued alongside it; note
that I 19 refers to the Middle Academy of Arcesi-
laus and the New Academy of
Lacydes, too.
list of 10, the Cynics are
included among the minor Socratics. However,
in the Suda, loc.
cit., the Stoics are not, through a Succession, linked
with the Cynics, but
with another minor Socratic school, viz. the
«Eristic Dialectical» sect deriving
from, ultimately, Euclid of Megara
and the mysterious Bryson (p. 404, 15-20 A.)op. cit., p. 157 ff., and G.
Giannantoni, Socraticorum cit., p. 97 ff.
Succession preferred by Diog. Laert. represents a definite choice;
yet,
as we shall seeInfra, p. 325 ff.
in bk. VII.
According to the current jargon, the 10 sects of I 18 (and, by
implication, also
Hippobotus’ 9) are known as the “ethical sects”. Note
that in the Suda, loc. cit., the sects are not said to be “ethical”; in
Diog. Laert. I
19, about the 9 sects, the term does not occur either.
But the list of 10 at I 18 is
introduced with the words τοῦ δὲ ἠθικοῦ
γεγόνασιν αἱρέσεις δέκα. As Giuseppe
Cambiano (anticipated by H.
Schmidt) has pointed out, it is definitely odd to find a
hairesis called
«Dialectical» among the “ethical”
sects H. Schmidt, Studia Laërtiana, diss. Bonn 1906, pp. 25-6;
G. Cambiano,Il problema dell’esistenza di una scuola
megarica, in G. Giannantoni (ed.), Scuole socratiche minori e filosofia ellenistica, Pubbl. centro stud.
storiogr. filos. 4, Bo-
logna 1977, p. 39. G. Giannantoni,
Socraticorum cit., III, p. 39 f., argues that
there is no problem because the ethical Megarical school only became dialectical
much later, under the direction of Clinomachus or Dionysius; but this would
entail
an original list of 9 ethical sects and still leave us with the awkward
later addition
of a dialectical one. Furthermore, some among these presumed
ethical sects dabbled
in physics. If one takes what is at I 20, in fine, as the basic text (see infra),
no
contradiction ensues. That a Dialectical school existed and should be
distinguished
from the Megarical school is capably argued by D. Sedley, Diodorus Cronus andHellenistic
Philosophy, «Proc. Cambr. Philol. Soc.», N. S. XXIII
(1979) p. 74 ff.
of the prologue at i 20 provides the solution: αἵδε μὲν ἀρχαὶ [I
1-12]
καὶ διάδοχαὶ, [13-5] καὶ τοσαῦτα μέρη [18] καὶ τόσαι φιλοσο-
φίας αἱρέσεις
(18,19-20). The sects as variously listed at I 18 f. are
schools of philosophy not
ethicsH. Schmidt,
op. cit., p. 25 f., who however does not adduce I
20,in fine. For the· expression cfr. Sext. Emp. P. I 185: πασαῖς ταῖς κατὰ
φιλοσο-
φίαν αἱρέσεις, and Μ. VII 27: τάς γενικωτάτας τῆς
φιλοσοφίας αἱρέσεις. These
are to be distinguished from the κατὰ ἰατρικὴν
αἱρέσεων (P. I 227, 241).
philosophical hairesis. The “choice” (if a schema
etymologicum be
allowedGlucker, op. cit., p. 116 ff. Note that
he prefers the late date for
Hippobotus. Cfr. also von Staden (supra note 18“).
doctrines but also, I would suggest, to which part or parts of
philo-
sophy have been included or rejected by each particular school.
Often
enough, Diog. Laert. insists that a prominent philosopher or even a
whole
school rejected one part or more, e.g., dialectic, or physics.
At ι 18, a lacuna should be assumed: τοῦ δὲ ἡθικοῦ xxx γεγόνασιν
αἱρέσεις
δέκα, to be filled with, e.g., (προστεθειμένου), or (προστεθει-
μένου τε καὶ
διαλεκτικοῦ). Immediately before the 10 sects are enu-
merated, the parts of
philosophy are listed in I 18, a remark about the
order of their invention being
appendedHabets, op. cit., p. 125 ff.
flourished from Socrates: ἀπὸ δὲ Σωκράτους, ὡς προείρηται,
τὸ
ἠθικόν. The cross-reference (Diog. Laert.’s own) is to the Succession
in I 14:
Σωκράτης ὁ τὴν ἠθικήν εἰσαγαγών. The focus on the
subject of ethics may have
produced the unnoticed lacuna. Alternatively,
it would have
to be assumed that Diog. Laert.’s phraseology at I 18
is confused
from — Socrates who introduced ethics became “ethical”. In a
similar way, the
suitcase in which the remains of the butchered wife were hidden
became “tragical”.
so I believe — that the formula “ethical sects” had better be dropped.
The point about the sects as related to the parts of philosophy
in
their order of invention (itself to be connected with the Successions
system)
is that before Socrates, you only have two (or, as in other
systems, three) diadochai, whereas after Socrates you not only havediadochai but sects as well (cfr. Sext. Emp. adv. math. VII 141 ἀπτώ-
μεθα δὲ ἑξῆς καὶ τῶν μετὰ τοὺς φυσικοὺς αἱρέσεων).
The sects are
relevant as soon as philosophy has been completed in all its
parts,
and through their founders the first 5 can be directly derived
from
Socrates.
2. The Cynic-Stoic Succession; Zeno’s Teachers.
In the preceding section, it has been pointed out that Diog.
Laert. firmly links the
Stoics with the Cynics. In 1905, E. SchwartzOp. cit., col. 755.
already insisted that in the diadoche at I 15 (for which he
suggested
a date in the second cent. BCEIbid. The antecedents are of course earlier; see O. Gigon, op. cit., p. 57 f.;
Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles.
Supp. II: Sotion, Basel-Stuttgart 1978,
p. 9 ff.; and my paper
cited supra note 11.
Kyniker aufgefasst [wird]; das ist ganz
nicht so selbstverständlich
wie es der vulgären Auffassung erscheint». Schwartz went
on to
discuss, briefly, some parallels for I 15 in Diog. Laert. and
discussed
various divergent views found both in Diog. Laert. and elsewhere.
An
important parallel for Diog. Laert.’s diadoche not mentioned
by
Schwartz is to be found in Cicero’s survey of the sects deriving
from
Socrates, de or. III 61-2 (not in SVF or Hülser; Socr. fr. I 4 G.; cfr.Ant. fr. 134 b D.-C.): [...] ab Antisthena [...] Cynici primum,
deindeStoici (apparently, Cicero knows both lists of sects found in
Diog.
Laert. and he even mentions the Pyrrhonists, which however he
considers to
be defunct). Von Arnim’s collection of passages in SVFis
very uninformative about this affiliation; fortunately, this lack is
largely made
good by Gabriele Giannantoni’s collection of passages
concerned with the Socratics, and to some extent by Karl-Heinz
Hülser’s
collection of Stoic fragments.
The diadoche at I 15 (not in SVF; fr. 121
Hülser; cfr. Socr.fr. I 6 G.) is carefully set out as
follows: Socrates-Antisthenes-Diogenes
the Dog-Crates of Thebes-Zeno of
Citium-Cleanthes-Chrysippus. Note
that Diogenes Crates Zeno, who could be mixed up
with other philo-
sophers, are identified in such a way that a confusion with
Diogenes
of Seleucia (or of Apollonia), Crates of Athens, and Zeno of Elea
(or
of Sidon, or of Tarsus) is precluded. In the rival account ap.Clem. Alex. strom. I 63, 2-64, 1 (not in SVF or Hülser; Polem. fr.
4 Gig.) Crates of Thebes has been confused — cfr. Mras ad loc. —
with Crates of Athens (originally on purpose?) and
hence « Zeno
of Citium [note the identification] who began the Stoic hairesis »
and who was succeeded by Cleanthes and Chrysippus
etc. is said to
be the pupil of (the Academic) Crates who is made the pupil
(rather
than the pupil and friend) of Polemo.
What should be strongly emphasized is that Diog. Laert. really
goes out of his way
in order to underpin the Succession Crates of
Thebes-Zeno of Citium. At VII 2, where he also lists other teachers
of Zeno, he says:
διήκουσε δὲ, καθὰ προείρηται, Κράτητος
(SVF I 1, p. 3, 12;
Socr. fr. V A 38 G.). The cross-reference, which
beyond
doubt is Diog. Laert.’s own, is to a nodal point, viz. to the
final sentence of the
final chapter of the book dealing with the Cynics,
VI 105: καὶ οὗτοι μὲν οἱ Κυνικοί. μετιτέον δ’ ἐπί τοὺς Στωϊκούς,
ὧν ἦρξε Ζήνων,
μαθητὴς γενόμενος Κράτητος (not in SVF; fr. 104
Hülser; Socr. fr. V H 37 G.). What is more, the whole
Cynic-Stoic
Succession beginning with Antisthenes is strongly underlined by
Diog.
Laert. in the last sentence of the last chapter of Antisthenes’ bios,i.e., at another nodal point, VI 19: ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοὺς ἀπ’
Ἀριστίππου
διεληλύθαμεν καὶ Φαίδωνος, νῦν ἐλκύσωμεν τοὺς ἀπ’
Ἀντισθένους
Κυνικούς τε καὶ Στωϊκούς (not in SVF or Hülser;
Socr. fr. V A 38 G.).
This sentence announces the whole of
bks. VI 20-the end, and VII (inclu-
ding its lost part), in a
way similar to the announcement of bks. VIII-X
at VIII 1 (quoted supra, p. 303). Both times, moreover, Diog. Laert.
looks both ahead and
backward. The backward reference at VI 19, which
appears to have been hardly, if at
all, considered in the learned litera-
ture
deed. The successors of
Aristippus and those of Phaedo had been treated
in bk. II,
viz. Aristippus’ at II 85-104, Phaedo’s at II 105 and
at
125-44 (the Eretrians, explicitly linked up with the Elians by Diog.
Laert.).
We have noticed above (p. 314) that Diog. Laert., strictly
heeding the diadoche of I 15, removed the Cynics from among the
Socratics
where they could have been treated because Antisthenes,
after all, was a pupil of
Socrates (cfr. II 47), and where, as it would
appear, they had
been treated in part of the Peri haireseon literature,
viz.
that concerned with the 10 sects or that echoed in the Suda
s.v.Σωκράτης. In a way, the backward reference at VI 19 to the
Ari-
stippeans and Phaedonians as connected with the Antisthenians is a
rudiment
of this alternative arrangement. There is an equally peculiar
but gratifyingly
commensurateG. Giannantoni, Socraticorum cit., ΙΙΙ,
p. 30.
It will be clear that I do not share his view of the «disordine» to be
found in
Diog. Laert. (cfr. also supra, p. 303 f., p. 313
f.).
which has vexed the learned. At
the end of the bios of Socrates,
II 47 (cfr. Megariker fr. 36 Döring, Socr.
fr. I 5 G.), Diog. Laert.
enumerates the pupils and followers of Socrates and
provides infor-
mation about the way what is to follow will be organized
accordingly.
I omit the corrupt or confused part of this chapter, and quote:
λεκτέον
δὲ πρῶτον περὶ Ξενοφώντοςsupra, note 20 and text thereto.
κοῖς, ἔπειτα περὶ τῶν Σωκρατικῶν, εἰθ’ οὕτω περὶ Πλάτωνος,
ἐπεὶ
κατάρχει τῶν δέκα αἱρέσεων καὶ τὴν πρώτην Ἀκαδημείαν αὐτὸς
συνεστήσατο. For
the Socratics and Plato cfr. the Succession at Ι 14,
quoted supra, p. 314; for the 10 sects (and Plato and the Old Academy)
cfr. Ι 18
(discussed in the previous section, p. 314 f.); for the Socratics,
Plato, and the
Academy cfr. also the concluding words of bk. ΙΙ:
καὶ οὗτοι μὲν οἱ Σωκρατικοὶ καὶ οἱ
ἀπ’ αὐτῶν. μετιτέον δὲ ἐπὶ
Πλάτωνα τὸν τῆς Ἀκαδημείας κατάρξαντα καὶ τοὺς ἀπ’
αὐτοῦ,
ὁπόσοι γεγόνασιν ἐλλόγιμοι. The parallels and the sterotypical for-
mulas
show that Diog. Laert. sticks to a definite plan and that the
text at ΙΙ 47 λεκτέον [...] συνεστήσατο is good; yet Diog. Laert.
does
not treat Antisthenes after Xenophon and before the (other)
Socratics in bk. ΙΙ, but much later, viz. in bk. VI. In
II 47, the refer-
ence to Antisthenes therefore constitutes a rudiment; it is found
here
because he was a pupil of Socrates (cfr. II 47, the
beginning) and
because in part of the Peri haireseon
literature the Cynics presumably
were treated among the other Socratics.
Consequently, the words ἐντ
οῖς Κυνικοῖς mean «(not among the Socratics, but) among
the
Cynics», viz «in bk. VI». The word εἶτα is harsh (emendation would
be
comparatively easy), but not harsher than the words ἐπειδή κτλ.
at VI 19. (Perhaps
the odd reference at ii 47 is not to the Cynics,
but to τὰ
Κυνικά.)
We are now in a position to compare the view endorsed by
Diog. Laert. that Zeno was
first and foremost the pupil of the Cynic
Crates with his scattered references to
other views. We have noticed
above (p. 315) that in the Suda
article on Socrates the Stoa, through
Zeno, is linked up with a Socratic school
practising dialectic. In Diog.
Laert. VII, this type of affiliation is also
represented.
Apart from Crates (cfr. above, p. 318), three other teachers are
mentioned at VII 2 (= SVF I 1, p. 3, 12 f.; cfr. Meg. fr. 2D.;Socr. fr. II O 4, V H 38 G.): Stilpo (of Megara; according to τινες);
Xenocrates
(not in Heinze or Isnardi Parente) «during ten years,
according to Timocrates (?) in
his Dio»; and Polemo (fr. 85 Gig.;
no source given, not even
an anonymous one).
Next, Diog. Laert. at VII 2-3 (SVF I 1-2,
p. 3, 14-25; Socr. fr.
V H 38 G.) gives two rival accounts of
Zeno’s conversion to philosophy.
The Stoics Hecaton (the pupil of Panaetius: fr. 26
Gomoll) and
Apollonius of Tyre in the first book of his On
Zeno claimed that
he studied the books of «the ancients». The anonymous
account fol-
lowed in some detail at VII 2-3 gives the famous story of the
ship-
wreck, what then happened at the bookseller’s, and the encounter
with
Crates. This continues with a description of the time Zeno was
Crates’ disciple (VII 3); presumably, the anecdote at VII 12,
the end,
about Zeno carrying money around for Κράτης ὁ διδάσκαλος (SVFI 3, pp. 4, 38-5, 1; not in Giannantoni) originally belongs in
this
context. The story of Zeno’s life is brought to a preliminary stop
at VII 4 (first sentence): ἕως μὲν οὖν τίνος ἤχούσε
τοῦ Κράτητος
— a phrase which in a manner typical of Diog. Laert. is resumed much
later in
the same chapter (cfr. SVF I, p. 4, 2-6): τελευταῖον δὲ
ἀπέστη
καὶ τῶν προειρημένων ἤκουσεν κτλ. The cross-reference,
clearly Diog.
Laert.’s own, refers back to VII 2 (Stilpo Xenocrates Polemo).
In between, we
have: 1) the report that, when a pupil of Crates, Zeno
wrote the Politeia and that some people said he had done so «
near
the Dog’s tail » (no doubt an obscene joke) — SVF I
2, p. 4, 3-4;
and: 2) the catalogue of Zeno’s oeuvre, cleverly introduced with
«apart
from the Politeia he also wrote the following» (SVF I 41) and
concluded with «those are the books».
Apparently, Hecaton and Apollonius (VII 2) wanted to play down
the Cynic connection.
From Philodemus, On the Stoics chs. 2-7Dorandi, Filodemo. Gli stoici (PHerc.155 E 39),
«Cron. Erc.», 12 (1982) [91-133] pp. 92-7; cfr. also G.
Giannantoni,Socraticorum cit., III, p. 416 ff. I
shall return to the problems concerned with the
presumed or real Cynic heritage
at the end of the next section, infra, p. 343 ff.
at Hipp. fr. 5 Gig. and Socr.
fr. V B 126 G.; snippets at SVF I 42,
590,
hi Ant. 67), we know that the obscenity and immorality attributed
to the
Politeia (cfr. Diog. Laert. VII 4; 32-4)
were a rather hot issue
both in Stoic circles and outside the school, and that some
denied
it was genuine. Indeed, on the authority of the rhetorician Isidorus
«of
Pergamum» (1st cent. BCE) Diog. Laert. tells us that Athenodorus
(Cordylion) the
Stoic (1st cent. BCE), director of the library «at
Pergamum», expunged those
passages from Zeno’s works which — pre-
sumably for their crudely Cynic contents —
displeased the Stoics (VII
34; not in SVF or Hülser). At VII
32-4, Diog. Laert. cites some
shocking details — extracts at SVF I 222, 226, 257, 259, 267, 268 —
after the Skeptic Cassius (Gr. Emp. fr. 286 Deichgräber)Gal., subf. emp. IV, p. 40,
15 Bonnet: pironeus ca(s)sius.
mowitz
pointed out a long time agoOp. cit., p. 23.
held by Chrysippus
are to be found at VII 187-9 (cfr. SVF I 254,
III 685, 744,
747). We shall see that the doctrinal links between Cynics
and Stoics emphasized by Diog. Laert. are wholly different from
the
things criticized by Cassius and IsidorusInfra, pp. 328 ff.
A further snippet of information from Apollonius of Tyre’s bio-
graphy has been
preserved at VII 24 (SVF I 278; Meg. fr.
169 D.,Socr. fr. no 4, fr. VII 38 G.).
Here we are told that Crates tried
to drag away Zeno from Stilpo, and find the
quotation of the rebuke
Zeno addressed to Crates on the occasion. Whether this story
entails
that Crates attempted to win back Zeno or (oddly, for a Cynic) to
win
him is not wholly clear; presumably, the former. But at any rate
Apollonius, in view
of the apophthegm he reported, must have tried
to prove that Stilpo was a more
important influence upon Zeno than
Crates, and he should therefore be included among
the τινές mentioned
at VII 2 who added Stilpo.
We must also include Heraclides Lembus, i.e., presumably, Sotion
(cfr. fr. 9
Wehrli), ap. Diog. Laert. II 120 (not in SVF; fr. 106 Hülser;Meg. fr. 167 D.; Socr. fr. II O 4 G.) τούτου [scil., Στίλπωνος] φησὶν
Ἡρακλείδης καὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα ἀκοῦσαι τὸν
τῆς Στοᾶς κτίστην.
In the bios of Stilpo, this is an isolated
notice in the final chapter.
It is not clear that according to Heracleides / Sotion
Stilpo was more
important than Crates (as he was according to Apollonius of
Tyre).
Against this suggestion is the common and not unfounded assumption
that
the Succession at I 13-5 is originally Sotion’s and that it is Sotion’s
arrangement
which is followed by Diog. Laert. most of the wayF. Wehrli, op. cit., 18-9;
G. Giannantoni, Pirrone, la scuola
scetticae il sistema delle «successioni», in Lo
scetticismo antico, I, «Elenchos» VI, Napoli
1981,
p. 20 f.
Sotion is known to have referred to other teachers besides the
one
relevant to his diadochical system (cfr. fr. 27 Wehrli ap. Diog. Laert.
IX 21). In an earlier section of the bios of Stilpo, II 113-4 (not inSVF or Hülser; Meg. fr. 164 A, 165 D.; Socr. fr.
II O 3 G.) Diog.
Laert. gives us — at least in part after
Philippus of Megara — a long
list of pupils Stilpo won over from his rivals. The
last to be men-
tioned is Zeno, II 114: καὶ δὴ καὶ Ζήνωνα τὸν
Φοίνικα [the ethnicon
suggests a source quoted rather than Diog. Laert.’s pen] μετὰ
τούτων
ἀφείλετο — which intimates that Zeno’s former teacher’s loss
(Crates’,
presumably) was Zeno’s gain and at any rate that the separation
was
final. This, of course, is also implied by Diog. Laert. at VII
4 (cfr.supra, p. 321): τελευταῖον δὲ ἀπέστη [scil. τοῦ Κράτητος], a
strong term, cfr. VII
167 (SVF I 442, p. 93, 15) on Dionysius: ἀπόστας
δὲ τοῦ
Ζήνωνος κτλ.
For Zeno’s connection with Polemo (VII 2; Polem. fr. 85
Gig.)
Diog. Laert. elsewhere gives no authority either. At VII
25, Zeno’satyphia is illustrated by the story (Polem. fr. 88 Gig.; SVF I 5, p. 6,
4
f.) that, when already an advanced philosopher, he also went to
hear Polemo’s
lectures and that the latter then snubbed him by ac-
cusing him of stealing his
doctrines and clothing them in Phoenician
garb. Schwartz and others need not be
right in connecting this account
— and, by implication, the reference at VII 2 — with the
well-known
historical views of Antiochus of AscalonSchwartz, op.
cit., col. 755.
that what is in
Diog. Laert. does not depend upon Antiochus
vourable to Polemo and rather favourable to Zeno, which does not agree
with An-
tiochus’ way of arguing the connection. On the other hand, the
anecdote at VII 20
(SVF I 306,
Polem. fr. 87 Gig.), though not very informative,
suggests that Zeno
esteemed Polemo’s thought. For a suggestion about the
possible background of the
emphasis on the Academic connection see infra, p. 327.
we have already noticedSupra, p. 318.
by Clem. Alex. strom. I 63, 2-64, 1, Zeno was the pupil of (the other)
Crates, who was
the pupil of Polemo. So maybe the assumption that
Polemo belongs with Zeno’s
teachers as reported at Diog. Laert.
VII 2 is to be connected with a similar
attempt to establish a link
between Zeno and the Academy. Possibly, one may even
interpret
Timocrates’ reference to Xenocrates (who was Polemo’s teacher
ac-
cording to Diog. Laert. IV 17 = Polem fr. 16 Gig.) in
this lightinfra, note 64, and text thereto.
Diog. Laert.’s bios of Polemo does not mention Zeno; however, in
the bios of Zeno we have a reference cited from Dioclessupra, note
14.
defected to Polemo when Zeno was very ill (VII
162; SVF I 333,Polem. fr. 93
Gig.)Ioppolo, Aristone di Chio e lo Stoicismo antico,
«Elen-
chos» I, Napoli 1980, pp. 19-22, against whom I would argue (because of
the
synchronism with Polemo!) that Zeno’s illness and Aristo’s defection
should not
be dated to the end of Zeno’s life.
Previously (supra, p. 320 f.), I have recalled the rival versions
of
Zeno’s conversion to philosophy at VII 2-3. More notices
concerned
with this matter have been appended (in the way typical of
Diog.
Laert.Mejer, op. cit., p. 23.VII 4-5 (cfr. SVF I 2, p. 4,7-11; Socr. fr. V H 38 G.).
First, Zeno’s apophthegm on the
occasion of his apostasy from Crates
is quoted (φασιν etc.), of which others (οἱ δὲ)
affirm that it was
uttered when he had become Crates’ pupil. This little piece links
up
well with what immediately precedes; Zeno’s aphorism interprets the
shipwreck
(for which see the main account at VII 2) as a
fortunate
event. The shipwreck provides the peg on which the next bits are
hung:
others (ἄλλοι) state that he heard of the disaster when already
at Athens and give
another, insipid version of Zeno’s statement (also
printed at SVF I 277). Other authorities (ἔνιοι), apparently denying
that the ship was
wrecked, say Zeno first sold his cargo at Athens
and then turned to philosophy.
Finally, Demetrius of Magnesia Fragments in J. Mejer, Demetrius of Magnesia: On Poets and Authorsof the Same
Name, «Hermes», CIX (1981) pp. 447 ff.
much later, VII
31-2 (Dem. fr. 22 Mejer; cfr. SVF I 6, p.
7, 10 f.,Socr. fr. V H 37 G.),
apparently joins the anti-shipwreck party and
even seems to give an account
comparable to that of Hecaton and
Apollonius at VII 2 (cfr. supra, p. 320 f.) by informing us that Zeno’s
father had brought him home
many books « of Socratics » from
his trips to Athens so that his education had been
excellent already
at Citium. He adds that this is why he came to Athens and
became
a pupil of Crates (ἐλθόντα εἰς ’Αθήνας Κράτητι παραβαλεϊνterminus technicus, cfr.
«Mnemosyne», XXXII (1979) p.
infra, note 108.
Demetrius thus follows the tradition which made Crates the person
who was important to Zeno; in other respects, however, he seems
to have
been influenced by those who wanted to play down this
relationship.
The last specific version of Zeno’s affiliations to be found in
Diog. Laert.
(although not in the summary at VII 2) is that of Hip-
pobotus
at VII 25 (Hipp. fr. 10 Gig., who gives too
much to Hippobotus;
cfr. SVF I 5, p. 6, 3-4, Meg. fr. 103 D., Socr. fr. II F 3 G.). This
makes Zeno the pupil of the famous logician Diodorus
Cronus. The
fragment has been wedged in between Apollonius’ story about
Crates
and Stilpo (cfr. supra, p. 322) and the anonymous
story about Polemo
(cfr. supra, p. 323). Accordingly, also
here the (immediate) context
is concerned with Zeno’s teachers; the stories involved
have been
exploited in order to illustrate Zeno’s lack of pompousness and
love
of learning, traits of his character here depicted in the larger
context.
Hippobotus says: ξυνδιέτριψε δὲ καὶ Διοδώρῳ [...], παρ’ ᾧ καὶ
τὰ
διαλεκτικά ἐξεπόνησεν. I have no compunction in attributing to Hip-
pobotus
also the following anonymous fragment, to be found at VII
16 (SVF I 4, p. 5, 29 f., Meg. fr. 104 D., Socr. fr. II F 3 G.) Context:
«he loved problems and
was much interested in the finer logical
points of all sorts of questions». The
fragment runs: ἐπιμέλως δὲ
καὶ πρὸς Φίλωνα τὸν διαλεκτικὸν διεκρίνετο [scil., Ζήνων] καὶ
συνεσχόλαζεν αὐτῷ· ὅθεν καὶ θαυμασθῆναι ὑπὸ
Ζήνωνος τοῦ νεω-
τέρου [τοῦ ἐταίρου Reiske, Ζήνωνος ΧΧΧ τοῦ Susemihl] οὐχ
ἧττον
Διοδώρου τοῦ διδασκάλου αὐτοῦ. No compunction because: 1) Dio-
dorus
Cronus is mentioned both times and there are no other refer-
ences to Diodorus in
Zeno’s biography but these two, and: because 2)
the same motif, Zeno’s dialectical
apprenticeship, is at issue: VII 25
τὰ διαλεκτικὰ ~ 16 τὸν
διαλεκτικόν. That Hippobotus did not
recognize (or did not refer to) a Dialectic
“sect” (cfr. supra, p. 313)
need not have prevented him from
calling someone a dialectician. As
is already apparent from Reiske’s and Susemihl’s
diagnostic conjectures,
this text contains a famous crux. Who
is this « younger Zenos » by
whom Philo — or is it Diodorus — is admired? Various
suggestions
have been submitted, e.g., the other Zeno listed according to
Hip-
pobotus among Zeno’s pupils at VII 38 (SVF I 38, p. 14, 4 f., Hipp.
fr. 11 Gig.)U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, op. cit., p. 113 f.,
and K. Döring,op. cit., p. 126 f.
For the difficulties see further M. Gigante, ad loc.
then
remains odd. It may be argued, fairly enough, that at VII 16
only Zeno of Citium can
be meant. But then it remains puzzling why
he should be said to be «the younger» —
younger than whom, Dio-
dorus or Philo? And whom does αὐτοῦ refer to? Emendation, I
be-
lieve, is necessary: simply read τὸν νεώτερον (corruption
through
perseveration of preceding genitive, possibly also through
anticipation
of following genitives). It should be recalled that συσχολάζειν
not
only means «to study along with», to be someone’s fellow-pupil,
but also «to
attend the classes or lectures of» (cfr. Plutarch Cic. 4, 5
=
Posid. T 29 E.-K., 10 Th.). A νεώτερος is a “pupil”, i.e., a younger
member of a
school, or of a loose group of persons teaching and
studyingPHerc. 1021, VI 41 (Xenocrates fr. 1 Isnardi Parente), and XVIII 6:
νεανίσκοι;
Diog. Laert. VII 182 (SVF II 9)
πρεσβύτην-νέοις. «Old(er)-young(er)»
are standard terms in chronographical jargon
for the teacher-pupil relationship,
cfr. P Oxy. 2438, p.
3, 4 f.: (Pindar) νεώτερος π̣[ρεσβυ]τέρῳ Σιμωνίδῃ ἐπιβάλλων,
on which see I. Gallo, Una nuova vita di Pindaro,
Salerno 1969, pp. 63. Cfr. alsoTabula Cebetis 2, 3 ἐθαύμασά ... αὐτὸν πολυχρωνιώτατον νεώτερος. Timon,
fr.
48, 1 Diels ap. Diog. Laert. rx 64 (= Pirrone T. 60 Decleva Caizzi, Suppl.Hellenist. fr. 822) addresses Pyrrho as γέρον, «master». For
other parallels see
« Mnemosyne », XXXII (1979) p. 42 note 9. [scil., Zeno]
used to dispute
very carefully with Philo the dialectician and even
attended his lectures.
Consequently, Zeno’s admiration for the younger
man [scil.,
Philo] was as great as his admiration for his [Philo’s]
teacher Diodorus ».
Hippobotus’ Diodorus (and Philo) presumably did not make it
into the Successions literature; this, at any rate, would explain
why
Diodorus does not turn up in VII 2. Heracleides’ / Sotion’s Stilpo,
not
Diodorus, was mentioned in the biography of Apollonius of Tyre
and by Philippus of
Megara. The fact that Hippobotus argued that
Crates of Thebes was the pupil not of
Diogenes the Dog but of a
mysterious person called Brysonsupra, note 31.
(ap. Diog. Laert. VI 85; Hipp. fr. 8 Gig., Meg. fr. 205 A D., Socr.fr. V H 1 and fr. II S 5 G.) and that, as we have noticed, he did
not
speak of a Cynic hairesis, shows that his position as to
Zeno’s affi-
liations must have been peculiar. We do not know what he may
have
said about other teachers of Zeno, for instance about Stilpo, provided
he
spoke about him. What is at any rate clear is that (just as the
system of sects and
Successions at Suda s.v. Σωκράτης) he underlined
Zeno’s
dialecticSchwartz,
op. cit., coll. 755, 757; G.
Giannantoni, Socraticorumcit., in, p. 210; and
supra, p. 315.
to the authorities cited by Diog. Laert. is also mentioned in
relation
with Zeno’s dialectic. In Diog. Laert. (see the bios, II 113-20) Stilpo
is a logician; about his diluted
Cynisizing ethicsSedley, op. cit. (supra, note 33) p. 77, who however
goes too far in
playing down Stilpo’s dialectic. On Stilpo’s doctrines see
further G. Giannantoni,Socraticorum
cit., in, p. 94 ff.
in a different source (cfr.
Socr. frr. II O 31 ff. G.). Polemo presumably
was made
responsible for aspects of Zeno’s ethics not reducible to
the Cynic example. The
main link, in Diog. Laert., remains that with
the Cynics according to the
Succession; other affiliations to some
extent are left to take care of themselves.
Most remarkably, the systems
reported in Diog. Laert. do not provide a suitable
teacher for Zeno’s
physics; perhaps the reference to his study of the books of the
ancients
in Hecaton and Apollonius of Tyre (VII 2) originally also was
intended
to fill this gap, although its main purpose seems to have been to
play
down the link with Crates. Numenius fr. 25 des Places ap. Eusebium,P.E. XIV 5, 11 (SVF I 11, p. 8, 10 f., Socr. fr. V H 39 G.), who
is
here dependent upon a tradition or traditions similar to those found
in Diog.
Laert.Diog. Laert. II
33
Num. fr. 25, p. 66 des Places (printed in parallel
columns by U. von Wila-mowitz-Moellendorff, op. cit., pp. 72-3).
but also «the doctrines
of Heraclitus» (not, however, to account for
Zeno’s physics). Should one assume that
Zeno heard Xenocrates and/
or Polemo lecturing on Timaeus,
which Platonic dialogue certainly has
tο be taken into account for Zeno’s physicsProvidence and the Destruction
of the Universe in EarlyStoic Thought, in M. J. Vermaseren (ed.), Studies in Hellenistic Religions,
EPRO
78, Leiden 1979, p. 136 ff.
context one
should not be concerned with what really may have hap-
pened, but with what was said to have happened
Zeno was a
pupil of Xenocrates. For suggestions as to what really happened see
K. von Fritz, Zenon (2) von Kition, in RE xxi 2 (1972) coll. 2526 f., 2528 f.,
and
the neat reconstruction by D. Sedley, The Protagonists, in M. Schofield-M. Burn-yeat-J. Barnes (eds.), Doubt and Dogmatism. Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology,Oxford 1980,
p. 5 ff., but cfr. infra, note 108.
the origins of Zeno’s physics are left without an explanation, and
those
of his logic are implicit rather than explicit. In the logical
doxography at VII 41 τὸ δὲ λογικὸν μέρος-83, Zeno’s name is never
mentioned,
although according to 38 he was the first to divide philo-
sophy into three parts
(SVF I 45) and according to 40 he began the
exposition of
philosophy with the logical part (SVF I 46)
arrangement according
to affiliation and Succession, at least as pre-
sented by Diog. Laert., allows for a
strong link (or several alternative
links) at one or more particular points but to a
certain extent breaks
down when one expects it to account for the doctrines as a
whole.
For this deficiency, one cannot hold Diog. Laert. responsible.
3. The Community of Doctrines Between Cynics and Stoics:
TwoViews.
We should now take a closer look at the community of doctrines
or koinonia (for the term cfr. Sext. pyrrh. hyp. I 213,
216) bet-
ween Stoics and Cynics and which is to be distinguished from
the
embarrassing Cynisizing connections found in the works of the early
Zeno and
in some works of Chrysippus (cfr. supra, p. 321 ff., infra,p. 343 ff.). This koinonia
supports Diog. Laert.’s construction of the
Succession in bks. VI-VII and for obvious reasons only pertains to ethics.
As is (or should be) familiar, von ArnimSVF I, p. XXX ff. M. Pohlenz, op. cit., ii, p. 10, agrees.
Posidonian) doxography of Stoic placita (VII 38-160) placed by Diog.
Laert. in the bios of Zeno, one of our more important sources for
Stoic thought, was put
together by Diog. Laert. from three different
kinds of sources: 1) general
doxographical surveys; 2) laudationes, i.e.,
clusters of
references to the views and books of individual Stoics; 3)
a detailed description of
logic (VII 49-82) derived from Diocles’ Epi-drome. As to the
laudationes, von Arnim pointed out that in some
instances
these fit in with their context to such a degree that it is
not possible to argue
that they have been inserted. In other cases,
however, to be found in all three
sections of the doxography, the
clusters of references disturb the exposition in a
bad way. Against
von Arnim, Michelangelo Giusta (for the ethical part) and
Jørgen
Mejer argued that the Stoic doxography including the laudationes and
(so Mejer) the Diocles fragment was taken by Diog. Laert.
from an
earlier sourceGiusta, I dossografi di etica, I, Torino 1964, p. 23: in Diog. Laert.
we would have the «riduzione di un
testo più ampio», just as in the parallel
ethical doxographies in Arius Didymus
ap. Stobaeum, Cicero’s De finibus,
Sextus
Empiricus, etc. Giusta’s work fully deserves its reputation as an
indispensable mine
of information, but the author’s thesis that all this
doxographical material derives
from one single source amounts to the ironing out
of important differences and
has therefore been justifiably criticized. It is
with some of these differences that
op.
cit., p. 5 ff.
new section begins at
VII 55Op. cit., p. 5
note 1.
the whole of VII 38-160 comes
from an intermediate source, the pro-
blem of its analysis is merely pushed one
stage further back, which
is hardly satisfactory. The Diocles fragment as
circumscribed by von
Arnim was further analysed by U. Egli, who discerned four
main
ingredientsEgli, Zur stoischen Dialektik, diss. Basel 1967, pp.
7 ff., 58 ff.; see
also his most welcome edition of the Greek text of vn 48-83,
with brief introduction
and not always accurate German translation, in U. Egli, Das Diokles-Fragmentbei Diogenes
Laertios, Arbeitspapiere Sonderforschungsbereich 99 Linguistik
Uni-
versität Konstanz 55, Konstanz 1981.
pp. 351 ff.
It should be conceded that von Arnim’s argument that some lauda-tiones do not particularly fit their context is plausible. However,
I believe
that for the others, or at least one or more of the others, one
should
not submit that it cannot be proved that they do not belong, but
rather
should try to prove that they do. It will be recalled
that
von Arnim hardly strayed beyond bk. VII (cfr. supra, p.
299 f.). But
the Cynic doxographies in bk. VI are very important for the
ethical
part of the Stoic doxography in bk. VII. A fully
complete comparison
of the ethics of bks. VI and VII cannot be
carried out here; it will,
however, become clear that I agree with F. Decleva
Caizzi’s argument
that the Cynic doxographies in bk. VI have been largely
StoicizedDecleva
Caizzi, Antisthenes. Fragmenta, Testi e docum. Stud.
antich.
XIII, Varese 1966, pp. 94 f. J. F. Kindstrand, Bion of Borysthenes. A Collectionof the Fragments with an
Introduction and Commentary, Act. Univ. Ups., Stud,
graec. Ups., Uppsala
1976, p. 56 ff., esp. p. 59 note 11, argues contra.
In bk. VII, there is at least one laudatio, viz. the cluster of
defini-
tions of the telos at VII 87-9,
which not only fits its context but is
also in a crucial way linked up with an
important passage in bk. vi.
This connection is indispensable for an attempt at what
Schwartz
called Quellenriecherei. The importance of the telos in ethical theory
enhances the value of this link.
After a short paragraph on the subdivision of ethics (VII 84
= SVF
III 1), which does not concern us here
begins with the “logical basis of Stoic
ethics”Long,
The Logical Basis of Stoic Ethics, «Proc. Arist.
Soc.»,XCII (1970-1) p. 85 ff.; cfr. also A.A. Long, Arius Didymus and the Expositionof
Stoic Ethics, in W. W. Fortenbaugh (ed.), On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics.The Work of Arius Didymus,
Rutgers Univ. Stud. Class. Hum. 1, New Brunswick-
London 1983, pp. 48, 49. For a
comparison between Diog. Laert. loc.
cit., andCic.
de fin.
III, 16-22, cfr. also M. Giusta, op. cit., pp. 30 ff., 295 ff.
(horme) and oikeiosis; in fine it is said that for rational beings (τοῖς
λογικοῖς) «the
life according to Reason rightly becomes the life ac-
cording to Nature» (VII 85-6 = SVF
III 178). After the laudatio, the
exposition, at VII 90 ff., continues with the subject of Virtue;
the
cluster of references
Cicero, and Clement
of Alexandria by M. Giusta, op. cit., p.
300 ff., who however
does not dwell upon what seem to me important differences.
There is also an
interesting multi-columned table in A. Covotti,
Quibus libris vitarum in libroseptimo scribendo
Laertius usus fuerit, «Studi Ital. di Filologia Classica», V (1897)
pp.
88-9.
cerned both with
the life according to Nature and that according to
Virtue. The laudatio lists the telos-definitions of: 1) Zeno (SVF I 179),
said to be followed by Cleanthes in his Peri hedones (SVF I 552),
Posidonius
(fr. 185 E.-K., 426 Th.), and Hecaton in his Peri telon(fr.
1 Gig.); 2) that of Chrysippus, followed by a substantial explanation
of what he
meant (Posid. fr. 427 Th.) which seems to be indebted
to
Posidonius
found at fr. 187 E.-K. = 417 Th. (the
passage referred to in the text immediatelyinfra), viz.
in the first verbatim quotation of Posidonius (p. 170, 4 ff.
E.-K., p. 337,
11 ff. Th.; cfr. infra, note 81).SVF III 4; cfr. Posid. ap. Gal. PHP V, pp. 326,18-
328,21 De Lacy = fr. 187, pp. 170,2-171,40
E.-K.; fr. 417, pp.
337,14-338,5 Th.; part of Galen’s text is printed at SVF III 12).
This is followed: 3) by the definitions of
Diogenes (SVF III D. 45)
and Archedemus (SVF III Arch. 19). I have added the SVF numbers
not
merely for the sake of convenience but also as a reminder that
von Arnim’s habit of
cutting up texts may prevent one from noticing
the purport of a larger section.
Book-titles are given for Zeno Cleanthes
Hecaton Chrysippus; it is noteworthy that
Aristo Herillus (cfr. infra,p. 336 Antipater Panaetius are
not included. The section on natural
impulse and the natural life of rational beings
(VII 85-6) is not merely
continued by the laudatio at 87 f., but in a way elucidated by it, for 87
starts with the
word διόπερCic.
de fin. v 39-40, parallels Diog. Laert.
VII 86: οὐδέν τε -
the end (cfr. M. Giusta, op. cit., p. 297 f.), the Ciceronian exposition at V 41
f.
does not continue with the Stoic telos. De fin. II,
33-4 begins with oikeiosis (i.e.,
presumably, Chrysippus
not Zeno) and proceeds with the Stoic telos only
after
definitions formulated by others have been listed. On Chrysippus and oikeiosis cfr.
A.M. Ioppolo, op. cit., p. 155 ff.
his On the Nature of Man, to affirm that the telos is “to live in
agreement (ὁμολογουμένως) with Nature”,
which means: “to live
according to Virtue” (ὅπερ ἐστι, κατ’ ἀρετήν ζῆν), for Nature
guides
us towards Virtue». The full title of the book, according to
the
catalogue at VII 4 (SVF I 41, p. 14, 29) is Περὶ ὁρμῆς ἢ
περὶ ἀνθρώπου
φύσεως. To be sure, there is, at 85, an explicit reference to a
book
by Chrysippus (SVF III 178) to whom the oikeiosis theory at 85-
προσίεται presumably belongs. Yet the
full title of Zeno’s book (quoted
with shorter title at 87) fits 86 οὐδέν τε-87, the
beginning, like a
glove. Those who hold that oikeiosis cannot
be attributed to Zeno
should at least take into account that in his On Impulse, or On theNature of Man, he
may have constructed a scala naturae resembling
Aristotle’s
in the De anima, plants (horme), animals
(horme + aisthesis),
men (horme + aisthesis + logos). This context shows that “Nature”
in Zeno’s definition at 87 means
Nature as, according to a higher
dispensation (cfr. 86, τελειοτέραν προστασίαν), it
manifests itself in
rational beings, or “Human Nature” as it really is and should
be.
At VII 89, we are told that Cleanthes (SVF I 552)
interpreted the
formula in the sense that one should live in accord with
universal
(κοινήν) Nature, not with individual (ἐπὶ μέρους) Nature,
whereas
according to Chrysippus one should live in accord with both (SVFIII 4, p. 4, 8 f.). But, to return to the laudatio at 87: « [...] Again,
to live according to Virtue is
the equivalent (πάλιν δ’ ἴσον ἐστὶ τὸ
κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν τῷ) to “living according to
one’s experience of the
events which occur according to Nature”, as Chrysippus says
in the
first book of his Peri telon» (SVF III 4).
What should be emphasized is that the formula “to live according
to Virtue” is not a
part of the definitions quoted, but serves to explain
them, and is in its turn
explained by themop. cit., p. 305) is not enough.
and explicitly states that both the definition of Zeno (and of
those
who are said to follow him) and that of Chrysippus are equivalent to
the
general formula (and so of course to one another). The significant
difference which
after all remains between these two definitions shows
that το κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν is a
formal formula which in order to
become operational needs further elucidation. In the parallels in
other
authors to Diog. Laert.’s laudatio this formula is far
less prominent,
viz. in the laudationes in Arius Didymus ap. Stobaeum (if it is Arius
DidymusKahn, Arius
as a Doxographer, in W. W. Fortenbaugh (ed.),On Stoic cit., p. 3 ff., and esp. N. P. White,
Comments on A.A. Long’s paper,ibid., p. 67 ff.op.
cit., p. 300 ff., and see supra, note 67.
Chrysippus formulated by
Posidonius (fr. 187 E.-K., 417 Th.)infra, note 81.
is an important although
neglected parallel it is not found at all.
Arius Did. See p. 319; 28 ff. The comments on this passage of O. ap. Stob, II, pp. 75, 7-76, 15,
lists definitions and
persons, but unlike Diog. Laert. he does not refer to books.
Here,
as is well known, a different definition is attributed to Zeno:
τὸ
ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν, explained as καθ’ ἕνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον ζῆν
(SVF I 179), and Cleanthes is said to have added τῇ φύσει (SVF I 552)
and others to have
provided other articulations. Those further listed
are Chrysippus, SVF
III 12; Diogenes, SVF
III D. 44; Archedemus,SVF
III Arch. 20; Antipater, SVF
III Ant. 57 (two definitions; Antipater
is not in Diog.
Laert.’s cluster). As to Zeno’s definition, RistRist, Zeno and Stoic
Consistency, «Phronesis», XXII
(1977) p. 168 f.
For references to the learned discussion see A. M. Ioppolo, op. cit., p. 143 f. note
5;ibid., p. 143 ff., she argues that both formulas may
be attributed to Zeno.
probably right that we do not have to choose
between Diog. Laert.’s
and Arius’ version. To his arguments one may add that the
context
in Diog. Laert. and the full tide of Zeno’s book quoted at Diog.
Laert.
VII 87 support Diog. Laert.’s version (supra, p. 332).
Moreover, Zeno
also wrote a Περὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν βίου (VII 4,
SVF I 41, p. 14, 28).
Zeno therefore may have used both
definitions, and Arius probably
sins by attributing the shorter formula only and by
being fussy about
Cleanthes’ presumed addition; note that the shorter formula plays
an
important part in Posidonius’ criticism of (Antipater’s and)
Chrysippus’
definitions of the telos cited supraPosid. fr. 187 E.-K., p. 171, 25 ff. = fr. 417
Th., p. 337,Rieth, Über das Telos der Stoiker,LXIX (1934) p. 34 ff., are still worth
reading.
explanation as ap. Arius Did. is liable to be
understood in a personalist
and even crudely Cynisizing sense, which would explain
Cleanthes’
point ap. Diog. Laert. 89 that not individual but
common Nature
should be followed. Presumably, Cleanthes opted for Zeno’s
less
ambiguous definition which included the words τῇ φύσει. Furthermore,
it is
interesting to acknowledge that the shorter Zenonian definition
as reported by Arius
would not have suited the context in Diog. Laert.
It is, however, quite apposite in
Arius’ context, for Arius does not
derive the Stoic telos
from natural impulse and oikeiosisLong, in W. W. Fortenbaugh (ed.), On Stoic cit., p. 44 f.,
who
points out that a very succinct form of the argument from oikeiosis is found else-
where in Ar. Did., viz. ap.
Stob, II, p. 67, 7-14.
other hand,
immediately before beginning his laudatio with
Zeno’s
definition, Arius (p. 75, 7 ff.) presents the (Stoic) definition of
Man
and says that the whole of human Virtue and of happiness consists in
ζωὴν
ἀκόλουθον [...] καὶ ὁμολογουμένην φύσει. But Virtue is not
the issue in Arius’
sequel; he has dealt with it already near the
beginning of his résumé
(ap. Stob, II, pp. 57 f., esp. p. 59 ff.),
and
Diog. Laert.’s formula τὸ κατ’ ἀρετήν ζῆν does not turn up in his
cluster of
Stoic telos-definitions. But he knows that it exists and
is
equivalent, cfr. p. 77, 16-19 (SVF
III 16): the telos is happiness,
τοῦτὸ
δὲ ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν
(Zeno’s definition
according to Arius), ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν
(Cleanthes’ definition according to
Arius). Again, at p. 78, 1-5 (SVFIII
16), τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν and a number of other formulas are
said to amount to the
same thing (ἰσοδυναμεῖ) — δι’ ὃ καὶ τὸ Στωϊκὸν
τέλος ἶσον δύνασθαι τῷ κατ’ ἀρετὴν
βίῳ. It is clear that, for Arius
as for Diogenes, τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν is a convenient
general formula.
In the Peripatetic section of the doxography ap. Stob, (which really
seems to be by Arius Didymussupra, note 77.
to the Peripatetics (pp. 126, 17 f.; 131, 5 f.), but
followed by an
important qualification which brings it close to Antiochus’
definition
of the telos ap. Cic. Varro
19 f., and de fin. V 26-7 f. See further A. Lueder, Die philosophische Persönlichkeit des Antiochos
vonAskalon, diss. Göttingen 1940, p. 22 ff.
noted, with Potamo’s at Diog. Laert. I 21. Without such
qualifications,
τῷ κατ’ ἀρετὴν [...] βίῷ is attributed to the Peripatetics at p.
145, 9.
Furthermore, near the beginning of the ethical excerpts in Stobaeus,
the
formula is attributed to Plato, II p. 50, 1-6. Plato is here
said
to have proposed many descriptions of the telos, all of
which however
amount to the same thing: εἰς δὲ ταὐτὸ καὶ σύμφωνον [no diaphoniain Plato!] συντέλει τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν. This makes
it absolutely
clear that the formula is a very formal one indeed. It would fit
most
philosophers (except, presumably, the Epicureans and Cyrenaics), but
would
need to be further specified in each particular case.
Cicero’s laudationesGiusta, op. cit., p. 300
ff., and supra, note 67.
and no book-titles are given. Several times, however, a form of
the
formal formula is found linked up with the definition of the Stoictelos. At de fin.
II 33-4 (SVF
III 14), the laudatio is part of
a
doxographic discussion concerned with oikeiosis, prima
naturalia, telos.The Stoics say the telos is “consentire naturae” [cfr. ὁμολογουμένως
τῇ φύσει], quod esse volunt “e virtute” [cfr. κατ’ἀρετήν] id esthoneste "vivere” [ζῆν; for Zeno, cfr. ibid.,
35 = SVF
III 14];quod ita interpretantur
(Chrysippus’ definition then follows, but his
name is not mentioned). Cfr. also de fin. IV 14 (SVF
III 13): first
Chrysippus’ definition without his name; then
Zenonis [...] "convenien-ter naturae
vivere” (SVF I 179), then Archedemus’ definition without
his
name. A cluster of Stoic /e/oi-definitions without any names is to
be found
at de fin.
III 31 (SVF
III 15). Again, at de fin. IV 43 (not
inSVF), we have Stoici [...] finem bonorum in una virtute ponunt.Cicero appears to have
known much doxographical information by heart;
on the other hand, his lack of
detailed precision should also be accoun-
ted for by the genre (dialogue not
treatise).
The Stoic laudatio in Clement is found in a fairly long
and
fairly dry doxographical survey of the various views of the philosophers
on
human happiness and the telos, strom.
II 127, 1-133, 7. Be it
noted that, at II
128, 3(-5), Aristotle is credited with the definition
τὸ ζῆν κατ’ ἀρετήν, just
as the Peripatetics in Arius Didymus, and
with similar appended qualifications (cfr. supra, p.
335). The Stoiclaudatio which follows at II 129, 1-7 (no
book-titles) mentions Zeno:
τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν (SVF I 180);
Cleanthes: τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ
φύσει ζῆν (SVF I 552). Then we
have part of Diogenes’ definition;
his name and a few other words have been restored
by editors (cfr.SVF III D. 46), but in view of the fact that
Zeno is only credited
with the general formal formula which in Clement he shares
with
Aristotle and of the further fact that in Cicero names occasionally
are
lacking so that definitions appear to coalesce, one should reject
this restoration
of the text of Clement. The list continues with
the
definitions of: Antipater (SVF
III Ant. 58); Archedemus (SVF
III Arch.
21); Panaetius (fr. 96 van Straaten); Posidonius
(fr. 186 E.-K., 428
Th.); Aristo (SVF I 360); Herillus (SVF I 419). In Diog. Laert., the
definitions of Aristo and
Herillus are not in the laudatio at VII 87-9,
but in their
respective biobibliographies: VII 160 (Aristo, SVF I
351),
and VII 165 (Herillus, SVF I
411). Diog. Laert.’s arrangement is
motivated; according to him (cfr. VII 160 ἃ δὲ τινες ἐξ αὐτῶν
διενέχθησαν ~ VII
167 καὶ οὗτοι μὲν οἱ διενεχθέντες and note that
such is also Cicero’s viewIoppolo, op. cit., p. 171 ff.
(cfr. also the brief characterizations in the list of Zeno’s pupils
atVII 27 = SVF I 38, not repeated
in von Arnim’s chapters devoted to
Aristo and Herillus). Clement is in a position to
include these dissidents
because he wants to argue against the pagan philosophers’
views of
the telos anyway. Numerous views of philosophers
other than Stoics
cited at strom.
II 127, 1-133, 6, are found in a similar form in Cicero’sDe finibus, but this is by the way (the apparatus of
Stählin-Früchtel
does not refer to Cicero).
The general formula also occurs elsewhere, e.g., according to
Plut. comm. not. 1060 E (SVF
III 139), Chrysippus in the first book
of his On Exhortation (not a verbatim quote) said
that living happily
consists in τῷ κατ’ ἀρετὴν βιοῦν.
The parallels to Diog. Laert.’s laudatio at VII
87-9 show that,
although the general formula τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν is also found
elsewhere,
Diog. Laert. is our only source to underline in its laudatio that the
definitions of both Zeno and Chrysippus are equivalent to
it
uses the formula for Plato nor (unlike Arius
Did. and Clement) for Aristotle.
fact that the cluster of definitions
variously also occurs elsewhere of
course shows that, theoretically, it could have
been added in or by
Diog. Laert., but I hope to have argued sufficiently that in
view of
his context this is implausible (supra, p. 331 f.).
Proof that this if
not the case is forthcoming from a comparison with a related
passage
in Diog. Laert. VI to be found in the general survey of Cynic placita(κοινὴ ἀρέσκοντα VI 103) which concludes this book, VI
104Giusta, op. cit., p. 139 f. It is not an
accident
that Diog. Laert. has these placita immediately
before the treatment of the Stoics
in bk. VII (cfr. supra, p. 310).
in SVF, cfr. fr. 138 Hülser; Ant.
fr. 22 D.C., Socr. fr. V A 98G.):
ἀρέσκει δ’ αὐτοΐς καὶ τέλος εἶναι τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν — ὡς
Ἀντισθένης φησίν ἐν τῷ
Ἡρακλεῖ — ὁμοίως τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς, ἐπεὶ
καὶ κοινωνία τις ταῖς δύο ταύταις αἱρέσεσίν
ἐστιν. ὅθεν καὶ τόν
Κυνισμὸν εἰρήκασι σύντομον ἐπ’ άρετήν ὁδόν. καὶ οὕτως ἐβίω
καὶ
Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεύς.
The idea that Cynicism is a «short cut towards Virtue» (attributed
to the Cynics by
Plut. amat. 759 D, and Gal. de cuiusl. anim. pecc. 3)
was stated by Apollodorus in his Ethics ap. Diog. Laert. VII 121 (SVF
II Ap. 17; all three texts at Socr. fr. V A 136 G.). Apollodorus,
loc. cit.,scil. τὸν σόφον) — cfr. also Arius Didymusap. Stob, II, p. 114, 24 = SVF III 638 —
whereas Epicurus in the
second book of his Peri Bion had said
οὐδὲ κυνιεῖν (scil., τὸν σόφον,ap.
Diog. Laert. X 119 = fr. 14 Usener, [1] 119 Arrighetti). In view of
these opposed
views of the feasibility of κυνιεῖν as stated in Diog. Laert.
VII and X, locc. citt., one is tempted to think of a synkrisis deriving from
the Peri haireseon
literaturesynkrisis between the Cyrenaics and Epicurus at II 86 ff. = Socr.fr. IV A 172 G. (where the Peri
haireseon of Panaetius, Hippobotus, and Clitoma-
chus are
cited) and X 136 f. = Socr. fr. IV A 200 G.; cfr. infra, text to note 93,
and p. 378 ff.
Stoicism are said to be «two haireseis» which have
something in
common; we are not merely dealing with personal relationships
as
represented by the Succession, but with doctrinal continuities.
Several points are important in this brief text (VI 104), or at any
rate crucial for
a better understanding of Diog. Laert.’s aims and the
sources he used, or rather the
traditions represented thereby. First,
the final sentence «and this is how Zeno of
Citium, too, lived»
— where οὕτως should be understood as κατ’ ἀρετήν; cfr. the
reference to
Antisthenes at the beginning, and the definition Zeno
gave of the telos as explained at VII 87: ὅπερ ἐστι
κατ’ ἀρετήν ζῆν.
Furthermore, “according to Virtue” is how Zeno, too, is said to
have
“actually lived”. This should throw some light on the biography of
Zeno
in bk. VII and on the connection between doxography
and
biography in Diog. Laert. in general. Arguably, Zeno as depicted at
— VII 1-31 lived according to Virtue (cfr. e.g., the decrees quoted VII 10 f.
= SVF I 7-8, p. 7, 25-7, [...] παρακαλῶν ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν [...],
παράδειγμα
τὸν ἴδιον βίον ἐκθείς ἅπασιν ἀκόλουθον ὄντα τοῖς λόγοις οἷς
διελέγετο,
almost to good to be genuine). The occasionally crude (although
not
immoral: immorality is linked with the words criticized at 32 ff.)
Cynic
colouring of some of Zeno’s witticisms and actions, however, should
also
be taken into account.
The telos-formula cited from Antisthenes’ Heracles (presumably,
the Heracles maior; cfr. also
Diog. Laert. VI 2 = Socr. fr. V A 85 G.)
and attributed as a
general placitum to both Cynics and Stoics is
the
blanket-formula found at VII 87. Be it noted that the
doxographies in
Cic. de fin., and Arius Did. ap. Stob, studied above do not refer to
Antisthenes, and that
Clement, strom.
II 21, 130 (Ant. fr. 77 A D.C.,Socr. fr. V A 111 G.) appropriately attributes to Antisthenes
ἀτυφία
as the definition of the telos and not, as Diog.
Laert. τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν
ζῆνop. cit., 139-40, that
Clement’s ἀτυφία is equivalent
to the doctrine to be found at Diog. Laert. VI 104-5 is confusing.
is a special thing.
In Diog. Laert., we do not hear what further explanation was
provided by Antisthenes or what his view of virtue amounted toRist, Stoic Philosophy, Cambridge 1977[2] = 1966[1], p. 54
ff.
Cfr., however, VI 14: δοκεῖ δὲ (scil., Antisthenes)
καὶ τῆς ἀνδρωδεστάτης Στωικῆς
κατάρξαι (Socr. fr. V A
22 G.), and see supra, text to note
12. That Antisthenes
was the archegete of «the more manly section of the Stoic
school» agrees with
the suggestions evoked by the title Heracles. At VI 14, Diog. Laert. continues by
quoting an epigram of
Athenaeus (date unknown; see RE II (1896) col. 2024 s.v.Athenaios (16)) introduced by ὅθεν. This really is
about the Stoic doctrine that
«Virtue is the only good of
the soul» (or: «Virtue of the soul the only good»),
and is also quoted VII 30. (Cfr. also Suppl. Hellen. fr.
226.)
Although the word arete occurs frequently in
the placita of Antisthenes
at VI 10-1 and in the further
maxims of Antisthenes quoted from
Diocles at VI 12, it is not further described
there either. The similarity
between Antisthenes’ (and the Cynics’) view of Virtue
and that of the
Stoics can only have been partial. In bk. VI, we have nothing
cor-
responding to the definitions in the laudatio (inclusive
of its further
explanations apart from the κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν) at VII 87-9. But
the
appeal to a book composed by Antisthenes is absolutely
similar to the
appeals to Stoic books at VII 87. The inference that the passage
quoted
from VI 104 and the exposition at VII 87 f. must have been derived
from
the same source cut up by Diog. Laert.’s scissors, i.e. a source
of the Peri haireseon type containing laudationes,
seems inescapable.
The references to the Heracles here and at
VI 105 (for which see im-
mediately infra) are the only
references to a book in the general Cynic
doxography of bk. VI, the end, and the
special doxography of Antisthenes
at VI 10 ff. What should further be emphasized is
that at VI 104 the
appeal is to Antisthenes not Crates or Diogenes. The community
of
doctrines (koinonia) at issue here is not concerned with
the embar-
rassing things Zeno wrote «near the Dog’s tail» (for which see supra,p. 321 f., and infra, p. 343 f.)
but with dignified ethics. It would
appear that in this grave context, viz. a
context where the telos and
Virtue are concerned, Antisthenes
was a more serious asset for thediadoche than Crates or
Diogenes.
The other reference in the general Cynic doxography, at VI 105
(Ant. fr. 23 D. C., Socr. fr. V A 99 G.), confirms this
inference (Anti-
sthenes and his Heracles again):
ἀρέσκει δ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι, καθά φησιν Ἀν-
τισθένης ἐν τῷ
Ἡρακλεῖ, καὶ ἀναπόβλητον ὑπάρχειν.
That «Virtue can be taught (διδακτὴν)» is stated not only as
Anti-
sthenes’ first tenet in his general placita quoted
after an anonymous
source, not Dioclesinfra, note 137 and text
thereto), we also
have αὐτάρκη δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν (fr. 70 D. C., Socr. fr. V A 134 G.).
At VII 127, the formula is
identical: αὐτάρκη τ’ εἶναι αυτὴν (scil., τὴν ἀρετήν)
πρὸς
εὐδαιμονίαν; a laudatio follows (127-8), mentioning Zeno (SVF I 187), citing
a book by Chrysippus (SVF III 49), containing a quotation from a book by Hecaton
(fr. 3
Gomoll), and adding that Panaetius (fr. 110 van Straaten) and Posidonius (fr.
173
E.-K., 425 c Th.) disagreed. It should be noted that this laudatio immediately follows
upon the statement about what is «in
between Virtue and Vice» (cfr. infra, this p.)
and the
little laudatio concerned with the view that «Virtue cannot be
lost» (cfr.
immediately infra).Ant. fr. 69 D.C., Socr. fr. V A 134
G.),
but is also the subject of a laudatio containing names
and book-titles
at VII 91:
διδακτήν τ’ εἶναι αὐτήν, λέγω δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷπρώτῳ
Περὶ τέλους
φησί [SVF III 223] καὶ Κλεάνθης [SVF I
567]
καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τοῖς Προτρεπτικοῖς [fr. 2 Ε.-Κ., 435 B Th.] καὶ
Ἑκάτων
[fr. 8 Gomoll].
Furthermore, that «Virtue cannot be lost» (ἀναπόβλητον — VI 105,
quoted supra) is the view of Cleanthes not Chrysippus. Their
arguments
are given at VII 127 (SVF I
568 — cfr. also VII 128 = SVF I 569 —;SVF
III 237). No book-titles in this case, and a dissensio between Stoic
scholarchs. The Cynics, apparently, side with
Cleanthes or conversely.
Note that Zeno is not mentioned at VII
91 or 127. It should be further
pointed out that VII 127
begins with an interesting synkrisis between
Stoics and
Peripatetics which recalls much of the argument of Cicero’sDe
finibus III-V and suggests provenance from the Peri
haireseon litera-
turesupra, note 89 and text thereto.
κακίας, τῶν Περιπατητικῶν μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κ α
-
κίας εἶναι λέγοντων τὴν προκοπήν (not in SVF).
According to this
passage, the Stoics hold that there is no condition of the soul
that
would be intermediate between Virtue and Vice. On the other hand,
according
to the Stoics there are things (actions, events) intermediate
between good things
and bad things: the adiaphora, which are further
subdivided;
this further division constitutes a very characteristic and
difficult part of Stoic
ethics (cfr. SVF I 191-196, III 147-168)
and, as
is well known, was not accepted by Aristo Cfr. A.M. Ioppolo, op. cit., p. 152 ff., and infra, this page.
of adiaphora etc. in Diog. Laert. is at VII
102-6, a passage which
according to von ArnimSVF I, pp. XXXVIII f.laudationes which badly
interrupt and disturb the exposition,
but it would seem that von Arnim
exaggerates. I must refrain from discussing this
passage and would
like instead to concentrate on Aristo, whose definition of the telos as
we have noticed (supra, p.
336) is given not in the general doxography
but in his biobibliography at VII 160 (SVF I 351): Ἀ [...]
τέλος
ἔφησεν εἶναι τὸ ἀδιαφόρως ἔχοντα ζῆν πρὸς τὰ μεταξὺ ἀρε-
τής καὶ κακίας
κτλ. Strictly speaking, this has been cava-
lierly formulated: for one should not
live in this way as regards the
conditions of the soul which are intermediate
between Virtue and Vice,
but in respect of those things, or aspects of life, which
are intermediate
between things good and evil. Interestingly, the same inaccuracy
occurs
in a general Cynic placitum at VI 105 where we find a
reference to
Aristo (not in SVF; fr. 138 Hülser; Socr. fr. V A 135, p. 370, 19 f. G.):
τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ
κακίας ἀδιάφορα λέγουσιν
ὁμοίως Ἀρίστωνι τῷ Χίῷ. The point of this statement
obviously is
that the Cynic view of the adiaphora is not the
common Stoic one (for
which see VII 102-6), but Aristo’s, who
did not distinguish between
things to be preferred and things not to be preferred
(VII 160 = SVFI 351, continued:
μηδ’ ἡντινοῦν ἐν αὐτοῖς παραλλαγὴν ἀπολείποντα,
ἀλλ’ἐπίσης ἐπὶ πάντων ἔχοντα). From
the wording, including the
inaccurate μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, it is clear that the
connection
between VI 105 and VII 160 is not less close than
that between the
other passages in bks. VI and VII dealing with
dignified ethical doctrines
which have been discussed above. Note that the Cynic
view reported
at VI 105 has been Stoicized, because the term ἀδιάφορα is Stoic
not
CynicIoppolo, op. cit., p. 158 f.
formula as at VI 105 and VII 160 can be paralleled from else-
where, see the important
account at Sext. Emp. M. XI 63 f. (SVFI 361, p. 83, 13 τὰ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἀδιάφορα; p. 83,
27-8,
τοῖς μεταξύ ἀρετής καὶ κακίας πράγμασιν), and adv.
Math.
VII 12
(SVF I 356, p. 80, 25-7).
Seneca’s account, ep. 94, 5 ff., is more
accurate (SVF I 359, p. 81, 21: pecuniam nec bonum nec
malum, and
esp. p. 81, 31 ff: virtutem unicum bonum
hominis adamaverit,turpitudinem s o l u m malum fugerit, reliquia omnia
[...] scieritesse mediam partem, nec bonis adnumeranda nec
malis); cfr. also Cic. leg. I 55 (SVF ι 367, p. 84, 36 f.). As is clear from these
passages in Seneca and
Cicero, the inaccurate formula found at Diog.
Laert. VI 105 and VII
160, and in Sextus, finds its origin in the fact
that Virtue itself was
considered a good, and Vice an evil.
The other reference to Aristo in the general Cynic placita is
at
the beginning of the exposition, VI 103 (SVF I 354 — von
Arnim’s
only excursion into bk. VI —, Socr. fr. V B 368 G.):
ἀρέσκει οὐν
αὐτοῖς τὸν λογικὸν καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν τόπον περιαιρεῖν,
ἐμφερῶς
Ἀρίστωνι τῷ Χίῷ, μόνῳ δὲ προσέχειν τῷ ἠθικῷ. Compare, from
Aristo’s
biobibliography at
VII 160 (SVF I 351, p. 79, 11 f.): τὸν
τε
φυσικὸν τόπον καὶ τὸν λογικὸν ἀνῄρει κτλ. Again, the wording is
virtually
identical; note that the parallel accounts at SVF I 352,
353,
356, speak of τα φυσικά and φυσικὴν ... θεωρίαν. That the Cynicplacita begin with this reference to Aristo is significant: logic
and
physics are discarded, continuity between Cynics and Stoics is in the
field
of ethics. We have noticed above P. 328.
emphasized by
Diog. Laert. also put the continuity in the field of ethics
in the first place.
Neither Diog. Laert. nor our other sources attribute
to Aristo Cynicizing doctrines
of an embarrassing nature. The purport
of the two references to Aristo at VI 103 and 105 is that Cynicism
is
an uncomplicated ethical system, that of the reference to «the life
in accord with
Virtue» and to Antisthenes and Zeno at VI 104 is that
this simple ethics was a
highly moral affair, for which the view of thetelos to be
found in Antisthenes’ Heracles set the pattern.
In the general doxography of Stoic ethics in bk. VII, there are
only two references
to Cynical views which, as we shall see, are criti-
cized elsewhere. The first of
these follows upon Apollodorus’ statement
that the Wise Man is to be a Cynicsupra, p. 337.scil.,SVF I 254,
III
747), where the mitigating κατὰ περίστασιν should be noted. The
second is to be
found in a laudatio at VII 131 (SVF I 269
+ III 728):
«they also hold that among the Wise there should be a community
of
wives with free choice of female partners, as Zeno says in hisPoliteia and Chrysippus in his Peri politeias — and as
also Diogenes
the Cynic [not in Giannantoni] and Plato say». Possibly, the
reference
to Plato to some extent neutralizes that to Diogenes. However,
from
these two passages it would appear to follow that it would be unwise
to
regard the ethical doxography as a monolithic whole.
We have noticed above
Stoics rejected Zeno’s Politeia and other works as spurious, or attemp-
ted to remove the more
embarrassing sections. Now there is, apart
from those in the general placita studied in the present section, one
other reference to
a work written by a Cynic which is to be found
in a doxographic context, viz. to
Diogenes’ tragedy Thyestes at VI 73
(Socr. fr. V B 132 G.). This play contained a curious
“Anaxagorean”
argument in favour of cannibalism. The text continues: «[...] if
the
tragedies are really his and not the work of his pupil Philiscus of
Aegina
[or of Dasiphon the son of Lucianus, who according to Favo-
rinus in his Miscellaneous History (fr. 72 Barigazzi) wrote them after
the
death of Diogenes]»
G. Giannantoni, Socraticorum cit., III,
p. 425 ff. (on Thyestes, p. 429 ff.).
attributed to Diog. Laert. himselfMejer, (supra, note 10), p. 30 ff.
between square brackets clearly is an addition cleverly inserted.
This
Philiscus of Aegina in also mentioned at VI 80, in the note
concluding
Diogenes’ bibliography: «Satyrus adds that the sorry tragedies are
by
Philiscus of Aegina, a pupil of Diogenes» (Socr. fr. V
B 128 G.;
cfr. also the passages from Julian printed ibid.). It would appear that
in the account followed by Diog.
Laert., the reference to Thyestes was
accompanied by a note
concerned with its dubious authenticity which
sufficiently interested Diog. Laert.
and so triggered off the insertion.
The point itself should be compared with that
about the genuineness
of Diogenes’ Politeia in Philodemus’
On the Stoics (see further infra,p. 348 f.) and with the discussion concerned with certain works
of
Zeno at VII 32 ff., a passage to which I shall now turn. Together withVII 187-9supra, p. 321 f., also for references to SVF.
and
Stoics which is entirely different from that concerned with the
common telos and related matters studied so farSupra, p. 330 ff.
At VII 32-34, the little known Skeptic Cassius, and
Isidorus
of Pergamum, are quoted for their criticisms of certain doctrines
held
by Zeno; according to Isidorus, Athenodorus the Stoic and
others
disapproved of these works, or at least of certain passages, and
declared
them spurious or expunged certain sections (34). These critics
quote
chapter and verse, i.e., provide a laudatio: there are
two explicit re-
ferences to Zeno’s Politeia (SVF I 259, 222), one to a book calledErotike techne (not in SVF; not in the bibliography at
Diog. Laert.
VII 4, which only lists a work called Techne —
perhaps the text atVII 4 should be emended to <Ἐρωτική>
τέχνη), and one to a book
called Diatribai (not in SVF, but cfr. SVF I 250) which is not in
the
bibliography either. Athenodorus represents a Stoic current that rejec-
ted
the cruder forms of Cynicism for moral reasons. Cassius’ angle
need not have been
the same as Athenodorus’; as a Skeptic, he will
have been delighted both by the dissensio among the Stoics and by
the fact that some of the
views of the early Zeno (VII 32, 33 = SVF
I
222, 226) flagrantly contradict the official Stoic doctrine (see,
e.g.,
VII 108 = SVF III 495, and VII
120 = SVF
III 731). It should be
noted that, at VII
34, the authority of Chrysippus is invoked against
Athenodorus c.s.: «that the
Politeia is by Zeno is also affirmed by
Chrysippus in his
Peri Politeias» (see SVF
III p. 203, 3 f.), cfr. the
point made by Philod, On the Stoics, ch. 6 (infra, p. 349).
At VII 187-8, we have the views of anonymous persons who
se-
verely criticized Chrysippus for the immoral and indecent things to be
found
in his writings (εἰσὶ δὲ οἳ κατατρέχουσι τοῦ Χρύσιππου ὡς πολλὰ
αἰσχρῶς καὶ ἀρρήτως
ἀναγεγραφότος). These critics also quoted chap-
ter and verse, i.e., provided a laudatio. Five titles of books by Chrysip-
pus are given. In
the first work to be quoted, Peri ton archaion physio-logon
(SVF
II 1071), he presented an ekphrasis of an
indecent painting
(Diog. Laert. does not give us the details, which however we know
from
other sources, cfr. SVF II 1073, 1074) which perhaps
didn’t even exist
because it is not mentioned by the important historians of
painting.
In his Politeia (SVF
III 744), and right at the beginning of his Periton me di heauta haireton (SVF
III 744), he promoted incest — a very
Cynic interest. In bk.
iii of his Peri dikaiou (SVF
III 747), he advised
the consumption of dead human bodies —
also a Cynic suggestion.
The last quote, from bk. ii of his
Peri biou kai porismou (SVF
III 685),
contains a doctrine that is not immoral, although it
is close to the
views of Aristo (and the Cynics?)supra, p. 341.adiaphora. But it fla-
grantly contradicts a view also
expressed by Chrysippus and known
from elsewhere, viz. from. Plut. stoic. rep. 1043 e and 1047 F (both
texts at SVF
iii 693). I assume that at VII 189 we have the remains
of a
Skeptic argument from diaphonia.
The argument, both as to its contents and as to its form, is remar-
kably similar in
VII 32-4 and 187-9. One small, but unique, point is
most
revealing. At VII 33, Zeno is said to have affirmed something
in
his Politeia in a passage « of about 200 lines (κατά τούς
διακοσίους
<στίχους>)». At VII 187, Chrysippus is said
to have affirmed something
in his Peri ton archaion
physiologon in a passage «of about 600 lines
(κατὰ τοὺς ἐξακοσίους στίχους)». Accordingly, the source from
which
this information derives emphasizes that, in both cases, the
scandalous
views of Zeno and Chrysippus were not obiter
dicta, but received ex-
tensive treatment. Furthermore, both these critical
passages which,
after all, are of a doxographic nature, have been appended: the
first
to the biography of Zeno, the second to that of Chrysippus. The pas-
sage
about Zeno has been inserted between the account of his death
and the paragraph on
the homonyms, that about Chrysippus comes at
the very end of the biography and is
only followed by the bibliography
which presumably was transcribed last because of
its extraordinary
length. The most plausible assumption is that Diogenes cut up
an
indictment of Cynicizing Stoic morality in malam partem,
and inserted
the pieces at or near the end of these two biographical sections supra, note 18)
is also valid, in some cases,
for larger ones. — That Diog. Laert. cut things up is
also clear from the
parallels containing laudationes at Sext.
Emp. P. III 245-8 ~ M.XI
189-93.
We are therefore entitled to speak of two different views
concerned
with the continuity between Cynics and Stoics, viz. one (the
tradition
preferred by Diog. Laert.) emphasizing dignified ethics, the other
(sort
of tucked away by him) immoral and obscene ideas. What we have
here are
the traces of an ancient polemic, in which both camps quoted
chapter and verse (laudationes). In order to contradict the critics, one
could
choose among several options: a) one could quote passages, and
even construct a diadoche (Antisthenes!), concerned with the telos inbonam partem; b) embarrassing works could be athetized; c)
youth
could be an excuse (see infra). That laudationes were an important
weapon in the hands of ancient polemists
(personal diffamation was
anotherOwen, Ancient Philosophical
Invective, « Oxf.Stud.Anc.Phil. »,
I (1983) p. 1
ff.pro and contra Epicurus
to be found in bk. X. Here, the contrasting
traditions are set out by
Diog. Laert. in a straightforward way (cfr. infra, App. I
as deviously as in bk. VII.
Proof that two traditions concerning the Stoics existed is
available.
Panaetius (ap. Cic. De off.
I 99 and 126-9) criticized those Cynicizing
Stoics who lacked verecundia (αἰδῶς) (cfr. also de off. I 148sophrosyne after Panaetius;
cfr. M. van Straaten, Panétius. Sa vie, ses écrits et sa doctrine
avec une éditiondes fragments, diss. Nijmegen 1946, Amsterdam 1946, p.
284. On Panaetius’ rôle
in the revisionist current see also ibid., p. 48. In view of Panaetius’ involvement,
it cannot be an
accident that his pupil Hecaton argued that Zeno’s introduction
to philosophy was
the result not of his encounter with the Cynic Crates, but of
his study of «the
books of the ancients» (VII 2), and that this was also the view
of Apollonius of
Tyre (ibid.; see supra, p. 320).
Although he did not deny that
Zeno met Crates, Demetrius of Magnesia (fr. 22
Mejer ap.
Diog. Laert. VII 22-3,
cfr. supra,
p. 324) seems to fall in with those Stoics criticized by Philodemus
— cfr. infra, p. 348 f. — who claimed descent from the Socratics and
Antisthenes,
because he speaks of the «books of the Socratics» Zeno read as a
youth at Cition.
The Cynics themselves could only become Socratics after
Antisthenes had been
interpolated in the Succession. Finally, the attempts to
emphasize Zeno’s links with
the Academy (the Academics, after all, were
Socratics) may also be viewed in this
light (on Polemo and Xenocrates as Zeno’s
teachers see supra, pp. 320, 323, 327).
It is well-neigh
impossible to separate the historical truth from the aetiological
historical
myth; Crates’ position, at any rate, is safe because Zeno wrote Apomne-moneumata Kratetos.de
fin.
III 48, mentions the two currents in Stoicism, and a sort
of
revisionism seems to be implied by Arius Didymus ap. Stob.
II, p. 114,
24-5 (not in SVF). Seneca presents the Graeco-Roman Cynic Demetrius
in a very
decent Stoic manner, omitting aspects that are embarrassingBillerbeck, Der
Kyniker Demetrios, (Philosophia antiqua XXXVI)
Leiden
1979.
Epictetus diatr.
III 22, presents the “true” Cynic in a very dignified
Stoic
light and sets him off against the sordid Cynic; even his Diogenes
has become
largely moral in the dignified Stoic senseBillerbeck, Epiktet: Vom Kynismus,
(Philosophia antiqua XXXIV) Leiden
1978, p. 4: «die philosophische Lehre, die
Epiktet dem Kyniker in den Mund
legt, basiert grundsätzlich auf der Lehrmeinung
der alten Stoa». Cfr. also ibid.,p. 43 f., about the
discussion concerned with Cycinism among the Stoics.
Athenodorus and the other Stoics mentioned by Diog. Laert., VII 34,
belong to the current represented by Panaetius ap. Ciceronem and
later by Seneca and Epictetus. But the severe attacks
against immoral
Cynic aspects of Early Stoicism exemplified at Diog. Laert. VII
32-4
and 187-9 seem to have originated with the Epicureans, who presu-
mably
took their revenge for the Stoic criticism of Epicurus (one does
not know, however,
which side began the hostilities). This, at any
rate, is what would appear from
Philodemus’ On the Stoics, already
briefly referred to
previouslySupra, p.
321.
splendid edition and commentary
Supra, note 44;
cfr. also the partial edition with commentary by R. Gian-nattasio Andria, Diogene Cinico nei papiri
Ercolanesi, «Cron. Erc.», 10 (1980)
p. 129 ff.
In Phil. de Stoic. 21 ch. 1, we have the fragmentary remains
of
(Stoic?) attacks against Epicurus, to which Philodemus replies, mostly,
with
a spirited counter-attack. He ridicules the attempts of revisionist
Stoics who tried
to excuse the embarrassing doctrines of the Politeiaby
insisting on the fact that Zeno was young when he wrote it or that,
for this reason
and in a sense, this work is not by the real Zeno (ch. 2).
He also attacks the
argument that the Stoics are not responsible for
what Zeno then wrote: he is after
all the founder of Stoicism (ch. 3).
There is a fragmentary sentence at the
beginning of ch. 3, col. XIII
(not in SVF or Hülser), which
has been restored by Koerte ad pro-babilem senteniam:
[λέγουσι γὰρ ὅτι ὑπὸ Σωκράτους ἡ ἀγωγ]η̣ τὴν
ἀρχὴ[ν καὶ Ἀντισ]θ̣ένους καὶ Διογένους
συνέσ̣τη, διό̣ καὶ Σωκρατικοὶ
καλεῖσθαι θέ[λ]ο̣υσιν. Presumably, the revisionist
Stoics (or some
among them) constructed a Succession
Socrates-Antisthenes-Diogenes-
Zeno, but not only played down Zeno’s Politeia but, as clearly appears
from the sequel according to
Dorandi’s convincing explanation, also
argued that Diogenes’ Politeia was spurious Op. cit., p. 92 ff.; for the Succession ibid., p. 119.
the real founder of the
Stoic school and those who deny him destroy it
(ch. 3). The following point
discussed by Philodemus (ch. 4) is of
great interest in our context, because it is
clear that the (or some)
revisionist Stoics rejected the Politeia but accepted Zeno because of
his discovery of
the telos, ch. 4 col. XIV (not in SVF or Hülser):
τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς ἀποδέχονται τὸν Ζήνωνα διὰ τὴν τοῦ τέ-λους εὕρεσιν οἱ
Στωϊκοί κατατετολμηκότων ἐστι˙ καὶ γὰρ
τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν δογμάτων θαυ̣μάζουσιν αὐτοῦ. καὶ τῶν ἀμήχανων
ἐστὶν τοῦ
τέλους ἐ[νδεχομ]ένου μὴ κ[α]ὶ τἆλλα συμφώνως ἀπο-
δίδοσθαι. καὶ τῷ τ̣έλει δὲ
ἀκόλου̣θόν ἐ̣στι τὰ διὰ τῆς Πολιτείας
ἐ̣κκείμεν̣α π̣ρ̣[ο]σ̣δέχεσθαι.
The telos discovered by Zeno can only be the famous formula or
for-
mulas discussed aboveSupra, p. 330 ff.; cfr. also T. Dorandi, op. cit., p. 117.
discard the embarrassing Cynic strains in
Zeno’s philosophy, or at any
rate ignored them, put the telos
first and foremost and constructed a
link with the telos of
Antisthenessupra, p. 337 ff.
of
misrepresentation: although the revisionist Stoics also accept the
other doctrines
of Zeno and not merely his telos-formula, they
definitely
exclude the Politeia. His point that the contents
of the Politeia agree
with the telos-formula must have infuriated his opponents, but we have
noticed supra that «to live in accord with Nature» is compatible
with
a personalist interpretationsupra, p. 333.
Other Stoics, Philodemus continues, naively accept the Politeiabut exclude the passage on the διαμηρίζειν (ch. 5). Others,
again,
argue that the Politeia of Diogenes (which has so much
in common
with that ascribed to Zeno) is spurious, but these persons disagree
with
the real Stoics (ch. 6). A very long list of laudationes
follows, which
proves that Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Antipater, stated that
Diogenes’Politeia is genuine. Cleanthes did so in a work
titled Peri stoles (text
at SVF I 590
not good). Not less than 9 titles are given for Chrysippus:Peri
poleos kai nomou; Politeiai; Peri
politeias; Peri ton me di heautahaireton; Pros tous allos noountas ten phronesin, bk. 1; Peri tou kataphysin biou; Peri tou kalou kai tes
hedones, bk. 4; Peri dikaiosynes,bk. 3; Peri tou kathekontos, bk. 6. We have noticed above
in his Peri politeias Chrysippus had said that Zeno’s Politeia is genuine
(Diog. Laert. VII 34); according to Philodemus, what he
said in the
same work about a doctrine of Diogenes amounts to the same
conclusion
about Diogenes’. Furthermore, of the 9 Chrysippean titles quoted
by
Philodemus, 2 (and possibly 3, if the Peri dikaiou is the
same work
as the Peri dikaiosunesDiog. Laert. VII 187, the
Peri dikaiou is cited for the
exhortation to consume
the bodies of the dead, and that in Philod. loc. cit., thePeri dikaiosynes is cited on
account of the practice of anthropophagy. On the latter
work cfr. H. von Arnim, SVF
III, p. 195 who believes Peri dikaiou
refers to it.
immoral
Cynicizing views at Diog. Laert. VII 187-9, viz. Politeia
andPeri ton me di heauta haireton. Philodemus adds that
the majority of
the evil doctrines contained in Diogenes’ Politeia are also to be found
in his tragedies — a remark which throws some
light on their athetesisaccording to some authorities cited
by Diog. Laert. VI 73 and 80supra, p. 343 f.
Finally, Philodemus points out
that also Antipater of Tarsus in hisKata ton haireseon
compared the Politeia of Zeno with that of Dioge-
nes (SVF
III Ant. 67). In ch. 7, a sort of “Lasterkatalog”,
Philodemus
enumerates the immoral doctrines shared by Zeno and Diogenes
and
those who agree with them. Numerous details are the same as those
to be
found in Diog. Laert. VII 32-4 and 187-9, as well as in the
report about Diogenes’
doctrines at VI 72-3; similar details and quotes
are also at Sext. Emp. pyrrh.
III 245-8 ~ adv. math. XI 189-93.
What is important about this long fragment of Philodemus is not
merely that he
provides important parallels for the two currents in
Stoicism, but also that his own
argument belongs with the tradition
which criticized the Early Stoa for its immoral
Cynic theories. Some
of the laudationes in ch. 6 also add the
specific doctrine involved.
Philodemus and his anti-Stoic sources belong with the
tradition also
represented by Diog. Laert. VII 32-4 and 187-9. Whether or not
Diog.
Laert. found these two opposed views in the same immediate source
is
immaterial. Antisthenes’ (restored) name occurs only once in Philo-
demus, viz. in
the Succession claimed by some Stoicssupra, note 113 and text thereto.
villain is Diogenes the Dog. In Diog. Laert., the emphasis is
different
and the tradition that is followed underlines the connection with
Anti-
sthenes, quoting the latter’s Heracles. Because
Antisthenes’ position at
the beginning of the Cynic-Stoic Succession is almost certainly a
later
constructG. Giannantoni, Socraticorum cit., ΙΙΙ, p. 203 ff.
have seen, knows the other position) and Diog. Laert. is of
capital
importance. It would appear that to the revisionist current in
Stoicism
Antisthenes proved a real asset. The genuine historical line,
presumably,
is Diogenes-Crates-Zeno (the young Zeno). Those who put
Antisthenes
first could argue that Zeno developed what was really important
in
Cynicism, or they could reject works both by Diogenes and by Zeno.
The
vitality of the historical tradition constructed in this way is also
apparent from
the inclusion of Aristo and the emphasis on the rejec-
tion, by the Cynics and
Aristo, of physics and logic (VI 103)supra, p. 342.
Stoic such as Epictetus
had little use for either physics or logic.
In Diog. Laert., the opposition between the two views of Stoicism
is only present in
the background: the unfavourable tradition is placed
in the context of the
biographies of Zeno and Chrysippus. Although
he strived to be neutral, Diog. Laert.
clearly has his preferences. The
result, in places, is rather flat, but I would like
to express disagreement
with Bouvard et Pécuchet and submit that it is the
historian’s duty
to «gonfler ce qui est plat».
4. The Logical Doxography and the Diocles Fragment.
The structure and composition of the logical doxography at VII
41 τὸ δὲ λογικόν
μέρος-83 καὶ ὧδε μὲν αὐτοῖς ἔχει τὸ λογικὸν
present a vexing problem. From Diog.
Laert.’s concluding words at
VII 83 one could not have inferred that in the previous
chapters both
a general and a more detailed account had been given, the
latter
covering much the same ground as large chunks of the general
expos-
ition. But looking back at VII 48, Diog. Laert. states that up to now
he
has provided a summary (48, κεφαλαιωδῶς, cfr. 38, ἐπὶ κεφαλαίων)
and that
henceforward things will be discussed in detail (κατὰ μέρος);
in what follows, he wishes to transcribe verbatim
(ἐπὶ λέξεωςs.v. ΙΙ, where two parallels are given. I have checked Aristotelisvita vulgata 9, p. 132 Düring. Add Simpl.
in phys. p. 563, 8 f. Diels.
passage
from Diocles’ Epidrome. The introductory sentence (or
sen-
tences), ἐν οὖν τοῖς [...] λέγων οὕτως, is (are) unfortunately far
from
clear. It is to be deplored that the apparatus in the most recent
critical
edition, by Eglisupra, note 69. Egli’s constituitio is
also printed in Hülser (cfr. infra,note 141)., is incomplete: it was Cobet not Diels who corrected
δοκεῖν
into the δοκεῖ accepted by Diels, Hicks, Egli although not by
Nietzsche and H. S.
Long
text and interpretation are at Bornmann-Carpitella (eds.), op. cit., p. 78
(cfr.
also ibid., p. 201 f.). For Diels’ text and
interpretation see Doxographi graeci,Berlin 1879, p. 169
ff. For Bahnsch’s text and argument see F. Bahnsch, Quae-stionum de Diogenis Laertii fontibus initia, diss.
Königsberg, Gumbinnen 1868,
pp. 42-3.
preferred in his text was conjectured by Cobet, who was followed
by
Bahnsch, Hicks, H. S. Long, whereas the mss, followed by Nietzsche
and Diels,
have εἴποιμεν. Egli’s ταῦτά τε follows the majority of the
mss; it is also read by
Nietzsche and Diels, whereas Hicks and H. S.
Long prefer ταῦτ(α). Furthermore,
Nietzsche and H. S. Long put a full
stop after κεφαλαιωδῶς, which would seem to be
more plausible if
— with Hicks and H. S. Long — one would read ταῦτ(α). The
various
interpretations and readings of the difficult sentence(s) that have
been
proposed have now been discussed in admirable detail by Barnes Op. cit. (supra, note 6) p. 28 ff.
who adds some pertinent
observations of his own. Yet I find it im-
possible to choose among the various
options on grammatical grounds
alone, i.e., without introducing considerations
pertaining to one’s idea
of the logical doxography in Diog. Laert. For instance,
although ταῦτά
τε as against ταῦτ(α) or ταῦτα τά may be right on
codicological
grounds, it can be argued (a possibility overlooked by Barnes)
that
the archetypus may already have contained variae lectiones variously
reported it its progeny, or else
that ταῦτα τά may have arisen from
dittography so that ταῦτά τε would be a Verschlimmbesserung. Further-
more, the infinitive δοκεῖν is not objectionable in itself; Diels
presum-
ably is right that only if one writes τε one should alter to δοκεῖ.
On
the other hand, if δοκεῖν is kept, a δοκεῖ should be supplied ad sen-tentiam with the ensuing καὶ τάδε which otherwise is left in the
air.
I agree with Barnes’ argument that Diels will be right (as
against
Nietzsche) that καὶ αὐτά represents a καὶ ἅ; yet this is not
necessarily
the only option open to us.
Diels’ translation of the difficult sentence(s) may be quoted
because it provides a
convenient point of departure: «in logicis igitur
et haec placent quae summatim
exposui [placent summatim would have
been more exact] et ut singillatim quoque
persequar etiam haec, quae
quidem ad institutionis artem Stoicorum pertinent [quae
ad artem
isagogicam pertinent would have been more exact] quaeque Diocles
in
philosophorum percursione ad verbum sic ponit» Dox. gr. 162.
Now Diels, von ArnimSVF I, p. XXXI. Von Arnim prints excerpts from Diog. Laert.
VII 49-82
as from Diocles not Diog. Laert., see the index in vol. IV of SVF.supra, note 69.
sumed, on the basis of this or a very similar translation and
inter-
pretation of the difficult sentence, that the whole of VII 49-82, or
the
logical singillatim section, is by Diocles. Egli even adds 83,
but
von Arnim correctly pointed out Loc. cit. supra, note 128.
at 46 αὐτήν [...] διαλεκτικήν ff., which is interrupted at 48
ἀνδρὸς
εἶναι.
Now von Arnim, in his analysis of the composition of Diog.
Laert.’s Stoic
doxography, insisted that in the section which he took
to be by Diocles the laudationes with one exception fit their context:
«bene se
habere et vacare iis offensionibus quae in physica parte
deteximus, praeter eas quae
§ 54 [VII 54 κριτήριον — the end] pro-
feruntur de norma iudicii»SVF I, p. XXXVII.
at 54 would — in von Arnim’s view — have
been inserted by Diog.
Laert. Egli, however, believes that 54 belongs to Diocles,
who would
have taken this and similar passages from Posidonius. Other
sources
of what would be Diocles’ compilation indicated by Egli are Crinis
and
the unknown author or authors of a Stoic logical manual or
manualsin margine.. Von
Arnim’s analysis and his attribution of VII 48-82 to
Diocles
were criticized by Mejer, who pertinently pointed out that at
55 a new section seems
to begin and argues that the preceding chapters
provide an explanation for what is
stated in 49Op. cit.
(supra, note 10), p. 5 note 12. But note that
according to Mejer VII
54 belongs with this explanation.
who believes that the difficult sentence in 48 is probably
corrupt,
reverts to the position of Cobet — who, it would appear, is
blindly
followed by H. S. Long — and has the Diocles fragment stop at the
end of
49. A. A. Long suggests that the fragment may continue a
bit farther, but does not
specify exactly how farF. H.
Sandbach, Ennoia and Prolepsis, in A.
A. Long (ed.), Problems inStoicism, London 1971,
p. 33; A. A. Long, Dialectic and the Stoic
Sage, in J. M.Rist (ed.), The
Stoics, Major Thinkers Series I, Berkeley and L. A.-London 1978,
p. 122
note 6.
that another inquiry into the composition of the
logical doxography
is hardly redundant.
First, I would like to point out that it would be unwise to try
to take the
difficult sentence in 48 au pied de la lettre, for the
simple
reason that it has more feet than one can handle. The text, as we
have
noticed, is not certain; furthermore, Diog. Laert.’s references to
sources quoted —
whether directly or at one or more removes —
or to subjects to be treated (cfr.,
e.g., II 47 supra, p. 319 f. One may also recall the sentence about the
“ethicalhaireseis” at I 18, for
which see supra, p. 316.
clumsy. In other cases, it is impossible to say where exactly a
given
abstract is supposed to end (cfr., e.g., VIII 36, the beginning).
One
cannot, therefore, be certain that all that follows after 48 up to 82
really
is Diocles.
Secondly, it should be recalled that in the 19th century scholars
such as V. Rose
and F. Nietzsche believed that the whole logical
doxography from VII 41 derives from
Diocles. Actually, Nietzsche
argued that Diog. Laert. as a whole (or at any rate to a large
extent)
is merely a sort of Diocles with revisions and additions Beiträge zur
Quellenkunde des Laertius Diogenes. § 2: Dioklesals Hauptquelle des Laertius
Diogenes, in Bornmann-Carpitella (eds.), op. cit.,
p. 201 ff., and J. Barnes’
remarks, op. cit. (supra, note 6) p.
21 ff.
as Diels’ refutation is based upon an acute linguistic
interpretation of
the difficult sentence at VII 48, it is not fully satisfactory,
but his
remark that the reference to Diocles at VII 48 should be compared
to
that at VI 12 (where, as a glance at VI 11 proves, a new section
begins) is fully
cogentDox. gr. 163
note 1; cfr. supra, note 92 and text thereto.
implication, of Nietzsche — is entirely to
the pointOp. cit., p. 42 f.
the “contents” of the longer
and the short accounts and so proved
that they cannot both derive from the same
source. Nietzsche’s attempt
to refute Bahnschsupra, note 136, and cfr. infra, note 152.
of the two accounts derive from different sources, but argues that
it
was Diocles who combined them. This is to put the cart before the
cart before
the horse. However, from Bahnsch’s analysis it does not
follow that all of VII 48-82
is by Diocles; yet this is what he appears
to have assumed.
On the other hand, Bahnsch made an important observation not
heeded by later
scholars Op. cit.,
p. 42.
section] nonnulla plenius, quam in posteriori [viz. the
detailed
section]». This is both odd and interesting, because, at first
blush,
one would expect the opposite to be true. Bahnsch did not further
pursue
this aspect of the matter; what follows is indebted to his
analysis, although I may
say that, working from the source itself,
I had completed my own before finding it
anticipated. The chapters
from the brief account to be compared are 41 τὸ δὲ
λογικόν-46
ἔκτυπον (41-49 = fr. 33 Hülser) and, from the detailed account,
49
ἀρέσκει,-82 the end SVF numbers throughout; note that von Arnim’s excerpts
are
far removed from covering the whole of 41-83. In Hülser, 48-83 = frr. 255 +
476
4- 536 + 594 4- 621 + 696 + 874 4- 914 + 1036 -f 1207 4- 87.
εἶναι (continued in 83), which mostly deal with dialectic and the
Stoic
Sage, have no parallel in the κατὰ μέρος section.
At VII 41, the λογικὸν μέρος of philosophy according to ἔνιοι
is subdivided the
normal wayrhet.should be
compared. Cfr. Zeno’s famous metaphor at SVF I 75, and
Cleanthesap.
Diog. Laert. VII 41 = SVF I 482.
rhetoric. But some (τινες) add two more parts,
one concerned with
definitions, the other with canons and criteria (τινὲς δὲ καὶ εἰς
τὸ
ὁρικὸν εἶδος (καὶ add. Pohlenz) τὸ περὶ κανόνων καὶ κριτηρίων; not
in SVF). Some (ἔνιοι), we are told, reject the definitory part.
These
other disciplines belonging to to logikon meros are
hardly ever ref-
erred to in the scholarly literatureU. Egli, Zur stoischen cit., (supra, note 69) p. 1, and
the
discussion in K. Hülser, Die
Fragmente cit., (supra, note 2) I, p. CXI
ff.;
there are some remarks in M. Pohlenz, op. cit., p. 32 and in G. Striker,
Κριτή-
ριον τῆς ἀληθείας, Nachricht der Akad. der. Wiss. in Göttingen,
Phil.-hist. Kl. 1974,
pp. 16, 38; cfr. also G. B. Kerferd,
The Problem of Synkatathesis and Katalepsis,in J. Brunschwig (ed.), Les Stoïciens et leur
logique, Paris 1978, p. 251 f. More,
in M. Frede,
Principles of Stoic Grammar, in J. M. Rist
(ed.), op. cit., (supra,note
134) pp. 53, 75 note 8. Cfr. also A. A. Long, Dialectic cit., (supra, note 134)
p. 114. It is rather noteworthy that
Cicero’s description of logic at tusc. V 72
(fr. 78
Hülser) omits rhetoric and phonetics and jumbles the other three parts
together:
sequitur tertia pars [scil., logic],
quae rem definit [~ horikon], / generadispertit, sequentia adiungit, perfecta concludit [~
semantics], / vera et
falsadiiudicat [~ peri kanonon kai
kriterion].
purpose these are of
outstanding importance.
Next, at VII 42 (not in SVF), we are told what are the
issues
dealt with in these disciplines concerned 1) with canons and
criteria,
and 2) with definitions. The former is a means of discovering
the
truth, ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ τὰς τῶν φαντασιῶν διαφορὰς ἀπευθύνου-
σιν. The latter
also is a means of recognizing the truth, inasmuch as
things (pragmata, what is the case) are apprehended by means of
concepts (ennoemata)
corrupt
sentence; it appears to have links with the horikon or at any
rate with
sub-disciplines of logic corresponding with the horikon.
With a brief definition of rhetoric, followed by two definitions
of
dialectic (SVF II 48), the exposition reverts to the two
main
disciplines into which (according to the ἔνιοι, at 41) the logical part
of
philosophy is subdivided. The first definition of dialectic to some
extent resembles
that of rhetoricLong, Dialectic cit., (supra,
note 134) p. 103, and my remarks
at «Mnemosyne», XXXI (1978) p. 141.
in our sense of the word and runs ἐπιστήμην ἀληθῶν καὶ
ψευδῶν
καὶ οὐδετέρων. This, of course, is Posidonius’ definition (cfr. fr.
188
E.-K., 454 Th., ap. Diog. Laert. VII 62). This provides a
t.p.q. for
the brief account. Two different subdivisions
of rhetoric are next
(42 καὶ τὴν μὲν-43 ἐπίλογον = SVF
II 295). Because the κατὰ
μέρος section does not deal with
rhetoric, I shall not return to what
is said about this logical discipline at VII 42-3.
At VII 43 τὴν διαλεκτικήν-44, the general exposition now
turns
to dialectic properSVF, no texts from VII 43-4 have been
printed.
σημαινομένων (τόπον)
and 2) (τὸν περὶ) τῆς φωνῆς τόπον. In thekata meros section,
however, the order is inversed: first Phonetics,
then Semantics (as I shall
henceforth for the sake of convenience
designate these two topoi). This difference points to different sources
for the brief and the
more detailed sections, or at any rate to different
traditions responsible for the
varieties in arrangement. Note that Chry-
sippus’ bibliography, though in some ways
closer to the brief account
than to the kata meros section,
does not correspond completely to the
former. In the brief account, we first have
Semantics (including ar-
guments) then Phonetics; in the bibliography, we first have
the prag-mata (SVF
II, p. 5, 4), then the lexeis (SVF
II, p. 6, 7), and then a
section on arguments (cfr. SVF n, p. 6, 31). Note that, in the biblio-
graphy, the
distinction between Semantics and Phonetics is not rigid,
for the section on lexeis also deals with the κατ’ αὐτὰς λόγον and
with certain
arguments. It is therefore incorrect to argue, with Egli
and Hülser, that the
sequence at VII 43-4 agrees with that of Chry-
sippus’ bibliographyEgli, Zur Stoischen cit., p. 1 ff., and
K. H. Hülser, op. cit., I,
pp. CXI,
CXIII f. Note that Egli, followed by Hülser, argues that the transmission
of
Chrysippus’ bibliography is chaotic, and that the order should be pp. 386,
10-389,
11+ 385, 3-386,9 + 390,11-23 + 398,12-390,10 Long = SVF II, pp. 6, 31-8,23 +
6,1-30 + 9,7-19 + 8,24-9, 6. Although this
transposition to a certain extent enhan-
ces the correspondence between the brief
account and the bibliography, the modified
bibliography itself can hardly be used
as an argument in favour of the relationship
of the brief account with such a
list of Chrysippus’ books, and several anomalies
remain even after this
transposition. The fact that the arrangement in the biblio-
graphy is disturbing
need not entail that it has been disturbed. Note that the
order of dialectical
topoi at K. Hülser, op. cit., I, p. CVI, is certainly not
Chrysippean (i.e. does not
correspond to the bibliography, even in its “restored”
form). See further infra, notes 148, 149, 155.
occurrence of Posidonius’ definition of dialectic at VII 42 proves
that
the brief account as a whole cannot be early.
At VII 43-4, the Semantic and Phonetic subdivisions of Dialectic
are then further
subdivided, the first topos being treated first. Here
we are
in for a small surprise: the first sub-topos of the
semantictopos is περὶ φαντασιῶν, a subject of which we
have just learned
that according to some authorities it (does not belong to the
semantictopos but) constitutes an eidos of its own. I shall revert to this
complication. The other items
dealt with according to the semantictopos are summarized in
an extensive table of contents up to 44
θερίζοντας. Here we are obliged to jump to
the κατὰ μέρος exposition.
At VII 63, ἐν δὲ τῷ [...] ὑπτίων (not in SVF; cfr. fr. 696 Hülser)
the contents of the semantic topos are also summarized. But, as Bahnsch
already pointed out
long ago, the summary in the brief account (43-4)
is much longer and far more
complete than that in the κατὰ μέρος
version (63)! It should be added that the list
at 43-4, although
rattled of a bit confusedly, perfectly matches (with a few
exceptions,
cfr. infra, p. 359) the ground covered in 63-82,
that the language
used in both tables is absolutely similar, and that accordingly
the
table in the κατὰ μέρος section is merely a compressed version of
that in
the brief accountEgli,
Zur Stoischen cit., p. 2 f., arbitrarily reduces the
extras in 43-4
by athetizing 43 καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων — εἰδῶν (thus eliminating genera and species,cfr. next note)
and 44 καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους — περαίνοντας. He is followed by Κ.-Η.Hülser, op. cit., I, p. CXIII f.
The second sub-topos (or -discipline) of dialectic
to be described
at 44 is τὸν προειρημένον [cfr. 43; important as a
Laertian
cross-reference] περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς φωνῆς. This deals with the
ἐγγράμ-
ματος φωνή (cfr., in the κατὰ μέρος section, 56-7; SVF
III D. 20)
and the τοῦ λόγου μέρη (cfr. 57-8; SVF
II 147, III D. 21, 22) as
well as with
soloecism (cfr. 59, in fine; SVF III D.
24), barbarism
(cfr. 59, in fine; SVF
III D. 24), poems (cfr. 60; not in SVF), amphi-boliai (cfr. 62; SVF
III D. 23), and the intonation of the voice and
music (both,
as Bahnsch pointed out, lacking in the detailed section).
By and large, the contents
of the phonetic topos as outlined at 44
are treated at 50-60
A and 62 ad finem.
But at 44 there is more: according to some authorities (κατὰ
τινας), the phonetic topos als dealt with: definitions, division,
and
peculiar expressions (lexeis). We should remember that
according to
the τινες mentioned at 41, definitions are to be
dealt with in aneidos of their own, although ἔνιοι rejected this part; presumably, the
latter added it to or
included it in the phonetic topos (cfr. infra, p. 367).
In the κατὰ μέρος account, definitions
are dealt with at 60 (SVFII 226, III Ant. 23), division at
61 (SVF
III D. 25); but lexeis
are
lacking. The detailed exposition, in other words, appends most of
the
further contents included by the τινας at 44. What should
be
pointed out, however, is that the κατὰ μέρος treatment of
the phonetictopos is also concerned with genera and species, which according to
43, as
Bahnsch already pointed out, do belong elsewhere, viz. with
the semantic topos
(genera and species constitute the
exceptions indi-
cated supra, p. 358, viz. those items on the
table of contents of the
semantic topos which are not found in the corresponding section of
the κατὰ μέρος account, but in another section thereofFrede, op. cit., p. 75
note 8. This
partly ruins his otherwise valuable comparison with later grammatical
treatises,
ibid., p. 53. U. Egli, Zur Stoischen cit., p. 2 f., and K. Hülser,op. cit., I, p. CXIII
f., argue that at VII 43 (cfr. previous note) genera and specieshave been listed
by mistake. In the section of Chrysippus’ bibliography at VII 200
(SVF
II, p. 9, 7 ff.) which lists works dealing with this subject,
the context, they
argue, is not concerned with lekta (note
that according to Egli and Hülser this
part of the bibliography has to be moved
from the ethical section to that onlexeis, see supra, note 147). But genera and species are not linguistic items, and
although they are
listed as linguistic items in the appendix to the Phonetics of
the kata meros section, it would be arbitrary to modify Chrysippus’
bibliography
accordingly. The inclusion of genera and species among the lekta of Semantics
as
at VII 43 is defensible. Note that according to “some” Stoics mentioned at VII
44horoi and dihaireseis are to
be included in Phonetics and that therefore this was
not a universal opinion.
Presumably, this inclusion of dihairesis brought that
ofgenera and species in its
wake; at VII 61, dihairesis is concerned with genus andspecies, and these have
previously been defined in the same chapter. Arguably,dihairesis was omitted at VII 43, either inadvertently or because it came
along
with the genera and species
that are listed.
Next, in 45, the usefulness of syllogistic is stressed; this issue
is
not discussed in the κατὰ μέρος section. What is in 45 is a prelude
to 46 αὐτήν
δὲ-48 ἀνδρὸς εἶναι+83. Next, argument (logos) is
defined; at
greater length, this definition also occurs later, at 76
(SVF
III Crin. 5). But nothing in the κατὰ μέρος section
corresponds
to the definition of proof that comes next at 45 (these
definitions
at 45 are SVF
ii 235).
Finally, we have another discussion of phantasia (45 τὴν
δὲ-46
ἒκτυπον, SVF II 53); it will be recalled that this
subject was already
found in the eidos concerned with canons
and criteria (41, 42) and
also (alternatively) briefly referred to as the first
sub-iopoi of the
semantic topos (43). In what is Zeno’s way
(cfr. SVF I 58, 59) it
is explained at τύπωσιν ἐν ψυχὴ. Then
the cataleptic phantasia is
briefly described: τὴν γινομένην
ἀπο ὑπάρχοντος κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ
ὑπάρχον ἐναπεσφραγισμένην καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένην (cfr. also
SVF I
59); next we find important information about two
different kinds
of phantasiai that are not cataleptic. To
some degree, this passage
corresponds to 49-54 in the κατὰ μέρος section. Note that
46 τὴν
γινομένην [...] ἐναπομεμαγμένην is almost identical with the
descrip-
tion of phantasia at 50, [...] ἡ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατὰ
τὸ ὑπάρχον
ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναποτετυπωμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη; the
word
αὐτὸ is not at 50, whereas the words καὶ ἐναποτετυπωμένη
are lacking at 46.
Furthermore, the sentence οΐα ούκ αν γένοιτο άπο
μὴ ὑπάρχοντος that immediately follows at 50 is not found at 46;
since
this is believed to be a further qualification subsequently added
to the definition
to fortify it against Arcesilaus’ criticismSext. Emp. adv. math.
VII 252 (not in SVF); Cic., Luc. 78 (SVF 177);
and see G. Striker, op. cit., p. 37
esting to have a
definition without this further qualification (but
with description of phantasiai that are not cataleptic) at 46.
We should now turn to the detailed account itself in order to
make the comparison
more stringent, and ask ourselves to which
parts and subdivisions and further
subdivisions of subdivisions of the
general exposition the parts and subdivisions
and further subdivisions
of the detailed exposition correspond, and how far this
correspondence
goes.
Take the first sentence quoted from Diocles at VII 49:
ἀρέσκει τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς τὸν περὶ φαντασίας καὶ αἰσθήσεως π ρ ο -
τ ά τ τ ε ι v λόγον,
καθότι τὸ κριτήριον, ᾧ ἡ ἀλήθεια τῶν πραγ-
μάτων γινώσκεται κτλ. (SVF I 52).
«To put in the forefront» (προτάττειν) in the context of the κατὰ
μέρος section
means: to treat before Phonetics (55 ff.) and Semantics
(63 ff.). This is not the arrangement according to the table of contents
of the
semantic topos at 43 according to which the phantasiai from
which the lekta arise are treated as
the first sub-topos of Semantics.
(Note that the
corresponding table at 63 and the account at 63 ff.
omit the phantasiai. There is only one brief sentence at 63: φασὶ δὲ
τὸ λεκτὸν εἶναι
τὸ κατὰ φαντασίαν λογικὴν ὑφιστάμενον. Logikephantasia is
defined at 51; otherwise, the sentence at 63 is closer
to the table at 43, cfr. ἐκ
τούτων ὑφισταμένων λεπτῶν. In VII 49-53,
the word lekton does not occur.) The arrangement actually followed
by
Diog. Laert. accepts an autonomous third (or rather first) sub-
discipline of logic
besides the dialectical sub-disciplines Phonetics and
Semantics. This agrees with
the division of to logikon meros ac-
cording to the τινες
mentioned at 41, who added τὸ περὶ κανόνων
καὶ κριτηρίων (εἶδος) as a further part
which served to establish
the truth and in which the different kinds of phantasiai were inve-
stigated (42). From what is said at 41, one could not have
expected
that this part could come first, but according to Diocles (49) it
was
the general (!) Stoic practice to begin with the theory of
knowledge.
Indeed, VII 49-54 is a very precise, detailed and important
exposition
of the different kinds (cfr. 42) of phantasiai
there are (and of the
formation of concepts), although it is frustratingly brief
about the
criterion (54)infra, p. 363 f.
I want to claim, however, is that this section constitutes
the Diocles
fragment (as would appear, from 50 paraphrazed rather than
tran-
scribed). VII 54 cannot be included, because it is unlikely that
Diocles
would have treated the phantasiai,
katalepsis, and concept-formation in
such detail and have been so
infuriatingly brief about the catalepticphantasia and the
criterion
in others, but we know nothing of the
sort about Diocles, although it cannot be
excluded a
priori that he wrote in the manner of Diog. Laert. Those who want
to
attribute 54 to Diocles, too, are forced to assume that it was Diocles
who
constructed the odd mosaic from different sources (cfr. U.
Egli, supra, note 132
and text thereto). From the
point of view of method, this is a regressus,
not
progress. Nietzsche’s argument against Bahnsch (cfr. supra, text to note 139) took
this form, in Bornmann-Carpitella (eds.), op. cit., p. 202, 26 ff.:
Diocles «hat
aus zweien seiner Quellen zwei Abschnitte, einen gedrängteren [41-8]
und einen
ausführlicheren [48-82] hintereinander gestellt. Hierbei erklärt sich
nun leicht,
dass der kürzere gelegentlich auch einzelne Notizen mehr hat als der
längere und
dass sich Differenzen finden, wie einige z.B. Bahnsch angemerkt
hat».
— not by Diocles — gives more information about the catalepticphantasia than is found at 54! Clearly, Diog. Laert. believed that
he
could be brief in those cases where he had been less brief in the
short
account.
At VII 50, the Diocles fragment contains a reference to Chry-
sippus which may but
need not have been inserted by Diog. Laert.
(note that what follows, νοείται κτλ.,
is very Zenonian, cfr. supra,p. 360), viz. a further
explanation of what is meant by typosis:
τουτέστιν ἀλλοίωσις,
ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ Περὶ ψυχῆς
ὑφίσταται [...] γίνεσθαι (SVF II 55). Phantasia as typosis
in the
soul should, according to Chrysippus, not be understood in a
crudely
materialist way (cfr. further SVF II 56). This
epistemological point
was not made by Chrysippus in a work concerned with the
logical
part of philosophy, let alone with the introduction thereto, but in
a
psychological, i.e., physical, treatise.
The tantalizingly disappointing treatment of the criterion at 54
consists of a laudatio; it will be recalled that according to von Arnim
this
cluster of quotations had been inserted by Diog. Laert., and
according to Egli been
taken by Diocles from Posidonius. Egli’s view
may be discounted, and — unlike von
Arnim and others — I do not
believe that the Diocles fragment is resumed at 55. But
von Arnim
must be right to the extent that at 54 Diog. Laert. switchesII 97 f., where
Diog. Laert. switches from his Peri haireseon type
of
source followed so far to Diadochai and biography, and supra, text to note 137.
another (kind of)
source. Instead of copying out or paraphrasing
Diocles’ account of the criterion and
of the cataleptic phantasia, which
as one may reasonably
assume will have been as detailed and precise
as that of the phantasiai at 49-53 (for some of these details see Cic.Varro 41 f. = SVF I 60), he moved to a source containing
laudationes.This is also clear from the final sentence of
53, which is a summary
serving as a transition marker: τοιάδε τινὰ καὶ περὶ
φαντασίας
καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ νοήσεως δογματίζουσι. The list at 54 is
interesting
in itself. The cataleptic phantasia is defined
(much more briefly than
at 46 Pohlenz, op. cit., II, p. 35. On kataleptike phantasia as
“Schul-
meinung” see G. Striker, op.
cit., p. 54.
Χρύσιππος [SVF
II 105] ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ [von Arnim, δωδεκάτῃ mss]
τῶν Φυσικῶν
καὶ Ἀντίπατρος [SVF
III Ant. 18] καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος
(SVF
III Αp. 3). For Anipater and Apollodorus, regrettably, no
book-
titles are given. That cited for Chrysippus confirms the point madesupra (this page) a propos his On the Soul: the locus classicus
for
the cataleptic phantasia was not found in a logical but
in a physical
treatise of Chrysippus. The catalogue of Chrysippus’ works
contains
several titles which indicate epistemological topics (ap. Diog. Laert.
VII 201, SVF
II 17, p. 9, 24-30); as A. A. Long has pointed out, it
can hardly be an accident that this list is found among
Chrysippus’
ethical works Dialectic cit. (supra, note 134), p. 118
and note 35; see also G. Striker,op.
cit., p. 54. Note that Egli and Hülser do not argue that this section should
be
moved to another position as well.begin with the theory of knowledge
(common practice according to Diocles)
must have been made by later
Stoics; it was endorsed by Diocles and determined Diog.
Laert.’s
order of presentation. It also determines the order of subjects in SVFI and II and in much of learned literature. But it conveys
a false
impression of Chrysippus’ priorities. Chrysippus (if the beginning
of
his catalogue may be assumed to have authority) began
graphy at Diog. Laert. VII 189 (SVF II 13, pp. 4, 38-5,2), the second presumably
dealt with the parts
of philosophy, the third and fourth with terminology, and the
fifth will have
been an introduction to dialectic (contents unknown; cfr. infra,
logic in
our sense of the word. Which entails a surprizing anticipation
of the views of
modern logicians.
To return to the list at 54: a different view of the criterion
held by Boethus is
next (SVF III B. 1). Then a different view of
Chrysippus
himself is recorded: διαφερόμενος πρὸς αὑτόν he said in
the first book of his Περὶ
λόγου (listed in the ethical part of the
catalogue cited supra, SVF II 17, p. 9, 29) that aisthesis and prolepsisare the criteria. Although
it would perhaps be as rash to infer that
in his On Reason he
did not speak of the cataleptic phantasia as to
claim that he
may have done so, it is (as von Arnim already pointed
out) at any rate most
remarkable that he is said to have been «dis-
agreeing with himself»SVF I, p. XXXVII. Diog.
Laert.’s remark, a symptom of compression, is
also one of bias. G. Striker, op. cit., 46 ff., convincingly
argues that there is no
contradiction.
Diog. Laert. VII 139 (two different accounts given by Chrysippus
in
one and the same work). One is of course reminded of Plutarch’s
arguments in
his anti-Stoic treatises, esp. stoic. rep.; Posidonius,
how-
ever, also used to argue that Chrysippus is inconsistent (see the
fragments
in Galen’s PHP). It is therefore noteworthy that again
another criterion held by « some of the more ancient Stoics» (SVFI 631) is cited from Posidonius’ Περὶ κριτηρίου (fr. 42
E.-K., 460
Th.). But there is no positive argument that the whole cluster at
54
derives from Posidonius.
It should by now be clear that the εἰσαγωγικὴ τέχνη, the
discipline introducing
dialectic mentioned by Diog. Laert. at VII 48,
is
“epistemology”, or the eidos (41-2) dealing with canons and
criteria.
Emendationsupra, note 69), Egli followed by Hülser, emends to
εἰσα-
γωγικ<ὴν διαλεκτικ>ὴν τέχνην.eidos grew out of the first sub-topos of Semantics, viz. that dealing
with
the phantasiai mentioned at VII 43.
Dialectic proper starts at 55 (τῆς δὲ διαλεκτικῆς θεωρίας);
J
Mejersupra, note 133.
with 49 and that a new subject is got under way at 55. Already
in
54, Diog. Laert. has broken his promise or forgotten his announcement
that
from now on he is going to transcribe Diocles for the details
of the logikon meros, if, that is, one is right in assuming that
this
is what he announced. But the sentence at issue, as we have seen,
is
difficult and unclear, and I would propose that we interpret it
by taking Diog.
Laert.’s actual procedure as our touch-stonesupra, p.
303.VII 48, he first says that he has given a
general account, then that
he would also like to expound things kata meros, and thirdly that
he will also discuss the «introductory
discipline» after Diocles’ Epi-drome. It does not follow
that 55-82, albeit κατὰ μέρος, are from
Diocles (83, a left-over of the general part
which comes last, is
certainly not by Diocles). The laudatio
at 54 may be attributed, if
only for economy’s sake, to the more detailed source
used at 55-82,
which as it seems was not as specific as Diocles’ exposition.
This
would entail that for the logical doxography Diog. Laert. used at
least
three different sources. Presumably, one should attribute the
summary
statements at 55 τῆς δὲ διαλεκτικῆς [...] τόπου, 63 ἐν δὲ τῷ [...]
ὑπτίων, and 76 καὶ ἄλλαι δέ [...] λέγομεν to Diog. Laert. He must
have
made a real effort to provide detailed information about the
logical part of Stoic
philosophy, which is important for one’s appreci-
ation of his personality as an
author interested in philosophy.
Although in the general section at 43-4 Semantics had been
described before
Phonetics, the more systematical detailed exposition
treats Phonetics first.
Typically, Diog. Laert. says (that he does so
because) the majority of the Stoics
agree (55 συμφώνως δοκεῖ τοῖς
πλείστοις) to «begin» dialectic with the phonetic topos, which now
follows, cfr. the concluding words at 62, ἐν
μὲν οὖν τῇ περὶ φωνῆς
θεωρίᾳ τοιαῦτα λέγεται τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς. I have already
compared
the contents of 55-62 with the table of contents at 44 (supra, pp.
359 ff.). It should be acknowledged that the exposition of the
defi-
nition of phone, of engrammatos
phone, of lexis, of the parts of logos,and of style and poetry, is fairly orderly and systematical. M.
Frede
has argued convincingly that this section represents the «elements
of»
Stoic «grammar», which developed out of the treatment of «dic-
tion»Op. cit., pp.
38-54.
treatment of the phantasiai in the Diocles fragment at
49-53. What
follows at 60 ὅρος -62 πέπτωκε is both more disorderly and even
more
compressedFrede, op. cit., p. 75 note 8, correctly points out
that what is at 60-2
can hardly be regarded as «forming part of the core of»
Phonetics. Hülser’s
argument, op. cit., I, p. CXIII f.,
that what is in the appendix at VII 60-2 cor-
responds with the relevant section
of Chrysippus’ bibliography (provided one per-
forms the requiered
“Blattumstellungen”, cfr. supra, note 147) is insufficient.
AtSVF
II, pp. 6,23-30 + 9,7-19, the sequence of items is different,
and horos,ennoema, and (Crinis’!) merismos are lacking. For genera and species see supra,note 149.
two definitions of horos in the little laudatio at 60 refer to
the first
books of Antipater’s On Definitions (SVF
III Ant. 23) and Chrysippus’On Definitions
(SVF
II 226), i.e., to a type of treatise that is not
concerned
with the logikon meros of philosophy only. This fans
one’s
suspicion that the jumble of definitions that follows in the later part
of Diog. Laert.’s treatment of Phonetics derives from a collection
ofhoroi, or rather from the horikon
eidos described at VII 41-2. The
definition of ennoema given at 61 A is not really needed after the
extensive treatment in
49-53. Furthermore, the whole little section ongenus and species (and, presumably, division) does not, as we
have
noticed above (p. 359), belong with Phonetics but with Semantics
according
to the table at VII 43. It would be false to assume
that
Phonetics entails a discussion of concepts, because these either
belong
with autonomous epistemology (49-53, 41-2) or with the first sub-topos of Semantics (43). The definition of ennoema at VII 61 is the
vulgate Zenonian one (61
ἀνατύπωμα ~ 45 τύπωσις) and lacks
Chrysippus’ distinguo (50).
Its intrusion in the appendix to Phonetics
at 60 ὅρος-62 can be explained: the
definition of genus that precedes
involves the use of the
term ἐννοημάτων. The horikon eidos, moreover,
according to
VII 42 is concerned with truth because διὰ [...]
τῶν
ἐννοιῶν τὰ πράγματα λαμβάνεται. Note that the appendix begins
with the
definition of horos and similar terms. We may
therefore
assume that the appendix to Phonetics represents the horikon eidoswhich some posited as a separate discipline (41-2) and others
appended
to Phonetics (44 καὶ περὶ ὅρων etc.). The section on amphibolia atVII 62 may be a Nachtrag to Stoic grammar (one would have expected
it either before or
after the section on poiesis and poiema,
60). As
a part of Phonetics, the section on genera and species is of course
illplaced, because
genera and species are conceptual
rather than linguistic
items.
In the first section of Diog. Laert.’s Phonetics, 55-9, Diogenes
of Babylonia is
mentioned not less than six times (SVF III D. 17, 18,
20, 21,
22) and the relevant title is given twice: 55 and 57, Περὶ
φωνῆς. Although von Arnim
attributes more to Diogenes than would
seem to be justifiable (cfr. SVF
ΙΙΙ D. 20, 23, 24, 25), much of this
section indeed seems
ultimately to go back to his bookH. von Arnim, s.v. Diogenes (45), in RE V (1905) col. 774.
to have been the
first Stoic to write a special treatise Περὶ
φωνῆς.
Note that he also wrote a
separate Διαλεκτικὴ τέχνη, SVF
ΙΙΙ D. 26
ap. Diog. Laert. VII 71. The
assumption that all references to Diogenes
in the grammatical section, VII 55-9, refer to the phonetic treatise is
a safe one. Other
names mentioned are those of the early post-
Chrysippean Stoics Archedemus (with
book-title, also Π. φωνῆς, 55
= SVF
ΙΙΙ Arch. 6) and, twice, Antipater (55 = SVF
ΙΙΙ Ant. 16;
57 = SVF
ΙΙΙ Ant. 22). The second time, a book-title is added
for
Antipater: Περὶ λέξεως καὶ τῶν λεγομένων. Accordingly, Antipater
treated
Phonetics and Semantics together in one treatise, whereas
Diogenes had written two
separate treatises, and Archedemus a separate
treatise on Phonetics. The definition
of the poem at 60 is cited from
Posidonius’ Περὶ λέξεως εἰσαγωγή (fr. 44 E.-K., 458
Th.), clearly a
phonetic treatise as well. Unlike the treatises On
Definitions cited at
60, the works by Diogenes, Archedemus, Antipater (for
its first part),
and Posidonius, clearly belong with the phonetic topos.
In these laudationes at 55-9, Chrysippus is cited twice. The
first
time at 55 = SVF
ΙΙ 140 (together with Archedemus + title,
Diogenes,
Antipater), where he is said to have stated that phone is corporeal in
the second book of his Physics. A definition given by Diogenes
Archedemus Antipater in “logical”
works consequently was given by
Chrysippus in a “physical” work. The catalogue of
his works at VII192 (SVF ΙΙ 14) shows
that he discussed the subjects treated in the
introductory treatises of Diogenes,
Antipater (first part), Archedemus,
and, presumably, Posidonius, but did so in a
series of major works
collected in the λογικοῦ τόπου περὶ τὰς λέξεις καὶ τὸν κατ’
αὐτὰς
λόγον. This catalogue, moreover, treats part of formal logic first (VII190-2 = SVF
ΙΙ 13-14, λογικοῦ τόπου τοῦ περὶ τὰ πράγματα). This
is
confirmed by the other passage in the phonetic section of Diog. Laert.
where
Chrysippus’ name is found (unfortunately without book-title),
viz. in the laudatio at VII 57 — SVF
ΙΙ 147, which is about the parts oflogos. Here, as we have noticed, Diogenes’ Περὶ φωνῆς and Antipater’s
Περὶ
λέξεως καὶ τῶν λεγομένων are mentioned as well. Cfr. the
catalogue at VII 192 (SVF
ΙΙ 14, p. 6, 17-20, where however Chrysippus
speaks of
στοιχεία not μέρη). Yet it should be added that the
distinction between the semantic
and the phonetic parts does not seem
to have been applied by Chrysippus in a
pedantical way; the first
title at VII 192 = SVF ΙΙ, p. 6, 17 f. is περὶ τῶν στοιχείων τοῦ λόγου
καὶ τῶν λεγομένων, the second and third are about λεγομένα only,
the
fourth about στοιχείων τοῦ λὸγου only. For Antipater’s title
one can quote
Chrysippean partial precedents. One may of course also
cite Chrysippus’ definition
of Dialectic (see infra), which lists both the
phonetic and
the semantic components, and in that order. Which
subjects were treated in
Chrysippus’ introductory monobiblos τέχνη
διαλεκτικὴ πρὸς
᾽Αρισταγόραν (Diog. Laert. VII 190 = SVF
ΙΙ 13,
p. 5, 2) one cannot know. But I think the evidence
suggests that the
material found in the κατὰ μέρος phonetic section of Diog.
Laert.
goes back, in as far as the manner of presentation is concerned,
to
Chrysippus’ successors. Introductory treatises presenting the vast
material
treated in numerous extensive works by Chrysippus were
needed, and a certain measure
of standardization must have been
indispensable for teaching purposes.
As we have noticed, Diog. Laert. at VII 62 rounds off
Phonetics
with a transitional sentence indicating its contents (quoted supra, p. 366),
which at the beginning of 63 is followed by a
summarizing and
incomplete list of the subjects to be dealt with in Semantics (cfr.
supra,p. 358). In a way that is entirely typical of his
method of composition,
Diog. Laert. inserts two definitions of Dialectic in general
before
this concluding sentence at 62, in fine. The first of
these, as he says, is
Posidonius’ (fr. 188 E.-K., 454 Th.), which as we have
seenSupra, p.
357.
also quoted, anonymously, at 42. The second, he tells us, is
Chrysippus’:
[...] ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππός φησι, περὶ σημαίνοντα καὶ σημαινόμενα (SVFΙΙΙ 122). These insertions are a bit awkward, not only
because Posidonius’
definition had already been given in the general account, but
also because
Chrysippus’ explicitly refers to both Phonetics (σημαίνοντα)
and
Semantics (σημαινόμενα), thus covering both what precedes (55-62)
and what
follows (63-82). One has a hunch that Posidonius’ definition
would have provided a
proper introduction to what follows, whereas
Chrysippus’ would have been more
efficient at 55. The reason they
are found where they are actually found, viz. at
the end of the
phonetic section (VII 62) is, presumably, that
Diog. Laert. had come
across these definitions in one of his sources, and appended them,
as
is his wont to do with extra material, at the end of a section supra, note 18.
I can only be very brief about the contents of 63-82, Diog. Laert.
here has copied
out his source or sources in more detail. Laudationesare
found at chs. 64, 65, 68, 71, 76, 79. Note that, at 65, a definition
of axioma is quoted from Chrysippus’ introductory treatise
Διαλεκτικοὶ
ὅροι (cfr. VII 189 = SVF II 13, p. 4, 40). The
definition of the
conditional at 71 is given not only after Diogenes’ introductory
treatise
Διαλεκτικὴ τέχνη, but also after Chrysippus’ ἐν ταῖς Διαλεκτικαῖς
(the
latter title should perhaps be emended to ἐν τ<ο>ῖς
Διαλεκτικ(ο)ῖς
<ὅροις>). The only other title quoted here is Crinis’
Διαλεκτικὴ τέχνη
(71 = SVF III Crin. 4). Crinis’ name occurs a few
more times:
1) together with those of Archedemus Athenodorus
= SVF III Crin. 3; the list begins with
Chrysippus’ name), and 2)
with the definitions of logos
(“argument”) at 76 = SVF
III Crin. 5.
Apollodorus’ name is found at 64 (not in the
Apoll.-ch. in SVF) and
Chrysippus’, apart from the passages
already mentioned, also at 79
(SVF II 241). The Semantics as
found in Diog. Laert. thus would
appear to derive from the scholastic treatises of
the successors of
Chrysippus and their pupils, as I have also argued for the
Phonetics.
The assumption that Diog. Laert.’s Semantics does not consist of
one long transcript
from Diocles helps to solve a famous crux, viz.
the meaning
of ἐν τῷ πλάτει at VII 76 καὶ ἄλλαι δὲ εἰσι διαφοραὶ
ἀξιωμάτων καὶ μεταπτώσεις αὐτῶν
ἐξ ἀληθῶν εἰς ψεύδη καὶ
ἀντισροφαί, περὶ ὧν έν τῷ πλάτει λέγομεν. In the preceding
chap-
ters, Diog. Laert. has discussed various sorts of propositions. At
75
πιθανόν-76 υριον he has described the plausible but false
(πιθανόν)
proposition, the four modalities some among which may change
their
truth-value, and the reasonable (εὔλογον) proposition, which appears
to be
a species of the possible. From 76, λόγος δέ ἐστιν, he continues
with argument (logos). The «other differences among propositions
and changes
from true to false etc.» mentioned at 76 are not treated
in the κατὰ μέρος section. The table of contents of the semantic toposin the general section (43-4), although a bit confused,
also suggests that
the κατὰ μέρος section could have been more detailed as to this
chapter
of Semantics. Hicks translates περὶ ὧν έν τῷ πλάτει λέγομεν by
«which we
now go on to describe broadly», which is patently false.
Theiler (see the app. crit.
of Egli and Hülser ad loc.) suggested that
(οὔδε) be inserted
before τῷ πλάτει. HolwerdaHolwerda, De Dioclis
Magnesii alterius operis vestigio neglecto, «Mne-
mosyne», XV (1962) p.
169 ff.
believes that Diog. Laert. is merely transcribing
Diocles, argued that
Diocles’ Epidrome was a brief work and
that the reference is to hisLives of the Philosophers. He
quotes late parallels for τὸ πλάτυ
meaning «our more extensive treatment». What is
rather awkward,
however, is that a detailed treatment of a very technical part of
Stoic
formal logic would have been contained in a biographical worksupra, notes 13 and 14.
wonders in whose biography it could
have been set out - Chrysippus’?
But then also other technical subjects would have
been treated there
in similar detail, which would hardly fit the genre. All
difficulties
vanish, or so I think, if we attribute the phrase at issue to Diog.
Laert.
himself and assume that ἐν τῷ πλάτει is the opposite of κατά μέρος.
Diog.
Laert., loc. cit., only lists the further differences and
more
refined distinctions among propositions and says that he refrains
from
treating these in detail. The words περὶ ὧν έν τῷ πλάτει λέγομεν
mean
«which I only mention in general terms».
Accordingly, the logical doxography in Diog. Laert. has preserved
a plurality of
traditions concerned with the subdisciplines of logic and
of dialectic, and with
their order of presentation. In order to conclude
this part of the present paper, I
would like — by way of a summary —
to submit the following hypothesis.
The sequence in the kata meros account, viz. 1) Epistemology
2)
Phonetics (including the appendix at VII 60-2) and 3) Semantics
(including
arguments) cannot be Chrysippean. In Chrysippus’ bibliogra-
phy, part of Semantics
is placed before Phonetics, another part of
Semantics, viz. that dealing with arguments, after Phonetics,
whereas
Phonetics itself includes the treatment of certain arguments.
Furthermore,
the epistemological works are listed in the ethical section. To those
who
wanted to teach logic in a systematical way, two options were open:
they
could (a) either put all of Semantics before all of Phonetics, or
(b) move Phonetics
to a position before the two semantic sections
which in Chrysippus’ bibliography are
separated by it. Both parties
could claim the authority of the view responsible for
the sequence
in the bibliography, although those who put Semantics first
certainly
were closer to Chrysippus’ catalogue, whereas the others could
quote
the definition of dialectic (cfr. VII 62). Now those who put
Semantics
first, according to VII 43-4, began their treatment with
Epistemology,
i.e., they had the whole logical curriculum start with the
discussion
of phantasiai etc. Others, however, preferred the
in itself more systemati-
cal sequence Phonetics-Semantics to be found in the kata meros account
of Diog. Laert. The first to have done so
may have been the influential
scholarch Antipater, the successor of Diogenes,
because he is the
first and only Early Stoic to have written a treatise Peri lexeos kai tonlegomenon (“On Phonetics and Semantics”,
VII 57). My guess is that
the sequence Semantics-Phonetics is the earlier of the
two, and that
Archedemus and his followers wanted to preserve epistemology at
the
beginning of the logical curriculum and consequently converted it
into a
third eidos of logic to be treated before Phonetics. This,
at
any rate, would explain Diocles’ statement ap. Diog.
Laert. VII 49
that the Stoics were agreed that one should begin with
Epistemology.
The prominent position of this philosophical (sub-)discipline in
these
later Stoic curricula should presumably be connected with the need
to
strengthen the system against the attacks by Carneades and his followers.
If this line of argument is correct, we may even have found the
explanation for
Diog. Laert.’s insertion of the Diocles fragment. Diocles
emphasized the symphonia among the Stoics as to the position of
Epistemology.
Consequently, the quotation serves as a convenient
bridge between the brief account
(: Semantics-Phonetics, with refe-
rences to the other eide
that either were or were not included) and
the kata meros
account (: Phonetics-Semantics). At VII 54, Diog. Laert.
could switch to the Stoic
logical handbook (or the source reporting
what was in this handbook) which served as his basis for the katameros account as soon as the section from Diocles on the
phantasiai(treated as first sub-topos of Semantics by those who did not recognize
a separate eidos dealing with canons and criteria) had been
transcribed.
Accordingly, the kata meros section provides
what, by the time of
Diog. Laert.’s source, had become the standard order of
“systematical”
presentation of Stoic logic. The brief account, on the other hand,
is
more “historical” in that it furnishes information about the various
forms of
presentation that had been provided in the past. One should
compare the report about
the parts of philosophy and their order of
didactical presentation at VII 39-41, and note that the brief account
of logic is
immediately subsequent to this report.
The appendix to Phonetics in the kata meros section (VII 60 ὅρος-
62) is concerned with topics that were treated in
the context of logic
(cfr. Chrysippus’ bibliography) but apparently could not all be
said to
belong exclusively to the domains of either Epistemology or Phonetics
or
Semantics. Some Stoics choose to establish this remnant as a
separate eidos (the horikon, VII 41-2), whereas
others, oddly, added
it to Phonetics (VII 44); the latter procedure appears to have
become
standard.
Appendix I: Contrasting Views of
Epicurus (Diog. Laert. X).
In pt. 3 of this paperSupra, p. 328 f.
traditions
concerned with the Cynicizing antecedents of and elements
in Stoicism, viz. the
tradition highlighted and preferred by Diog. Laert.
which argued continuity, from
Antisthenes, in the field of dignified
ethics, and another tradition which, as we
have noticed, is also
represented by and known to Philodemus, but which in Diog.
Laert.
has been confined to the biographies of Zeno and Chrysippus. We have
also
taken into account that both parties in this dispute make use of
references and even
pile quotation upon quotation (laudationes) in
order to drive
their points home. Zeno’s Politeia (and similar works)
were not only criticized by revisionist Stoics, but also by Skeptics
and
Epicureans, and so was Chrysippus in so far his cruder Cynic views
were
concerned. Furthermore, we have seen that according to Philodemus
the probable
charges against some of the Stoics are far worse than the
in his view misguided
accusations brought against Epicurus’ hedonism
and the loose way of life of the
Epicureans.
In bk. VII, the tradition which blamed Zeno and Chrysippus had
to be largely
reconstructed. In bk. X, the matter is wholly clear. Diog.
Laert. first enumerates
and quotes those who slandered and criticized
Epicurus not only by blackwashing his
way of life but also by quoting
embarrassing passages from his works (X 3 Διότιμος-8
ἀπαίδευτον).
He clearly takes sides, for at X 9 he declares that these
opponents
are «raving mad» (μεμήνασι δ’ οὗτοι). Next, he cites evidence
to
disprove the slander of Epicurus’ life; authorities in favour of Epicurus
are
marshalled and quoted, and passages from Epicurus’ Correspondencereferred to and cited (X 11). What we have here, clearly,
are laudationeson both sides of the issue, just as with the
two opposed views concerned
with the Stoics in bk. VII.
At X 12, Diog. Laert. continues: «we shall know this even better
[viz. that Epicurus
deserves praise not blame] as we proceed, viz.
from his doctrines and his
statements». Consequently, more laudationesin favour of
Epicurus are to follow. However, Diog. Laert. does not
rest content with quoting
extracts from the available secondary literature
(for which cfr. X 29: [...] καὶ εἴ
τι ἔδοξεν ἐκλογῆς ἀξίως ἀνεφθέγχθαι),
but inserts entire works written by Epicurus,
viz. the three Lettersand the Ratae
sententiae. This is what he states unambiguously at X 28
ἃ δὲ αὐτῷ-29
εἰδέναι
himself is
a fact for which Diog. Laert. has been blamed as an author
and condescendingly
praised as an indispensable source. It should be
explained, however, as the result
of careful planning. The four works
by Epicurus are laudationes added by Diog. Laert. himself in order to
prove that Epicurus
should be praised, not blamed; he may be overdoing
this from our stylistic point of
view, but one may feel certain that he
knew what he was doing.
A point which deserves some emphasis is that both the attack
and the
defense pertain to Epicurus’ life as well as to his doctrine.
Quotations could serve
to prove that he was up to no good or at any
rate a detestable character, and other
quotations could be used in order
to prove the exact opposite. The ancient view, of
course, is that there
is, or should be, some sort of consistent relation between a
philosopher’s
life and his doctrines, so one may use his written statements as
evidence
that he was either a good or a bad person, and cite biographical
evidence
in order to shore up these quotations. We have noticed supra (p. 338)
that at VI 105 Zeno is said to have actually «lived in
accord with Vir-
tue», and have referred to certain passages in his biography which
un-
derscore this statement, just as there are other aspects of the story of
his
life that seem to be Cynic in a cruder sense. A similar situation
prevails
in Epicurus’ case. This is important for the evaluation of the
relation
between doxography and biography in Diog. Laert. Slander of a
person’s
life is biographical, but the same slander in the form of
quotations
(laudationes) soon develops into a critical
doxography, just as a bunch
of quotations collected in order to defend a person’s
character actually
constitutes a perhaps more factual doxography. By which, of
course,
I do not mean to say that laudationes are to be found
in polemical
literature only.
That one should speak of a tradition rather than a source in
respect of the
criticisms (or slander, if you prefer) to be found at x 3
ff. is clear from the many
names of critics of Epicurus mentioned,
although undoubtedly Diog. Laert. got his
information from at least
one intermediate source.
The methods used by Epicurus’ opponents are noteworthy. The
Stoic DiotimusDemetrius Magn. fr. 7
Mejer (supra, note 55), and Mejer’s comments.Letters» as being by
Epicurus, whereas
others ascribed to him the «Notes commonly
attributed to
Chrysippus» (X 3). The first critic to be mentioned is
a Stoic. Where the letters
variously ascribed to Epicurus or Chrysippus
are at issue, we seem to be hearing the
echoes of a dispute between
Stoics and Epicureans (comparable to that ap. Philod., On the Stoics)in which
Diog. Laert. — or his source — sides with the Epicureans.
The allegations that works quoted are spurious or should be ascribed
to
someone else recall the discussions concerning the Politeia (and
other
works) of Zeno and the Politeia and Thyestes of Diogenes the Dogsupra, p. 321, p. 343 f.
Other critics follow suit (X 4): «Posidonius the Stoic and his
school» (fr. 288
E.-K., 290 b Th.), Nicolaus (of Damascus?), an
otherwise unknown Sotion Posid. fr. 290 b Th.Refutations of Diocles (Diokleioi
elenchoi we do not know which
Diocles, but it should be noted that at Diog.
Laert. X 10-11 Diocles
(of Magnesia) is cited among the apologists of Epicurus), and
Dionysius
of Halicarnassus (II p. 250 Usener-Radermacher).
These authors
slandered Epicurus in various personal ways, apparently quoting
from
the renegade Epicurean TimocratesD. Sedley, Epicurus and his Professional
Rivals, in Études sur l’Épicu-risme antique, cit.
(supra, note 13) p. 119 ff., argues that Timocrates is
behind much
of the diffamation of Epicurus known to us.
given in a book by the faithful Herodotus. Three passages
from Epicurus’
letters are quoted in order to prove that he flattered his
acquaintances
beyond measure (X 5: fr. 143 Us. = 71 Arr.VitaEpicuri (fr. [1] Arr.) are wrong.
Arr.; fr. 165 Us. = 88 Arr.), and an unclear but apparently
unedifying
passage from another letter (X 5: fr. 126 Us.) is cited after the
4th
book of Theodorus’ Against Epicurus. A lot of other
letters of the
same ilk are mentioned in a general way (X 6). An important
passage
from Epicurus’ Peri telous follows next (fr. 67 Us.,
cfr. fr. 22.1 Arr.),
together with again a quotation from a letter (fr. 163 Us. = 89
Arr.).
Then another Stoic, viz. Epictetus, is cited, who is said to have
expressed
his disapproval of Epicurus in rather strong words. This is the
only
time Epictetus is mentioned in the surviving part of Diog. Laert.’s
work,
and the reference is important not only because it pertains to
a rather late
Stoic
the lost part of bk. VII; cfr. supra, p. 241 f.t.p.q. for Diog.
Laert.’s account of the anti-Epicurean
tradition, viz. well into the 2nd
cent. CE. An extract from the renegade Timocrates’ Euphranta then
follows, which work may indeed be the ultimate source up to
x 9,
άπαίδευτον. If it is, Timocrates not only gave an unfavourable account
of
Epicurus’ life, but also quoted chapter and verse, viz. the workPeri physeos and the Letters (cfr. fr. 93 Us.). At its
end, x 9 contains
the longs list of slanderous terms Epicurus is said to have
lavished
on his predecessors and rivalsDiog.
Laert.VII 24 = Socr. fr. V B 487 G. In this
respect, Epicurus seems to have refrained
from following his own maxim that the
Wise Man should not become a Cynic(Diog. Laert. x 119;
cfr. supra, p. 337; infra, p.
378).. The extravagant invectives loved by
the
master are used in order to discredit his character.
As D. Sedley has plausibly arguedOp. cit. (supra, note 174) p. 125
ff.
those at x 6-9) may not be pertinent in
that they appear to be grounded
in distortion, or devious quotation. What matters in
our present context,
however, is that this is how the critics proceeded and that
they not
only quoted Timocrates but also Epicurus himself, and rather
generously
at that. Sedley argues that in many cases Epicurus’ detractors
presented
the evidence in a false light, and adduces the relevant textual
proofs.
The interesting thing, however, is that this appears not to have
been
the procedure of the defenders of Epicurus, for these quoted otherpassages in order to prove the opponents wrong, or (as in the case
of
the Diotimus Letters, or of the Notes attributed to either Epicurus
or Chrysippus) argued that the evidence
adduced was spurious. Again,
the important point for our present purpose is not
whether or not the
criticisms were justified, but what the tradition was. That
Epicurus
once in a while expressed himself in such a way that he was an
easy
target need not, however, be doubted. Even Sedley has not succeeded
in
explaining away all the charges. Revisionist later Epicureans will
have attempted to
smother the incriminating material by numerous
counter-quotations.
Laudationes in favour of Epicurus other than the four
works
inserted by Diog. Laert. are to be found in various places in bk. X.
At X
31, there are several references pertaining to epistemology; because
this is not an issue at X 3 ff. (just as the Stoic epistemology is not
an
issue in Philodemus or at Diog. Laert. VII 32 ff. and. 187
ff.), I shall
not discuss this passage. At X 117-21, we have a survey of the
Epicu-
rean views concerned with the Wise Man and with several general
aspects
of ethics. It is here (as well as in the ensuing Letter
toMenoeceus and the Ratae sententiae) that we find
the arguments contrathose at X 3 ff. At X 118, we have two
references to the Epicurean
Diogenes of Tarsus (cfr. X 26); the first is to his Brief Account of Epicu-rus’ Ethical Doctrines, the second to
bk. 12 of another work treating the
same subject — perhaps the ethical section of
the Epilektoi Scholai, orEpilekta,
the 1st book of which (dealing with physics) is cited at X 97,
the 5th at X 120, the
17th at X 136, and the 20th at X 138. At X 119,
there is laudatio referring to four works by Epicurus: to his Diaporiaiand to his Peri Physeos (fr. 19 Us.), to
his Symposium (fr. 63 Us.), and
to bk. 1 (fr. 8 Us.) and bk.
2 (fr. 14 Us.) of his Peri bion. This last
reference,
significantly, is concerned with the maxim ουδέ κυνιεῖν —
which definitely has an
anti-Stoic pointsupra, p. 337.
Another important passage is the synkrisis of the Epicureans
and
the Cyrenaics at X 136-8 (fr. 1, fr. 452 Us., Socr. fr.
IV A 200 G.),
which is complementary to II 86-90 (Socr. fr. IV A 172 G.) and obviously
has its roots in the Peri haireseon literaturesupra, notes 89 and 93, and text
thereto.
references to three (or four) works by
Epicurus are to be found: to hisPeri haireseos kai phyges,
to his Peri telous (quoted by the opponents
according to X
6), to his Peri bion (cfr. X 119), to the Letter to thePhilosophers at Mytilene (quoted by the opponents according
to X 7),
and to a Peri haireseon which presumably should be
read -eos.
Returning to the synkrisis between Epicurus and the
Cyrenaics
at X 136 ff., I would like to call attention to a remarkable
passage
(X 137 = fr. 66 Us.) concerned with what we may call the «logical
basis
of Epicurean ethics»
and oikeiosis; cfr. supra, note 72 and text
thereto.
καὶ χωρὶς λόγου are
content with pleasure and shun pain as soon as
they are born. We avoid pain, «just as even Heracles, devoured by
the
poisoned robe, cries aloud
‘And bites and yells, and rock to rock resounds,
Headlands of Locris and Eboean cliffs’» (Soph. Trach. 787-8).
Heracles was a Cynic as well as a Stoic hero; we have noticed suprathe importance of Antisthenes’ Heracles for
the tradition, favoured
by Diog. Laert., that is concerned with the continuity
between Cynics
and Stoics in the field of dignified ethicssupra, p. 337 ff.
appear, could retort by citing other aspects of the hero’s
behaviour,
and it is at any rate quite apposite that the tradition favourable
to
Epicurus, which rejected the Stoic criticisms of the hedone-principle,
has preserved this quotation from Sophocles. At X 138,
which im-
mediately follows, the Epicurean view of Virtue is described, which
is
rounded off with a quotation from Epicurus (fr. 506 Us.) that «only
Virtue is
inseparable from Pleasure». This account provides a worthy
counterpart to the
Cynic-Stoic construction of the “life in accord with
Virtue”supra, p. 331 f., 337
ff.
Appendix II: ζῇ Διοκλῆς (VII 75).
In the discussion following the oral presentation of the first draft
of the present
paper Jonathan Barnes suggested that the exceptional
use of the proper name Diocles
in a Stoic proposition in VII 75 may
be interpreted as a sort of sphragis. This, he added, was already
Nietzsche’s view Bornmann-Carpitella
(eds.), op. cit., p. 78: «In nonnullis enim
figuris
dialecticis ipsum Dioclis nomen usurpatum est veluti ζῇ Διοκλής. Unde
Laertius
talia desumere potuit nisi de ipso Diocle?». “Nonnullis” is wrong, for
VII 75 is
the only example.Apuleius
disserit at
Ap. de int. p. 128, 3 Thomas; cfr. also
p. 128, 13-21, and esp. 16-7,
which argues that the proper name may be replaced by
the circumlocu-
tion philosophum Platonicum Madaurensem.
Interestingly enough, the use of the proper name Apuleius in thede int., loc. cit., provided one of the
arguments used by scholars in
the 19th cent, to prove that the de
int. is spurious. For the relevant
literature one may refer to Beaujeu’s
edition of Apuleius’ philosophical
works in the Budé series (he does not include the
de int.) and to
Lumpe’s careful discussion in his recent
study of the treatiseJ. Beaujeu (ed.), Apulée: Opuscules
philosophiques et fragments, Paris
1973, pp. VII-VIII and 53 (but one
need not speak of a «faussaire»: the so-calledsphragis
explains the attribution); A. Lumpe, Die
Logik des Pseudo-Apuleius. EinBeitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie,
Augsburg 1982, p. 12 ff., 19. Cfr. alsosupra, note 15 and
text thereto.
are of course other pseudepigraphous works in the corpus apuleianum,such as the Asclepius. Lumpe points out that there are crucial linguistic
differences
with other books by Apuleius and suggests that perhaps
it was a draft found in his
Nachlass and revised for publication.
Schwabe in 1896
already stated that Apuleius disserit neither proves
nor
disproves that the treatise is genuineRE II (1896) s.v. Apuleius, col.
252.
the use of his own name in examples by the
grammarian Plotius
Sacerdos, but Lumpe neutralizes this argument by a reference to
the
use of Sacerdos’ name in an example by Dositheus Sinko, De Apulei et
Albini doctrinae Platonicae adumbratione, diss.
phil. Ac. Cracov. ii 26, Cracau 1906, p. 169 note 1; A. Lumpe,
op. cit., p. 14.
The references are to Keil’s Grammatici latini, VI, p. 447, 18 Sacerdote
docente,and VII, ρ. 413,23-4 ad
Sacerdotem πρὸς Σακέρδωτα.
certain is that the de int. cannot be the third book of the De
Platone,for in that case (cfr. the beginning of the second book) the
elaborate
point about the three parts of philosophy at its beginning would
be
redundant after i 4, the end. It is an independent work — which in
itself
does not prove that it is spurious. The odds, however, are against
its
being by Apuleius M.
W. Sullivan, Apulean Logic. The Nature, Sources, and
Influences ofApuleius’s Logic, Amsterdam 1967, who prefers to consider
the treatise genuine,
mainly follows the arguments of Ph. Meiss (in his edition
of de int., Lörsch 1886;
relevant passage usefully
reprinted by Sullivan, p. 235 ff.). J. Dillon, The MiddlePlatonists, (cfr. supra,
note 5) pp. 310-1 (cfr. also pp. 336-7), likewise assumes
that it is genuine but
brings no arguments that are new or decisive. One accepts
Dillon’s view that the
treatise belongs with the dossier of Middle Platonism (just
as, for instance,
much of Calcidius in Timaeum), but this
does not prove that it
has to be dated to the 3rd cent. CE or that it is by
Apuleius. Lumpe’s careful
discussion is the best so far.
Diocles, or of Sacerdos, in an example does not prove that the work
at
issue is by Apuleius or Diocles or Sacerdos. One needs other
arguments.
But even if one were to accept that the chapter on modal logic
in Diog. Laert.
derives from Diocles, it would not follow that the
whole treatment of Semantics, let
alone the whole κατά μέρος-section,
is by Diocles. One may adduce a similar possible
sphragis in VII 58.
Here, the
definition of the appellative is given after Diogenes of
Babylonia (κατὰ τὸν
Διογένην), that of the verb both after Diogenes
(ὡς ὁ Διογένης), and, following
others (τινες), in another way. In
between, the definition of the proper name is
given, anonymously; two
examples are provided, viz. Socrates, Diogenes. Should one
assume that
Diogenes used his own name as a sphragis? If we
do, it does not
follow (and can indeed be disproved because of the following
τινες
and several other references in the environment of the sphragis) that
the whole Phonetical section is by
Diogenes. It seems more likely,
however, that the source who quoted Diogenes (either
at first hand or
from a secondary source) used the name as a convenient
example;
after all, it occurs several times in the relevant section in Diog.
Laert.
before the theoretically possible sphragis.
Finally, if one were to assume that Diocles of Magnesia used his
own name as a sphragis in a logical proposition, one way well ask why
he did
so in his chapter on modal logic and not elsewhere, and why,
among the four options
available, he chose the possible proposition. AtVII 75, we
learn that examples of possible propositions are propositions
that, although false,
may change their truth-value. Diocles himself
cannot have given «Diocles is alive»
as his example of a possible
proposition, because at the time it was not false but
true, i.e., not-
necessarily true. Therefore, as Barnes suggested, he must have
written
<οὐχὶ> ζῇ Διοκλῆς, “not: Diocles is alive”, false at the time but
due
to change its truth-value. Yet doubt lingers. If we assume Diocles knew
what
he was doing which, applying the principle of charity, is what
we should assume, and if we further assume that he hoped to be
read
after his demise, he must have known that for a person reading
the book of the late
Diocles of Magnesia the statement “not: Diocles
is alive” would be an instance not
of a possible but of a necessary
proposition. So if he used the name Diocles, he
must have used it as
a token name, the way one uses Dion or Theon or Socrates, i.e.
without
reference to himself. The simpler assumption, surely, is that
someone
else used “Diocles” as such a name in an example.
My conclusion is that the use of “Diocles” in VII 75 in itself is
neutral, i.e.,
neither proves nor disproves that the relevant section of
the text is by Diocles,
and that the belief that what we have here is
a sphragis
entails more difficulties than its opposite. So I stick to my
guns as to the extent
of the Diocles fragment argued in pt. 4. One
should not forget, moreover, that
Diocles is a not uncommon name.
Diocles of Carystus was a famous physician.
Chrysippus addressed two
of his works to a Diocles (catalogue at VII 200 = SVF
II 16, p. 9, 13-4).
A Pythagorean Diocles of Phlius is
mentioned at VIII 46, and the
name Diocles occurs twice in the will of Strato (V 62,
63). Diocles
of Magnesia is among the auctores rather
frequently referred to by Diog.
Laert. on either side of VII 75; if one does not
want to assume — as
one probably should — that Διοκλῆς has to be emended to Δίων
per litt.) that ζῇ Δίων is used several
times in the
parallel passage at Alex. ap.
Simpl. in Phys., p. 1299, 36 ff.
Diels
= SVF I, 206.
(or Διογένης; error arising
from abbreviation Mejer, op. cit., p. 25 f.
either Diog. Laert.’s source (not: Diocles) or Diog. Laert. himself
put it
in
also take Diog. Laert. bk. VI into account, K.
Hülser for pertinent criticisms per litt. of the fourth
part of the first draft, the other members of the Amalfi corona for their contributions to the discussion, and my colleague Wayne
Hudson
for looking at the English text. An expanded form of the draft read at
Amalfi was
the basis for a lecture (Stoiker-Kyniker-Epikureer:
Hellenistische Philosophie in Polemik und Verteidigung) delivered 26 XI
1985 at Saarbrücken before a university
audience connected with the “Schwerpunkt
Hellenistische Philosophie”.