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PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY BETWEEN
SOUL AND BODY: UNION OR UNITY?

In the 'New system of the nature of substances'¹ of 1695, Leibniz publicly announced his hypothesis that the 'union of the soul with the body' is to be explained and understood in terms of a 'mutual relationship, arranged in advance' between events in the soul and events in the body.²

A month or so afterwards, in the so-called 'Third explanation of the new system',³ he explained this 'mutual relationship', which he had then come to call a 'pre-established harmony', in terms of two clocks which were made 'with such skill and accuracy that we could be sure that they would always afterwards keep time together'.⁴

Some years later, in 1703, the Jesuit René Joseph de Tournemine, in the course of his 'Conjectures on the union of the soul and the body',⁵ objected that, as an account of that union, Leibniz's hypothesis of pre-established harmony is insufficient and just will not do. 'For after all', he said, '*correspondence, or harmony, does not make a union [union], or essential connection [liason essentielle]. Whatever parallels we imagine between two clocks, even if the relation between them were perfectly exact, we could never say*

¹ 'Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances, aussi bien que de l'union qu'il y a entre l'âme et le corps. Par M.D.L.', *Journal des Savants* (Paris), 27 June 1695, no. 23, pp. 294-300; 4 July 1695, no. 24, pp. 301-306 (Amsterdam edn vol. 23, pp. 444-462).

² 'Système nouveau', paras. 12, 14 (GP 4, pp. 483-484/WF, p. 17).

³ 'Extrait d'une lettre de Monsieur de Leibniz sur son hypothese de philosophie...', *Journal des Savants* (Paris), 19 November 1696, no. 38, pp. 451-455 (Amsterdam edn vol. 24, pp. 687-693).

⁴ 'Extrait d'une lettre de Monsieur de Leibniz...', para. 4/WF, p. 62.

⁵ 'Conjectures sur l'union de l'ame et du corps. Par le P. de Tournemine', *Journal de Trévoux: Mémoires pour l'Histoire des Sciences et des Beaux Arts* (Trévoux), May 1703, art. 91, pp. 864-875 (continued, as 'Suite de conjectures...', in June 1703, art. 106, pp. 1063-65).

that these clocks were united [*unies*], just because the movements of the one correspond to the movements of the other with perfect symmetry'. In the pre-established harmony, says Tournemine, '[t]here is, if you like, a perfect correspondence; but there is no real connection [*liason réelle*]', there is no 'genuine union' [*veritable union*].⁶

About four years later Leibniz published a reply to Tournemine's 'Conjectures'.⁷ In it he conceded the core of what he took to be Tournemine's objection to him. What the pre-established harmony, as explained in terms of the simile of the clocks was meant to do, Leibniz said, was 'only to give an explanation of the phenomena, that is to say of the relation we perceive between the soul and the body'. And, in merely giving 'an explanation of the phenomena', it was not meant to give an explanation of any 'metaphysical union [*union métaphysique*]' between the body and the mind. Such a metaphysical union would be additional to the perceived phenomenal relation between soul and body, and it is not anything with which, so Leibniz says, his pre-established harmony was meant to deal.⁸

The phrasing of Tournemine's objection in terms of a 'metaphysical union' of soul and body is Leibniz's; Tournemine himself speaks rather more informally, in terms of a 'real connection' or a 'genuine union'. Moreover, Leibniz says nothing more here about what might be meant by there being a 'metaphysical union' between soul and body, or about what the difference between there being or not being such a union might amount to.

But something more about what Leibniz was saying the pre-established harmony did not provide emerged later, in the *Theodicy*, in retrospective references he made to the exchange with Tournemine.

In the *Theodicy*, referring explicitly to the 'metaphysical union' of his reply to Tournemine, Leibniz speaks of that union as one which would make of the soul and the body a 'suppositum'. And in a later passage he

⁶ 'Conjectures', pp. 869-870/WF, pp. 147-149.

⁷ 'Remarque de Monsieur de Leibnitz sur un endroit des Mémoires de Trévoux de mois de Mars 1704', *Journal de Trévoux* (Trévoux), March 1708, art. 35, pp. 492-496. Having noted that Leibniz's reply gives the date of Tournemine's article not (as in note 5) as May 1703, but as March 1704, it has been suggested that the reference is simply a mistake or is to the actual as opposed to the merely nominal date of the article's appearance (see Adams, p. 295, n. 42; AG, p. 196; Garber, p. 110, n. 60; Rutherford a, p. 285, n. 23). The discrepancy actually stems from the fact that there are two editions of the *Mémoires de Trévoux*. In the first, published in Trévoux itself, the bibliographical details of Tournemine's article are as in note 5 above; whereas in the Protestant, second, edition published in Amsterdam and evidently the edition Leibniz read, its details are vol. 7, art. 16 (March 1704), pp. 231-239.

⁸ 'Remarque de Monsieur de Leibnitz...', pp. 493-494/WF, p. 250.

again speaks of it as something which produce a 'suppositum', and also as something which would make 'a single person'.⁹

In recent discussions of the Leibniz-Tournemine exchange Robert Adams glosses 'suppositum' as 'complete individual substance', and Donald Rutherford understands it as something in which the soul and body form a '*per se* unity' or a 'composite substance'.¹⁰

In what he says to Tournemine, and in the *Theodicy*, Leibniz is not completely clear about his attitude towards what he calls a 'metaphysical union'. The evidence is rather mixed whether he really thinks the idea makes much sense, and whether much turns for him at that time on whether or not the soul *does* make a single *per se* unity with the body.¹¹

But, whatever his attitude towards it, Leibniz could *not* have been clearer in replying to Tournemine that a pre-established harmony between body and soul does not of itself mean that there *is* a 'real metaphysical union' between the two, a union sufficient to make 'a single person', a *per se* unity of the body and the mind.

Commentators have discerned a change in Leibniz's mind here, a change in two connected respects. It has been suggested that at the time of the 'New system' and earlier, in the 1680s, Leibniz was *quite positively* for the idea that human beings are single, *per se*, substantial unities.¹² And it has been suggested that despite what Leibniz later conceded to Tournemine, he nevertheless, at the time of the 'New system', thought that the pre-established harmony does not merely amount to a 'perfect correspondence' be-

⁹ *Theodicee*: GP 6, p. 45/H, p. 69; GP, 6, p. 81/H, p. 104. The 'metaphysical union' of the reply to Tournemine crops up also in a letter to des Bosses of April 1709 (GP 2, p. 371/L, p. 598; see also Leibniz to des Bosses, 8 Sept 1709 (GP 2, p. 390), and Leibniz to de Volder, 19 Jan 1706 (GP 2, p. 281/L, p. 538-539). The wider topic under discussion is the Eucharist and Leibniz makes a link between 'presence' in that connection and the presence of the soul in the body – a link which was hinted at in Leibniz's reply to Tournemine (p. 494/WF, p. 250). Questioning whether and in what sense souls can be said to be in the body. Leibniz says that some would say that the soul is in the body in that it operates on it, or 'speaking according to the new system of pre-established harmony, that they are in a place only through correspondence'. However, he continued, given a 'real metaphysical union' between the soul and the body, a union which, he remarked, figured in his reply to Tournemine, then it 'can be said that the soul is truly in the body'. So a further thing that 'metaphysical union' between the mind and the body amounts to is that, given it, the mind not merely 'acts' on the body, or, better, is in pre-established harmony with it, but also is 'truly in' it.

¹⁰ Adams, p. 298, n. 46; Rutherford a, p. 274; Rutherford b, p. 156.

¹¹ See the discussion in Adams, pp. 295 f., Garber, p. 110, n. 60, Rutherford a, pp. 266, 273 ff., Rutherford b, pp. 156 f.

¹² Adams, pp. 291-292, Rutherford a, p. 266.

tween body and soul, but that it underwrites and is sufficient for the claim that a person is a single entity, a *per se* unity.¹³

Recently, however, Marleen Rozemond has tried to resolve this 'tension'¹⁴ between Leibniz's earlier evident pride about the possibilities of his hypothesis of pre-established harmony for explaining the 'union of the soul with the body', on the one hand, and his relaxed candour to Tournemine about its limits, on the other.

Rozemond suggests that between the time of the 'New system' and the time of the reply to Tournemine there is no change of Leibniz's mind about the possibilities of the pre-established harmony. It is rather, in her view, that there are different things at issue at the different times. One is the question whether there is a 'union' of the soul and the body in the sense of there being interaction and connection between them – she uses here the analogy of a 'union' of a computer and the printer with which it is united. The other is the question, not so much whether there is a *union* of this kind of soul and body, but rather how or whether soul and body form a *per se* unity, and make one thing – something which, despite their being connected and united, the computer and its printer do not. Rozemond suggests that at the time of the 'New system', when Leibniz puts forward the pre-established harmony, 'he routinely proposes it as a solution to the problem of interaction rather than the problem of *per se* unity'. However, she says, Leibniz took Tournemine 'to be interested in the other issue, which concerns the *per se* unity of the body-soul composite'.¹⁵

Despite her view that Leibniz's earlier pride in the pre-established harmony is focussed on what it will do for *union*, Rozemond allows that he might also, in a marginal and less optimistic way, have thought it provided an account of *unity* too.¹⁶ But she does not allow that this would have been justified, and she is critical of a suggestion of Adams' that the pre-established harmony contains features which would support the claim that a person is a single entity, a *per se* unity.¹⁷

It seems to me that Rozemond's distinction between soul and body union and soul and body unity, is an immensely useful one for thinking about the whole issue of the relation of mind and body in the thought of the early moderns. But I think there is something to be said in support of

¹³ Adams, pp. 292 f., Garber, p. 44., Rutherford a, pp. 270, 274.

¹⁴ Rozemond, p. 152.

¹⁵ Rozemond, p. 157.

¹⁶ Rozemond, p. 160.

¹⁷ Rozemond, pp. 152, 163-177.

Adams's suggestion and against her view that Leibniz *was right* to concede to Tournemine that the pre-established harmony does not underwrite a *unity of*, but merely a *union between* soul and body.

Before proceeding it is worth recording that Leibniz's concession to Tournemine, that a pre-established harmony between soul and body does not amount to a 'metaphysical union' between them, perhaps misses what Tournemine was looking for.

Tournemine's objection was that all Leibniz has provided between body and mind is correspondence but no real connection, and that what is required is a 'union which is not superficial but intrinsic'.¹⁸ Now I have already noted that the description of a 'not superficial' and 'intrinsic' union of this sort as 'metaphysical', is *Leibniz's* gloss on the matter. And it must be added that, when *Tournemine* counter-replies to Leibniz,¹⁹ he explicitly and forthrightly says that he was not actually looking for something so grand. The union he has in mind is not, 'as he [Leibniz] claims, a metaphysical idea'. What he wants, Tournemine says, is some account according to which '[t]he body is really, physically united to the soul, more united than are two perfectly identical clocks'.²⁰

What Tournemine wants, as he explained in the first place, is 'a principle which shows that there is between a certain body and a certain soul a connection so natural, so essential and so necessary, that no soul other than mine could animate my body, and no body except mine could be animated by my soul'. He wants 'a certain body [to be] united to a certain soul [...] because it has an essential need of that soul in order to be maintained in an arrangement which is suitable for human functions'. He wants it to be that the soul is united with the body, 'not only because the soul acts on the body', but also 'because its action on the body is, on the one hand, so essential to the body that without it it would not be a human body, and, on the other, so specific to the soul that no other created thing could produce it by its natural powers'. And, as he said of his own system, which he then went on to expound, 'my system sets up between the body and the soul not a simple correspondence, but a genuine union, which is as real and perfect as the union between a machine and the single spring which is able to make it work'.²¹

¹⁸ Tournemine, 'Conjectures', p. 870/WF, p. 249.

¹⁹ 'Réponse du P. Tournemine', appended (pp. 496-498) to 'Remarque de Monsieur de Leibnits' (as in note 7 above).

²⁰ P. 497/WF, p. 251.

²¹ 'Conjectures', pp. 870, 874, 1063.

Given all of this, one might wonder whether Leibniz had really read Tournemine's initial article through before he replied to it.²² Tournemine's counter-reply certainly indicates that at any rate he thinks that Leibniz's talk of 'a metaphysical union' is somewhat off at a tangent.

The question whether Leibniz was right, as Rozemond contends, to concede to Tournemine that pre-established harmony does not underwrite 'metaphysical union', or *per se* unity, is not, then, the only possible line of investigation. One could also wonder, given a fuller reading of Tournemine, whether the pre-established harmony actually does provide what he was wanting – however that should be described.²³ It is certainly true that the conceptual resources and complexity of the hypothesis of pre-established harmony go far beyond what is captured by the 'Third explanation' simile of the two clocks, a simile which, quite possibly, represents the limits of Tournemine's knowledge of the matter. So it is perhaps not obviously out of the question that the pre-established harmony, when fully detailed, does provide something interestingly like what Tournemine, as properly understood, was wanting all along.²⁴

I shall shortly look at some of that further detail – not, however, with a view to deciding whether it after all provides what Tournemine was really wanting, but rather with a view to the question provoked by Rozemond, the question whether the pre-established harmony can, after all, underwrite a substantial, *per se* unity of soul and body.

Adams's suggestion is that, to an extent, it *can* do this – specifically when seen as a supplement to and support for a scholastic conception of *per se* unity according to which a substantial unity is one whose constituents are, 'incomplete' by themselves.²⁵ Rozemond's objection to this is that 'the conceptions of incompleteness found in Leibniz and the scholastics are very different, and [...] the differences are crucial to the question of the unity of corporeal substances'.²⁶

In expounding the scholastic account of how the body and the soul, each one incomplete by itself, complete each other in substantial unity,

²² Cf. Rozemond, note 16.

²³ Cf. Rozemond, note 16.

²⁴ Leibniz's remarks that souls 'inherently express those portions [of matter] with which they are united' (A 6, 3, p. 240/RB, p. 240), and that 'every created intelligence has an organic body, whose level of perfection corresponds to that of the intelligence or mind which occupies the body' (A 6, 3, p. 307/RB, p. 307) certainly find an echo in some of what Tournemine (as quoted above) says.

²⁵ Adams, p. 294.

²⁶ Rozemond, p. 165.

Rozemond explains that, for the scholastics, the soul needs the body and is incomplete without it in that it 'cannot exercise its functions without it'; for them, she says, the soul 'needs the body in order to exercise its functions'.²⁷ To take one specific case, they thought, she says, that 'the human intellect cannot operate without the imagination [...] because it cannot understand anything without forming images'.²⁸ She contrasts this with Leibniz's statements to the effect that souls 'are independent from body and causally self-contained', and that 'the soul alone is the subject of its states and it operates entirely independently of the body'.²⁹ She suggests, too, that Leibniz's talk of incompleteness, as in a letter to Damaris Masham, has a quite different meaning from what it had for the scholastics. His explanation of why Caesar's soul does not exist apart from a body is different from their's, for it is spelt out to Masham simply in terms of the demand for richness and perfection in the world.³⁰

Adams is of the view that this explanation, which is 'tantamount to demands of the goodness of God', is 'surely not weaker than the natural aptitude that matter and substantial form have for each other according to Suárez', and Rozemond agrees that 'if body and soul imply each other's existence in virtue of God's goodness the reasons for this mutual implication are indeed very strong'.³¹ But she goes on to say that so far as the question of the body and soul forming one thing is concerned, 'these reasons are not *the right kind of reasons*: there is nothing about these reasons that explains how body and soul constitute a genuine unity'.³²

In what follows, then, I want to make at any rate the beginnings of a response to Rozemond and to offer some support to Adams. In doing so I shall concentrate, as Rozemond does, on the question of the incompleteness of the soul without the body, rather than that of the body without the soul. I want to point out that there is more to say on Leibniz's behalf about incompleteness than he says to Masham, and that the pre-established harmony does provide something of what Rozemond calls the 'right kinds of reason' for speaking of the incompleteness of the soul without the body.

We need to see, then, that the pre-established harmony has rather more to offer than she acknowledges about respects in which the soul and the

²⁷ Rozemond, pp. 168, 175; see also p. 169.

²⁸ Rozemond, p. 169.

²⁹ Rozemond, pp. 172, 175.

³⁰ Rozemond, p. 173. The reference is to Leibniz's letter to Masham, 30 June 1704 (GP 3, p. 356/WF, p. 214).

³¹ Adams, p. 294; Rozemond, p. 175.

³² Rozemond, p. 175.

body imply each other's existence, and to begin to see this we need to remind ourselves that the 'Third explanation' simile of the clock leaves out much of the conceptual complexity of the pre-established harmony.

That simile as Tournemine reports it, says no more than that soul and body in their pre-established harmony, are like two clocks which, first, tell the same time, and, second, do so, not because there is some mechanism connecting them, not because someone continually adjusts them, but because they have been reliably regulated in advance.

Leibniz's important denial of any direct causality or 'influence' between soul and body is certainly captured by this. His anti-occasionalist notion of substances having their own complete natures and internal causality (their 'own original constitutions') is also, though less explicitly, captured. But what is completely left out is something which is catered for by other, fuller, accounts of the pre-established harmony – namely, that there are, nevertheless, dependencies between soul and body, and that these are of an internal and not merely external nature.

As a background to this, consider Descartes's account in *The Passions of the Soul* of the relation between body and soul. As might naturally have been expected, it is part of that account that some events in the soul (perceptions of outside bodies, for example) have their causes in the body (the effect of light on the retina), and that some in the body (our legs moving, for example) are consequences of causes in the soul (our willing to walk).¹¹

Now 'telling the same time as' is a symmetrical relation between the two clocks. So, to mirror the asymmetrical causal dependencies between body and soul such as were naturally recognised by Descartes, it would need somehow to be built into the clock simile, and in a way that does not renege on Leibniz's denial of causal connection between the clocks, that one clock strikes eight (for example) *not merely when but because* the other does, while the other strikes one (for example) *not merely when, but because* the first does.

But how the clock simile might actually be developed is a secondary matter. The important fact is simply that as it stands it really is not sophisticated enough, for, as indeed one would have hoped, it is part of Leibniz's hypothesis of pre-established harmony, just as much as it is of Descartes's account, that there are asymmetrical dependencies between body and soul. Of course, Leibniz does not explicate these, as does Descartes, in terms of extensional, efficient causality. His appeal is, rather, to the intensional notions of 'representation' or 'expression'. So, in the 'New system', for exam-

¹¹ Part 1, paras. 18, 21, 23, 31, 41 (CSMK, vol. 1, pp. 335-37, 340, 343).

ple, the 'mutual relationship, arranged in advance' between body and soul is not simply a matter of their 'keeping time together', even though what arises in the soul does 'from its own original constitution', and even though what happens in the body is 'according to the laws of the bodily mechanism'.³⁴ What more it is, is a matter of there being dependencies of each on the other. On the one hand, what arises in the soul is as it is through its 'representational nature (its ability to express external things which are in relation with its organs)'; and, on the other hand, the parts of the body have 'exactly at the right moment the motions which correspond to the passions and perceptions of the soul' and to the soul's willing it to act.³⁵

Now, that the soul represents the body and, in its turn, is expressed by it goes some way to supporting the idea that for Leibniz, just as for the scholastics, the functions of the soul, such as its sensitive and intellectual ones, 'cannot', as Rozemond puts it, 'be exercised in separation from the body'.³⁶

Leibniz speaks more often of the soul's representing the body. Indeed it is, he says, the very 'nature of the soul to represent the body'.³⁷ Now it is true that when Leibniz's statements about the soul's being independent of the body provoked Simon Foucher and Damaris Masham into suggesting that 'the bodily organs serve no purpose, if the soul is self-sufficient', his reply is merely 'that God wanted there to be more substances rather than fewer, and he thought it best that these "modifications of the soul" should correspond to something outside'.³⁸ But all that Leibniz says about perception carries the implication of there being a conceptual unnaturalness in the idea of a soul without a body.

As the word 'represent' implies, the relationship between the soul and body is not a merely external one as is that of efficient causality. While it is of the nature of the soul to represent or perceive the corporeal world it is necessary that it does not represent it clearly and objectively, but, rather, confusedly and from a point of view. Otherwise 'there would be no distinc-

³⁴ 'Système nouveau', para. 14 (GP 4, p. 484/WF, p. 18). Of course even a perfectly symmetrical 'telling the same time as' relation between soul and body would call for the pre-established harmony for some notion such as 'expression' or 'representation'. What, otherwise, could 'telling the same time as' mean?

³⁵ 'Système nouveau', para. 14 (GP 4, p. 484/WF, p. 18).

³⁶ Rozemond, p. 168.

³⁷ GP 2, p. 171/L, p. 517; also GP 2, p. 58/M, p. 65; GP 2, p. 71/M, p. 87; GP 4, p. 519/WF, p. 81; GP 4, p. 523/WF, p. 84; GP 6, p. 617/L, p. 649; GP 7, p. 410/L, p. 710.

³⁸ Letters from Masham to Leibniz (3 June 1704) and Leibniz to Masham (30 June 1704); 'Reponse de M.S.F. à M. de L.B.Z sur son nouveau système...', *Journal des Savants* (Paris), 12 September 1695, no. 36, pp. 422-426; 'Eclaircissement de nouveau système...', *Journal des Savants* (Paris), 2 April 1696, no. 14, pp. 166-168, 9 April 1696, no. 15, pp. 169-171.

tion among souls' and 'each would be a divinity'.³⁹ And this requirement of confused or subjective perception is met by the soul's having a body, which, as it were, places it within the corporeal world. While the soul represents or perceives the whole corporeal world 'it is an expression of the phenomena of all other bodies in accordance with the relationship with its own'.⁴⁰ So, says Leibniz, even though 'what happens to the soul is born from its own depths' and it does not 'adapt itself [...] to the body' with which it is merely in harmony, nevertheless the soul is, in a sense, *necessarily* embodied, and is 'the form of its body'.⁴¹

So the pre-established harmony between soul and body does more than provide a mere analogue to the external relation of efficient causality. It replaces it with something different and richer. The relationship between the perceiving soul and the body is an internal one. The soul is incomplete without a body in that an understanding of its essential function of representing involves an essential reference to it.⁴²

The cases where, rather than the soul's representing the body, it is expressed by it, lend even more support to the idea that the functions of the soul have an internal reference to the body, so that it would be incomplete without it. There are two kinds of such case.

Of the most obvious kind are those which correspond to the Cartesian cases where the soul acts causally on the body. Willing is an example. In willing, the soul wants the body to act and, as a result, the body does act. Cases like this are referred to in the 'New system' when, as quoted earlier, Leibniz says that the parts of the body have 'exactly at the right moment the motions which correspond to the passions and perceptions of the soul' when it desires it to act. They are referred to again in his exchanges with Pierre Bayle where Leibniz says that '[e]verything that ambition or whatever other passion produces in Caesar's soul is also represented in his body'.⁴³

³⁹ Letter from Leibniz to Arnauld, 30 April 1687 (GP 2, p. 90/M, p. 113); *Monadology*, para. 60 (GP 6, p. 617/L, p. 649).

⁴⁰ Letter from Leibniz to Arnauld, 4/14 July 1686 (GP 2, p. 58/M, p. 65-66; see also letter to Coste, 4 July 1706 (GP 3, p. 383/WF, p. 135 n. 12), *Monadology*, para. 62 (GP 6, p. 617/L, p. 649).

⁴¹ Letter from Leibniz to Arnauld, 4/14 July 1686 (GP 2, p. 58/M, p. 65); also *Monadology*, para. 62 (GP 6, p. 617/L, p. 649).

⁴² See Wilson, pp. 197-198 for some discussion of this. A further way in which the hypothesis of pre-established harmony goes beyond the Cartesian picture is, of course, that for Leibniz everything that goes on in the body has some representation in the soul (Letter from Leibniz to Arnauld, 9 October 1687 (GP 2, p. 112/M, p. 143).

⁴³ 'Réponse de Mr. Leibniz [à] ... la second edition du Dictionnaire Critique de Mr. Bayle', *Histoire Critique de la République des Lettres*, art. 4, vol. 11, 1716. Quotation from GP 4, p. 559/WF, p. 112.

Asymmetrical correspondences of this kind between soul and body support the idea that for Leibniz the soul requires the body and is incomplete without it. For it is plainly Leibniz's thought that the relationship between the soul's willing and the body's acting is not the merely external and contingent one it is for Descartes, who holds that the relation is causal. It is, rather, internal and necessary. As the word 'expression' implies, it is clearly Leibniz's thought that will is 'embodied' in the bodily action. There would be an abnormality, an unnaturalness, in the soul's willing *without* being expressed. In willing it bears an internal relation to it and *requires* to be expressed by it.

Cases of the second kind in which the soul gets expressed by the body show even more how the Leibnizian soul requires completion by the body. For these are cases which go beyond the boundaries of Descartes's causal account of the mutual dependencies of the soul and the body.

It is a feature of Descartes's picture of the relationship between soul and body that the soul has, as it were, some 'life' apart from the body. For him, pure abstract thought, unlike acts of will, has no causal effect on the body (nor, of course, is it caused by it). So, for Descartes, not every mental event has a corresponding bodily event which is to be explained or understood by reference to it.⁴⁴ But for Leibniz every mental event does have some bodily event corresponding to it. For Leibniz, *all* aspects of the active life of the soul require embodiment in and expression by the body.

Thus, Leibniz tells Bayle that 'the body is so constructed the soul never makes any decisions to which bodily movements don't correspond'. '[E]ven the most abstract reasonings', he says, 'having their place there, through the symbols which represent them to the imagination'.⁴⁵

Again, it must be stressed that the relation between abstract reasoning and the corresponding 'bodily movements' is not a merely external one. For, first, the bodily correlates are nothing like brain traces or somesuch – rather they are written characters which express and embody the reasoning. Secondly, the abstract reasoning *requires* to be expressed.⁴⁶ '[W]e cannot', says Leibniz, 'have abstract thoughts which have no need of something sen-

⁴⁴ I take it that this feature of Cartesian interactionism, that some mental events have no effect in the body, is taken over into Cartesian occasionalism. However, and perhaps invited to do so by the clocks analogy, Tournemine appears not to notice this and explicitly says that the Cartesians hold that 'to each change in the body there corresponds a change in the soul, and in the same way to each change in the soul there corresponds a change in the body' ('Conjectures', p. 866/WF, p. 247).

⁴⁵ 'Réponse de M. Leibniz...' (GP 4, p. 559/WF, p. 112; see also GP 4, p. 541/WF, p. 100, GP 4, p. 563/WF, p. 117; A 6, 3, pp. 77, 116/RB, pp. 77, 116; GP 6, p. 532/L, p. 556).

⁴⁶ See Wilson, pp. 263-264 for some discussion of this.

sible'. Indeed, as he goes on to say, this is an essential feature of the soul and the body being in harmony: 'If sensible traces were not required, the pre-established harmony between body and soul [...] would not obtain'.⁴⁷

In her exposition of the Scholastics' account of the mind's being incomplete without the body Rozemond says that for them 'the human intellect [...] cannot understand anything without forming images'.⁴⁸ It is quite clear that this is no less the case for Leibniz, and that the pre-established harmony offers more than she acknowledges of what, objecting to Adams, she calls 'the *right kind of reasons* [...] to explain how body and soul constitute a genuine unity'.⁴⁹

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ABBREVIATIONS

- Adams: Robert M. Adams, *Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist* (New York & Oxford, 1994).
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⁴⁷ A 6, 3, p. 77/RB, p. 77.

⁴⁸ Rozemond, p. 169.

⁴⁹ Rozemond, p. 175.