Introduction.

The argument of this paper spirals inward. In pt. 1, p. 299 ff., a

hypothesis concerned with Diogenes Laertius’ local and temporal coordi-

nates is formulated. Next, the larger setting of his book is described,

special attention being given to the complex structure of the Laertian

form of bios, and to the more systematical treatment according to

hairesis and the more historical treatment according to diadoche and

biography. Pt. 2, p. 317 ff., is a study of the Cynic-Stoic diadoche as

handled by Diogenes Laertius and of the motives behind the various

listings of Zeno’s teachers that are to be found in his book. For Stoic

dialectic, other than Cynic affiliations had to be sought, whereas no

antecedents are provided for Stoic physics. Pt. 3, p. 328 ff., is about

the community of doctrines (koinonia) between the two haireseis of

Cynicism and Stoicism which is emphasized by Diogenes Laertius. This

koinonia consists in continuity in the field of dignified ethics, and the

general Cynic doxography at the end of bk. VI, to which sections of

the special doxography concerned with Antisthenes may be added, is

strongly connected with important sections of the doxography of Stoic

ethics in bk. VII. Apart from this tradition, another view of the relation

between Cynicism and Stoicism is also represented in Diogenes Laertius;

this is concerned with the less reputable Cynic elements in Stoic ethics,

and has been relegated, for the most part, to doxographical appendixes

to the biographies of Zeno and Chrysippus. Parallels in Philodemus

and other authors prove that during rather a long period these two

opposed views of Stoicism were very much in the forefront of discussion.

App. I, p. 373 ff., compares the calumny and defense of Epicurus in

bk. X; here too, as with the two views concerning Stoicism, we have

the contrasting outcomes of divergent historical traditions. The clusters

of references (laudationes) which are such a conspicuous feature of

bks. VI, VII, and X, play a crucial part in this inquiry. Pt. 4, p. 351 ff.,

— 298 —

is about the logical doxography in bk. VII. Here it is argued that in

the important kata meros section (48-82) only chs. 49-53 have been

transcribed from the Epidrome of Diocles of Magnesia. A minutiose

comparison between the contents of the general and the detailed account

of Stoic “logic” (in the ancient sense of the word) reveals that these

cannot derive from one source, and provides the means to assess the

peculiarities of the kata meros treatment. This section begins with

epistemology (VII 49-54, in part after Diocles; for VII 75 see App. II,

p. 379 f.); this should be compared to the eidos concerned with canons

and criteria (VII 41). Next, “Phonetics”, or Stoic grammar, is treated

(VII 55-62); the appendix to Stoic grammar at 60-2 should be compared

with the eidos concerned with definitions (41). Finally, we have

“Semantics” or formal logic (VII 63-82). The references to authors and

works to be found in VII 55-82 indicate that the consecutive treatment

of grammar and formal logic goes back, not to Chrysippus, but to

some of Chrysippus’ pupils and successors. The position awarded to

epistemology seems to be a post-chrysippean innovation, too. It would

appear that the contents of the kata meros section represent the

introductory courses of logic as taught in the Stoic schools.

It is not the primary aim of the present investigation to evaluate

the reliability of Diogenes Laertius as a source for Stoic philosophy,

although obiter dicta will not be avoided. As I worked my way into

the various labyrinths that constitute his book, I gradually grew more

convinced that our first objective should be an assessment of the various

traditions which have been assembled there. Questions of historical

truth can only be solved (in as far as they can be solved) when the

historical context provided by the tradition at issue has been understood.

Speculation about the specific sources used by Diogenes Laertius only

makes sense in some cases, as, e.g., in that of the use of Diocles in

the logical doxography of bk. VII. As a rule, however, the investigation

of the tradition or traditions involved is feasible in cases where

speculation about sources is not helpful ¹.

— 299 —

Quellenforschung, just as psycho-analysis, is an heirloom of 19th

century positivism; it was believed that something is understood if

one knows its origins, or what it is composed of. One could even

argue the remote influence, or actio very much in distans, of Presocratic

arche-speculation. But we have since learned also to take the author

and his public into account. Consequently, I have attempted to display

less interest in Diogenes Laertius as a person than as an author, and

although one knows little about the sort of early third-century provincial

public he wrote for, one may at least account for the fact that the

traditions used by him reflect the feudings among and the discussions

internal to the philosophical schools, as well as the various ways of

teaching philosophy or addressing the general public, that evolved in

the Hellenistic period and later. The way Diogenes Laertius handles

his materials may reveal certain preferences, but it would be jejune

to hold him responsible for the information at his disposal.

For obvious reasons, I cannot in the present paper provide an

analysis of Diogenes Laertius (henceforward Diog. Laert.) book VII as

a whole. The biographical sections will only be touched on; of the

large and important doxography, physics had to be excluded, whereas

ethics can only be treated in part. I shall try to make up for these

deficiencies by putting the treatment of the Stoic school and of Stoic

philosophy in the larger context of Diog. Laert.’s work. SVF does

not provide sufficient information. Although it would appear hardly

believable at first blush, it really is a fact that von Arnim not only

printed much less material from bk. VII than he should have, but

also hardly strayed beyond this book and thus, for instance, overlooked

an important passage in the bios of Epicurus (X 26-7, fr. 157 Hülser ²)

— 300 —

which is a sort of double of VII 180-1 (cfr. SVF II 1, p. 1, 13 ff.).

Comparison of these two passages shows that at VII 180, SVF II, p. 1,

19, concerned with a criticism of the way Chrysippus wrote, one should

read καὶ (μὴ) διορθούμενος (cfr. X 27 ἀδιόρθωτα), thus filling in a

lacuna which no one appears to have suspected. Another most welcome

piece of information to be found at Χ 27 is that not only the works

written by Chrysippus and Aristotle but also those composed by Zeno

were full of quotations (καὶ τὰ μαρτύρια [...] Ἀριστοτέλει). Diog.

Laert.’s ultimate source (Carneades?) is correct about Chrysippus and

Aristotle, so I see no reason to doubt what it tells us about Zeno. As

far as I know, no other source (not even Diog. Laert. bk. VII) provides

this information. What should be noted, of course, is that Diog.

Laert.’s biography (VII 1-35) shows that Zeno used to quote the poets

in conversation, or during his lectures; one may now believe that this

is also how he wrote, and that he cited other than poetic literature too.

Of greater importance than the occasional neglected treasure, how-

ever, is the framework (largely missing in SVF) in which the account

of the Stoics in Diog. Laert. has been set, viz. that of the Cynic-Stoic

diadoche, and of the κοινωνία (VI 104) between the two philosophies.

The Cynic-Stoic diadoche itself is part of the Ionian diadoche,

constituting one of its three branches (I 13-5), and should be studied

in this setting. Inevitably, therefore, we shall have to inquire into the

plan and nature of Diog. Laert.’s work, which is not easy because

the dedication appears to have been lost, or even never to have been

written.

First, a word about the local and temporal coordinates. I would

like to argue that Diog. Laert. was a citizen of Nicaea in Bithynia,

not a centre of learning, and that he probably worked there. The old

dilemma as to whether IX 109 Ἀπολλωνίδης ὁ Νικαιεὺς è παρ’ ἡμών

means A. [...] who came from our city» or «... from our school»,

viz. the Skeptical school, may — pace Schwartz ³ — be solved. A parallel

— 301 —

exists if we follow the manuscripts rather than the editors of Plato’s

Sophist: at 242 d, the Visitor from Elea refers to τὸ [...] παρ’ ἡμῶν ⁴

Ἐλεατικόν ἔθνος. Thinking of Diog. Laert. as a local savant largely

depending on the not wholly up-to-date public library of an unimportant

town in an outlying Roman province provides some help towards

understanding why he does not seem to have bothered about

Aristotelianism as reinvigorated by Alexander of Aphrodisias or about

the more recent trends and fashions in Platonism ⁵. It is, of course,

also useful to remember that Middle Platonism is a modern invention,

along with Neoplatonism. Moreover, I believe it can be argued that

Diog. Laert. has to be dated some time before Plotinus. That he

— 302 —

was a sort of mild Skeptic, as Schwartz and others have argued, is

not supported by his admiration for numerous philosophers and phi-

losophical schools, and above all by his rather fervid appreciation of

Epicureanism.

Tentatively, I would suggest that the temporal coordinates of

Diog. Laert. can also be determined more precisely. The partly fabri-

cated Skeptical diadoche in the final chapter of bk. IX is unique in

that it is the only one in Diog. Laert. to continue far into the Roman

period and to provide names for this continuity. The only parallel, that

concerned with Epicurus’ numerous successors at x 9, does not provide

names, so one cannot know precisely how far it reached. The last

person on the Skeptical list to be mentioned, in the final sentence

of this chapter, is a pupil of Sextus Empiricus (ΙΧ 116): Σέξτου δὲ

διήκουσε Σατορνῖνος ὁ Κυθηνᾶς. Now Κυθηνᾶς is a vox nihili; in

their translations, Hicks and Gigante have toyed with the emendation

Κυ(δα)θηνα(ιεύ)ς. In that case, however, one would have expected

Ἀθηναῖος, τῶν δήμων Κυδαθηναιεύς, cfr. II 18, 48; III 1, 3; IV 1, 16;

X 1. At. IV 21, Ἀθηναῖος) has been restored by editors. At II 104,

121, 122, 123, we have Ἀθηναῖος only, without the demotic. The only

(partial) parallel is V 75, Δημήτριος Φανοστράτου Φαληρεύς. But

Demetrius was a well-known person and Phalerum a well-known place.

Consequently, I would suggest the emendation ὁ καθ’ ἡμᾶς (found not

infrequently in Strabo at the end of a list of notable persons from a

town or region) which, as Jonathan Barnes reminds me, was already

proposed by Nietzsche ⁶. At a count of three generations to a century,

the partly fictitious list at IX 115-6 (if we date Aenesidemus to c. 50

BCE) would date Diog. Laert. to the first decades of the third cent.

CE, which seems fair enough.

— 303 —

There is another preliminary point. Applying the principle of

charity, I side with those scholars who argue ⁷ that Diog. Laert. had

some notion of what he was doing and should be taken at face-value

whenever he appears to speak in his own right. Without denying that

his work is a compilation, I would like to emphasize (although

exceptions exist) that his style and vocabulary are fairly uniform, and

especially so when he appears to speak in his own right. To imagine

him as a pair of scissors attached in some way or other to the ancient

equivalent of a xerox machine would be unwise. The book has structure.

The second part of the prologue — esp. the Successions as listed

I 13-5, which do not match the fuller treatment in the body of the

work ⁸ — should not be read as intimating a failure to state a full table

of contents or, worse, the sort of inconsistency to be expected of a

scissors-and-paste man, but merely as a kind of outline of the things

to be expected. Diog. Laert.’s intentions may be gauged from his actual

performance. One should study him the way an anthropologist studies

the customs and traditions of an alien culture.

The plan of the work as executed may be pieced together from

various passages at nodal points, as, e.g., the beginning of bk. VIII, where

we read: « having completed our account of the Ionian philosophy

beginning with Thales as well as of the persons worthy of note that

belong with it, let us now proceed to tackle the Italian philosophy

which was started by Pythagoras » etc. ⁹ This sentence looks back

toward bks. II-VII (Ionian philosophy) and foreward to bks. VIII-X

(Italian philosophy). Whatever the original title of Diog. Laert.’s work,

its contents have been fairly well described in the notice found in

several manuscripts (in some, a version thereof precedes a detailed

— 304 —

list of the persons to be found in the 10 books ¹⁰): Λ. Δ. βίων καὶ

γνωμῶν τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ εὐδοκιμησάντων καὶ τῶν ἐν ἐκάστῃ αἱρέσει

ἀρεσκόντων κτλ. Hence it was concerned both with the “biographies”

and “apophthegms” of the famous “persons” and with the “doctrines”

of the “sects” (schools). Although I do not believe that a rigorous

Dielsian distinction between the genres of biography and doxography

should be assumed ¹¹ — with as its corollary that Diog. Laert.’s work

would be exceptional —, some differences of course have to be accepted.

Hippobotus wrote both a “biographical” Philosophon anagraphe and

a “doxographical” Peri haireseon which presumably were fairly different

works, although the doxographical book can hardly have dispensed

with dates and affiliations, just as the biographical book will have

presented information about ideas, and some quotes. In Diog. Laert.

himself, for instance, one may note that the information that Zeno

invented the concept of the kathekon is found both in the biography

(VII 25) and in the ethical part of the doxography (VII 108); von Arnim

printed both texts at SVF I 230. The doxographical note in the

biography of Antisthenes, VI 15 (not in SVF; fr. 105 Hülser, Ant. fr.

135 B Decleva Caizzi, Socrat. fr. v A 22 Giannantoni) that Antisthenes

gave the impulse to the apatheia of Diogenes, the enkrateia of Crates,

and the karteria of Zeno (note the Succession) may be connected with

the poetical quotations in the biography of Zeno (VII 26-7) illustrating

the fact that he was karterikotatos ¹². The Peri haireseon literature,

the Successions, and the individual or collective Lives did not

constitute rigidly distinct domains; the difference is one of emphasis:

— 305 —

historical in the Bioi and Diadochai, systematical in the Peri haireseon.

This is also clear from the remains of Diocles of Magnesia, whose

“doxographical”, or “systematical”, Epidrome ton philosophon apparen-

tly should be distinguished ¹³ from his “biographical”, or “historical”,

Bioi ton philosophon; yet it is occasionally unclear (just as in the

case of Hippobotus) to which particular work a particular fragment

should be assigned ¹⁴. Varieties of a mixed nature existed. Apuleius’

De Platone et eius ogmate begins with a brief biography and

continues with a Middle Platonist doxography dealing with physics and

ethics ¹⁵; from a purely formal point of view it is a good parallel

— 306 —

for Diog. Laert. III. One should also keep in mind that the

extensive (Neo-)Pythagorean doxography at VIII 24 ff. (Vorsokr. 55

B. 1a) is quoted from Alexander Polyhistor’s Successions of Philosophers.

But the background against which Diog. Laert.’s work should be stu-

died is not merely the very imperfectly known special literature dealing

with the lives and the doctrines and the affiliations of individual

philosophers or schools ¹⁶, but the ancient technical and handbook

literature in general. It can be rewardingly compared with the literature

περὶ τέχνης, i.e., dealing with or providing an introduction to a

specific discipline. This more often than not contained a definition

of the subject, an account of its origins, a short history of the discipline

listing illustrious workers in the field, and/or of various views held on

its nature and importance. All these topics are to be found in the

second part of Diog. Laert.’s prologue (Ι 13-21), which may be set

off against and compared with the introductory sections of the gram-

matical commentaries edited by Hilgard which are known under the

misleading name of Scholia in Dionysium Thracem, the introductions

to various rhetorical treatises published in Rabe’s Prolegomenon sylloge,

and especially with the Introductions to Philosophy produced by the

very late Neoplatonists of Alexandria. More ambitious treatises of

this sort — apart from those of Hippobotus and Diocles in the field

of philosophy — are for instance the (imperfecdy known) “biographical”

De poetis and “doxographical” De poematis of Varro ¹⁷. To combine

— 307 —

these two different approaches systematically for the whole history

of philosophy up to a certain date — or rather a variety of dates for

the various persuasions — may or may not have been Diog. Laert.’s

own idea (we have noticed the partial precedent of Apuleius’ De

Platone), but one can hardly deny that the bricks and the mortar for

the imposing edifice were amply available ¹⁸. It is, for instance, worth

one’s while to compare the so-called introduction to Celsus’ De medicina,

which consists of two parts: first (§§ 1-12), a brief history of medicine

is provided after the subject has been defined; the parts of medicine

are mentioned (§ 9). Then the important names and relative dates

are given, and the concept of Succession plays a certain part (11 ex

cuius successoribus). Secondly (§§ 13-74), the important schools are

described and set off against one another (synkrisis) viz. the

dogmatists and the empiricists, with the methodists thrown in as an

extra (54 ff.). This second part may be fruitfully compared with

Galen’s Peri haireseon tois eisagomenois, which proceeds in the same

way. Galen’s little book is one of the few surviving examples of

the Peri haireseon literature which, as will appear from the sequel

of this paper, is of great importance for the interpretation of Diog.

Laert. ^18a8a Finally, the description of the contents of Diogenes Laertius

(supra, p. 304) can to a surprising extent be paralleled from the title

of a lost work by Soranus who lived earlier: the lost Βίοι ἰατρῶν

καὶ αἱρέσεις καὶ συντάγματα βιβλία ι', Sud. ι 4, ρ. 407, 23 f. A. It

is interesting to compare the Vita Hippocratis secundum Soranum

(CMG ιν, p. 173 ff.) to a Laertian biography. A snippet of medical

doctrine is quoted from another (?) work at Orib., CMG VI 3, p. 132

Raeder: è Σωρανός ἐν ταῖς τὼν Ἰατρῶν διαδοχαῖς.

— 308 —

Furthermore, the notion of what, according to Diog. Laert.,

constitutes a bios is rather large. At first blush, one would expect

bios to refer to the “life”, then also to the “life and works”, of an

individual person. This is not correct for Diog. Laert. Brief lives,

including bibliographies, of the Epicureans Metrodorus (X 22-4) and

Hermarchus (X 24-5) have been inserted into, i.e., are part of, the

bios of Epicurus, whose own bibliography follows somewhat later

(X 27-8). Other followers of Epicurus listed at X 23-6, both pupils

and successors, are succinctly characterized. What we are able to see

here with our own eyes is in what way a list of persons may blossom

into a series of biographies. The formula introducing the inserted

biographies is noteworthy: Μαθητὰς δὲ ἔσχε πολλοὺς μέν, σφόδρα

δὲ ἐλλογίμους Μητρόδωρον κτλ. (Χ 23). A similar formula is found

at VI 93, i.e., at what in our editions is the end of the Life of Crates:

μαθηταὶ δ’ αὐτοῦ. The editions then give a new chapter-heading

(Metrocles), and VI 94 begins with: Μητροκλῆς ὁ Μαρονείτης κτλ.

But the chapter-heading is misleading; read μαθηταὶ δ’ αὐτοῦ

Μητροκλῆς κτλ. The biography of Metrocles (VI 94-5) and that of

his sister Hipparchia who married Crates (VI 96-8) are part of Diog.

Laert.’s bios of Crates; indeed, much of Hipparchia’s life was shared

with Crates. Accordingly, VI 98 φέρεται ... Βοιωτίᾳ pertains to Crates;

the account broken off at VI 93 is resumed and rounded off at 98 ¹⁹.

In bk. VI, the bioi of Menippus (VI 99-101) and of Menedemus (VI 102)

have been appended; these persons, although Cynics, do not belong

with Diog. Laert.’s succession Antisthenes-Diogenes-Crates. At VI 103,

a new section begins (103-5), viz. the common Cynic placita which Diog.

Laert. choses to treat after the bioi of the individual Cynics (103

καὶ οὗτοι μὲν οἱ βίοι τῶν Κυνικῶν ἑκάστου).

That bk. X only contained the bios of Epicurus is confirmed the

list of ἐκάστου βιβλίου τὰ πρόσωπα first published by Rose ²⁰;

however, for vi the list refers to μητροκλῆς; ἵππαρχος [i.e., -ία].

This is a point I shall revert to shortly.

— 309 —

Other cases of brief lives inserted into an important bios are the

following. In ΙΙ, the lives of Euboulides (11 108-9) and Diodorus Cronus

(ΙΙ 111-2) are part of the bios of Euclid of Megara; Rose’s table does

not list them. However, the table for bk. ΙΙ lists ἀρίστιππος: θεόδωρος,

whereas our editions do not sport a separate chapter devoted to

Theodorus the Atheist but include him as the final part of the bios

of Aristippus (ΙΙ 97-104).

A comparable situation obtains in bk. VII. The biobibliography

of Zeno’s faithful pupil Persaeus has been inserted into the biographical

part of the bios of Zeno at VII 36 ²¹. The introductory formula is

remarkably similar to that introducing Metrodorus’ biobibliography at

X 23, viz. VII 36 Μαθηταὶ δὲ Ζήνωνος πολλοὶ μέν, ἔνδοξοι δὲ

Περσαῖος κτλ. At VII 37-8, the other pupils are listed (cfr. X 23-6).

Diog. Laert. explicitly says that he will deal with Sphaerus in «the

chapter on Cleanthes» (VII 37: καὶ λέξομεν περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ

Περὶ Κλεάνθους). This promise is kept at VII 177-8, where the

biobibliography of Sphaerus is preceded by an explicit backward reference

(to VII 37): τούτου [scil. Κλεάνθους], καθάπερ προειρήκαμεν,

ἤκουσε μετὰ Ζήνωνα καὶ Σφαῖρος κτλ. Our editions, which give a

separate chapter to Persaeus, appear to be wrong; the Περὶ Κλεάνθους

runs from VII 168 to 178. At VII 179 a new section begins, which we

may call Περὶ Χρύσιππου. The separate chapters in our editions concer-

ned with Aristo (VII 160-4), Herillus (165-6), and Dionysius (166-7),

also convey a false impression: what we may call the Περὶ Ζήνωνος

runs from VII 1 to VII 167. The biobibliographies of Zeno’s three

dissident pupils belong with the Laertian bios of Zeno at the end

of which they have been appendend, the way the biography of

Theodorus has been appendend to and included into the bios of

Aristippus (which, like Zeno’s at VII 38-160, includes a doxography,

viz. of the Peri haireseon type, at II 86-97). A new bios begins with

Zeno’s successor Cleanthes. One may adduce the transitional sentences

— 310 —

which introduce and round off the biobibliographies of the three dissi-

dents: VII 160 ἃ δέ τινες ἐξ αὐτῶν διενέχθησαν ἔστι τάδε ~ VII 167

καὶ οὗτοι μὲν οἱ διενεχθέντες. διεδέξατο δὲ τὸν Ζήνωνα Κλεάνθης,

περὶ οὗ λεκτέον.

A bios, or section “On X”, in Diog. Laert. may therefore include

the biographies and even the bibliographies of minor persons closely

connected with the main person at issue. As we have noticed, it may

also include a doxography; for this mixing of genres precedents have

been cited supra, p. 306 f. Diog. Laert. explicitly states (VII 38) that he

will treat the common Stoic doctrines (πάντων τῶν Στωϊκῶν δογμάτων,

cfr. τὰ [...] δόγματα κοινῶς) «in the bios of Zeno» (ἐv τῷ

Ζήνωνος [...] βίῳ ) , «because Zeno was the founder of the

hairesis». On the other hand, as will be recalled, the common doctrines

of the Cynics were treated after their individual “Lives” (bioi; VI 103).

In bk. VII, the Stoic doctrines are included after the biobibliographies

of Zeno and Persaeus and before those of the three dissident pupils,

and so are placed before the bioi of Cleanthes and Chrysippus. Diog.

Laret.’s motive, viz. that Zeno founded the Stoic hairesis, appears to

be weak — conversely, why not proceed in a similar way in bk. VI

and include the common Cynic placita in the bios of Antisthenes

rather than add them at the end of the book? This is a point to

which I shall return in parts 2 and 3 of this paper. What may already

be pointed out, however, is that Diog. Laert.’s locations of the Cynic

and the Stoic common placita put these as close to one another as

is virtually possible. This underscores the continuity which according

to him obtains between these schools — and so it is relevant to put

the Stoic placita in the bios of the founder. There certainly is a

measure of method in Diog. Laert.’s arrangement in this case.

We are now in a position to comment on the part of Rose’s table

which lists the πρόσωπα dealt with in bk. VII (conveniently printed as

Posidonius T 66 E.-K. = T 24 Th.; however, read (ἑ)κάτων with

Rose and Gomoll). It has often been argued that this list cannot serve

as a table of contents for bk. VII and is therefore useless in as far as

the lost part of this book is concerned (the manuscripts stop halfway

the bibliography of Chrysippus), because it does not refer to Persaeus

— 311 —

Aristo Herillus Dionysius Sphaerus ²². According to our above analysis,

however, the fact that it begins with ζήνων : κλεάνθης : χρύσιππος

is an argument in favour of its reliability. Indeed, Nietzsche already

pointed out that according to Diog. Laert. himself Persaeus Aristo

Herillus Dionysius belong with the bios of Zeno, as Sphaerus with

that of Cleanthes, and he tells us that according to Wachsmuth’s

investigation of the manuscripts there are no separate chapter-headings

for these persons ²³. One should add that, with a few minor exceptions,

Rose’s table of πρόσωπα is correct in as far as the other books are

concerned. The exceptions, as we have noticed, are: 1) the reference

to Theodorus, whose Life follows in the text without a break upon

the Cyrenaic doxography in II 97 and who accordingly gets no separate

chapter in our editions. It is to be noted, however, that Diog. Laert.’s

treatment of Theodorus is fairly long and substantial. Furthermore:

2) the references in Rose’s table to Metrocles and Hipparchia do not

square with our analysis of Diog. Laert.’s bios of Crates. It would

appear that where the table refers to more persons than one would

expect on the basis of an analysis of the structure of the relevant

Laertian bioi, the individuals involved are noteworthy for specific

reasons (think of Theodorus’ atheism and Hipparchia’s funny mar-

riage), and that where persons are not listed — as in the case of

the five Stoics of the second generation mentioned above — the text

of Diog. Laert. itself affords sufficient justification. Now Rose’s table

of the persons treated in bk. VII contains quite a number of names

after Chrysippus’, viz. ζήνων τάρσευς : διογένης : ἀπολλόδωρος :

βοηθός : μνησαρχίδης [i.e., presumably, Μνησάρχος] : μνασαγόρας :

νέστωρ : βασιλείδης : δάρδανος : ἀντίπατρος : ἡρακλείδης :

— 312 —

σωσιγένης : πανάιτιος : (ἑ)κάτων : ποσειδώνυος : ἀθηνόδωρος : καὶ

ἀθηνόδωρος ἄλλος : ἀντίπατρος : ἄρειος : κορνοῦτος. A rather mixed

lot: scholarchs (e.g., Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes), other famous Stoics,

and even unknown persons (e.g., Mnasagoras). That the Succession at

I 15 ends with Chrysippus is not a good argument against the reliability

of the list, for although the Peripatetic Succession (ibid.) ends with

Theophrastus, bk. V also contains the Lives of the scholarchs Strato

and Lyco, followed by two others, viz. Demetrius of Phalerum and

Heraclides Ponticus; and this is exactly what we find in Rose’s table

for bk. V. It cannot be a mere list, like the fictitious list of Skeptical

diadochai and other Skeptics at IX 115-6; at any rate, nothing in

Rose’s table — which ends with τίμων — for bk. IX corresponds

with the list at IX 115-6. I am aware of placing myself outside the

communis opinio, but do believe that the evidence warrants the inference

that the other Stoics on Rose’s table were indeed treated in the lost

part of bk. VII. One may compare the appended lives of Demetrius

and Heraclides in bk. V and those of Menippus and Menedemus in

bk. VI as well as the interpolated very brief biobibliographies of Crito

Simon Glaucon Simmias Cebes in II 121-5. Not all the Stoic persons

need have been treated in detail, but what was in Diog. Laert. must

have been sufficiently explicit.

The last person listed in the table is Cornutus, the friend of the

Roman poet Persius; so the last Stoic dealt with by Diog. Laert. lived

in the 1st cent. CE ²⁴. Consequently, there are three haireseis for

which Diog. Laert. underscored continuity until well into the 1st-2nd

centuries CE: the Stoic; the Skeptic (IX 115-6); and the Epicurean

(X 9). The renascences of Platonism and Aristotelianism and the equally

interesting revivals of Pythagoreanism and Cynicism have not been

taken into account by him. This state of affairs seems to reflect the

Hellenistocentric bias of the traditions to be found in the literature

on which he based his work.

— 313 —

We may now pass on to the contents of Diog. Laert.’s prologue.

Here, the sections dealing with the diadochai

(I 13-5), the parts of

philosophy (I 18), and the haireseis (I 18, 19-20), are for my present

purpose the important ones, since these provide the materials from

which the structural framework has been constructed. Diog. Laert.’s

history is set out according to the (“historical”) diadochai and the

(“systematical”) haireseis, the former however taking preference over

the latter as a principle of organisation ²⁵. For each sect or major

figure, moreover, the doctrines are given according to the division of

philosophy into parts.

Diog. Laert. uses only one bipartite system of Successions ²⁶

(I 13-5), viz. that divided into an Ionian system (with three subsequent

branches) and into an Italian one — cfr. also VIII 1, cited supra, p. 303.

He does not refer to the rival tripartite division into Ionian, Pythago-

rean, and Eleatic streams known from, e.g., Clement of Alexandria,

strom. I 62, 1 ff. On the other hand, he cites two partly alternative lists

of haireseis·. an anonymous list (there is no ground for the ascription

to Panaetius) of 10 sects at I 18 (cfr. Ant. fr. 134 a D.C., Socr. fr. I

6 G.), and Hippobotus’ list of 9 sects at I 19 (cfr. Hipp. fr. 1 Gigante;

Socr. fr. I 6 G.). These lists are not in SVF or Hülser. Hippobotus’ list

has two sects not figuring on the former, viz. the Annicereans and the

Theodoreans; on the other hand, as Diog. Laert. points out (I 19),

Hippobotus did not speak of the Cynic, Dialectic, and Elian, sects

figuring on the anonymous list ²⁷. In the body of his work, Diog.

— 314 —

Laert. treats all the sects figuring on both lists or on one only. He

adds the Pyrrhonist sect, which he says is not included by the majority

(οἱ πλείους, I 20); it is given full treatment in bk. IX. This brings

the total number of sects stipulated in Diog. Laert.’s prologue to 13 —

or rather 14, for we should include, as he does himself in the appendix

to the prologue (I 21; after the summary of its contents at I 20, last

sentence) the Eclectic sect not treated in the body of the work, the

placita of which are briefly summarized here in the order logic (i.e.,

theory of knowledge) physics ethics. It is perhaps clear why Diog. Laert.

cited two different lists of sects and only one system of Successions;

the former permitted him to cast his net more widely, while a different

arrangement of philosophers would hardly have increased the material

at his disposal.

For my present purpose the first list, containing both Cynics and

Stoics (Hippobotus, as we have seen, did not include the Cynics) is

the more important one. The full list includes the following sects:

Academic; Cyrenaic, Elian, Megarian, Cynic, Eretrian, Dialectic;

Peripatetic; Stoic; and Epicurean. It is to be noted that according to

this classification Cynicism is placed among the minor Socratic schools

and that Stoicism follows much later. By treating the Cynics and

Stoics in bks. VI-VII Diog. Laert. has removed the Cynics from among

the Socratics and given preference to the order of Succession as stated

at I 15. The remaining Socratics are treated in bks. II-III, again accord-

ing to the Succession (cfr. I 14: Σωκράτης [...] οὗ oἵ τε ἄλλοι

Σωκρατικοί, — bk. II — καὶ Πλάτων ὁ τὴν ἀρχαίαν Ἀκαδημείαν

συστησάμενος — bk. III). Xenophon (II 48-59) is thrown in as an

extra ²⁸. It is interesting to compare the list of sects said to be deriving

from Socrates in the Suda s.v. Σωκράτης, IV p. 404 Adler (cfr. Socr.

fr. I 7 G.; not in SVF or Hülser) ²⁹. This catalogue, which includes

relevant fragments of Successions, has all the sects to be found in one

— 315 —

or both of Diog. Laert.’s lists at I 18 and 19, except the Epicureans

(found on both lists in Diog. Laert.), and includes the Pyrrhonists

just as Diog. Laert. himself had done ³⁰. As in Diog. Laert.’s anonymous

list of 10, the Cynics are included among the minor Socratics. However,

in the Suda, loc. cit., the Stoics are not, through a Succession, linked

with the Cynics, but with another minor Socratic school, viz. the

«Eristic Dialectical» sect deriving from, ultimately, Euclid of Megara

and the mysterious Bryson (p. 404, 15-20 A.) ³¹. The Cynic-Stoic

Succession preferred by Diog. Laert. represents a definite choice; yet,

as we shall see ³², the Dialectical affiliation has left important traces

in bk. VII.

According to the current jargon, the 10 sects of I 18 (and, by

implication, also Hippobotus’ 9) are known as the “ethical sects”. Note

that in the Suda, loc. cit., the sects are not said to be “ethical”; in

Diog. Laert. I 19, about the 9 sects, the term does not occur either.

But the list of 10 at I 18 is introduced with the words τοῦ δὲ ἠθικοῦ

γεγόνασιν αἱρέσεις δέκα. As Giuseppe Cambiano (anticipated by H.

Schmidt) has pointed out, it is definitely odd to find a hairesis called

«Dialectical» among the “ethical” sects ³³. Fortunately, the summary

— 316 —

of the prologue at i 20 provides the solution: αἵδε μὲν ἀρχαὶ [I 1-12]

καὶ διάδοχαὶ, [13-5] καὶ τοσαῦτα μέρη [18] καὶ τόσαι φιλοσο-

φίας αἱρέσεις (18,19-20). The sects as variously listed at I 18 f. are

schools of philosophy not ethics ³⁴. The Dialectical sect of I 18 is a

philosophical hairesis. The “choice” (if a schema etymologicum be

allowed ³⁵) not only pertains to specific ethical (or logical, or physical)

doctrines but also, I would suggest, to which part or parts of philo-

sophy have been included or rejected by each particular school. Often

enough, Diog. Laert. insists that a prominent philosopher or even a

whole school rejected one part or more, e.g., dialectic, or physics.

At ι 18, a lacuna should be assumed: τοῦ δὲ ἡθικοῦ xxx γεγόνασιν

αἱρέσεις δέκα, to be filled with, e.g., (προστεθειμένου), or (προστεθει-

μένου τε καὶ διαλεκτικοῦ). Immediately before the 10 sects are enu-

merated, the parts of philosophy are listed in I 18, a remark about the

order of their invention being appended ³⁶. It is said here that ethics

flourished from Socrates: ἀπὸ δὲ Σωκράτους, ὡς προείρηται,

τὸ ἠθικόν. The cross-reference (Diog. Laert.’s own) is to the Succession

in I 14: Σωκράτης ὁ τὴν ἠθικήν εἰσαγαγών. The focus on the

subject of ethics may have produced the unnoticed lacuna. Alternatively,

it would have to be assumed that Diog. Laert.’s phraseology at I 18

is confused ³⁷ and misleading, and one would still have to agree — or

so I believe — that the formula “ethical sects” had better be dropped.

— 317 —

The point about the sects as related to the parts of philosophy in

their order of invention (itself to be connected with the Successions

system) is that before Socrates, you only have two (or, as in other

systems, three) diadochai, whereas after Socrates you not only have

diadochai but sects as well (cfr. Sext. Emp. adv. math. VII 141 ἀπτώ-

μεθα δὲ ἑξῆς καὶ τῶν μετὰ τοὺς φυσικοὺς αἱρέσεων). The sects are

relevant as soon as philosophy has been completed in all its parts,

and through their founders the first 5 can be directly derived from

Socrates.

In the preceding section, it has been pointed out that Diog.

Laert. firmly links the Stoics with the Cynics. In 1905, E. Schwartz ³⁸

already insisted that in the diadoche at I 15 (for which he suggested

a date in the second cent. BCE ³⁹) «die Stoa [...] als Filiale der

Kyniker aufgefasst [wird]; das ist ganz nicht so selbstverständlich

wie es der vulgären Auffassung erscheint». Schwartz went on to

discuss, briefly, some parallels for I 15 in Diog. Laert. and discussed

various divergent views found both in Diog. Laert. and elsewhere.

An important parallel for Diog. Laert.’s diadoche not mentioned by

Schwartz is to be found in Cicero’s survey of the sects deriving from

Socrates, de or. III 61-2 (not in SVF or Hülser; Socr. fr. I 4 G.; cfr.

Ant. fr. 134 b D.-C.): [...] ab Antisthena [...] Cynici primum, deinde

Stoici (apparently, Cicero knows both lists of sects found in Diog.

Laert. and he even mentions the Pyrrhonists, which however he

considers to be defunct). Von Arnim’s collection of passages in SVF

is very uninformative about this affiliation; fortunately, this lack is

largely made good by Gabriele Giannantoni’s collection of passages

— 318 —

concerned with the Socratics, and to some extent by Karl-Heinz

Hülser’s collection of Stoic fragments.

The diadoche at I 15 (not in SVF; fr. 121 Hülser; cfr. Socr.

fr. I 6 G.) is carefully set out as follows: Socrates-Antisthenes-Diogenes

the Dog-Crates of Thebes-Zeno of Citium-Cleanthes-Chrysippus. Note

that Diogenes Crates Zeno, who could be mixed up with other philo-

sophers, are identified in such a way that a confusion with Diogenes

of Seleucia (or of Apollonia), Crates of Athens, and Zeno of Elea

(or of Sidon, or of Tarsus) is precluded. In the rival account ap.

Clem. Alex. strom. I 63, 2-64, 1 (not in SVF or Hülser; Polem. fr.

4 Gig.) Crates of Thebes has been confused — cfr. Mras ad loc. —

with Crates of Athens (originally on purpose?) and hence « Zeno

of Citium [note the identification] who began the Stoic hairesis »

and who was succeeded by Cleanthes and Chrysippus etc. is said to

be the pupil of (the Academic) Crates who is made the pupil (rather

than the pupil and friend) of Polemo.

What should be strongly emphasized is that Diog. Laert. really

goes out of his way in order to underpin the Succession Crates of

Thebes-Zeno of Citium. At VII 2, where he also lists other teachers

of Zeno, he says: διήκουσε δὲ, καθὰ προείρηται, Κράτητος

(SVF I 1, p. 3, 12; Socr. fr. V A 38 G.). The cross-reference, which

beyond doubt is Diog. Laert.’s own, is to a nodal point, viz. to the

final sentence of the final chapter of the book dealing with the Cynics,

VI 105: καὶ οὗτοι μὲν οἱ Κυνικοί. μετιτέον δ’ ἐπί τοὺς Στωϊκούς,

ὧν ἦρξε Ζήνων, μαθητὴς γενόμενος Κράτητος (not in SVF; fr. 104

Hülser; Socr. fr. V H 37 G.). What is more, the whole Cynic-Stoic

Succession beginning with Antisthenes is strongly underlined by Diog.

Laert. in the last sentence of the last chapter of Antisthenes’ bios,

i.e., at another nodal point, VI 19: ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοὺς ἀπ’ Ἀριστίππου

διεληλύθαμεν καὶ Φαίδωνος, νῦν ἐλκύσωμεν τοὺς ἀπ’ Ἀντισθένους

Κυνικούς τε καὶ Στωϊκούς (not in SVF or Hülser; Socr. fr. V A 38 G.).

This sentence announces the whole of bks. VI 20-the end, and VII (inclu-

ding its lost part), in a way similar to the announcement of bks. VIII-X

at VIII 1 (quoted supra, p. 303). Both times, moreover, Diog. Laert.

looks both ahead and backward. The backward reference at VI 19, which

appears to have been hardly, if at all, considered in the learned litera-

— 319 —

ture ⁴⁰, is most peculiar, because Diog. Laert. goes back a long way in-

deed. The successors of Aristippus and those of Phaedo had been treated

in bk. II, viz. Aristippus’ at II 85-104, Phaedo’s at II 105 and at

125-44 (the Eretrians, explicitly linked up with the Elians by Diog.

Laert.). We have noticed above (p. 314) that Diog. Laert., strictly

heeding the diadoche of I 15, removed the Cynics from among the

Socratics where they could have been treated because Antisthenes,

after all, was a pupil of Socrates (cfr. II 47), and where, as it would

appear, they had been treated in part of the Peri haireseon literature,

viz. that concerned with the 10 sects or that echoed in the Suda s.v.

Σωκράτης. In a way, the backward reference at VI 19 to the Ari-

stippeans and Phaedonians as connected with the Antisthenians is a

rudiment of this alternative arrangement. There is an equally peculiar

but gratifyingly commensurate ⁴¹ reference to Antisthenes in bk. II,

which has vexed the learned. At the end of the bios of Socrates,

II 47 (cfr. Megariker fr. 36 Döring, Socr. fr. I 5 G.), Diog. Laert.

enumerates the pupils and followers of Socrates and provides infor-

mation about the way what is to follow will be organized accordingly.

I omit the corrupt or confused part of this chapter, and quote: λεκτέον

δὲ πρῶτον περὶ Ξενοφώντος ⁴², εἶτα περὶ Ἀντισθένους ἐν τοῖς Κυνι-

κοῖς, ἔπειτα περὶ τῶν Σωκρατικῶν, εἰθ’ οὕτω περὶ Πλάτωνος, ἐπεὶ

κατάρχει τῶν δέκα αἱρέσεων καὶ τὴν πρώτην Ἀκαδημείαν αὐτὸς

συνεστήσατο. For the Socratics and Plato cfr. the Succession at Ι 14,

quoted supra, p. 314; for the 10 sects (and Plato and the Old Academy)

cfr. Ι 18 (discussed in the previous section, p. 314 f.); for the Socratics,

Plato, and the Academy cfr. also the concluding words of bk. ΙΙ:

καὶ οὗτοι μὲν οἱ Σωκρατικοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν. μετιτέον δὲ ἐπὶ

Πλάτωνα τὸν τῆς Ἀκαδημείας κατάρξαντα καὶ τοὺς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ,

ὁπόσοι γεγόνασιν ἐλλόγιμοι. The parallels and the sterotypical for-

mulas show that Diog. Laert. sticks to a definite plan and that the

— 320 —

text at ΙΙ 47 λεκτέον [...] συνεστήσατο is good; yet Diog. Laert.

does not treat Antisthenes after Xenophon and before the (other)

Socratics in bk. ΙΙ, but much later, viz. in bk. VI. In II 47, the refer-

ence to Antisthenes therefore constitutes a rudiment; it is found here

because he was a pupil of Socrates (cfr. II 47, the beginning) and

because in part of the Peri haireseon literature the Cynics presumably

were treated among the other Socratics. Consequently, the words ἐντ

οῖς Κυνικοῖς mean «(not among the Socratics, but) among the

Cynics», viz «in bk. VI». The word εἶτα is harsh (emendation would

be comparatively easy), but not harsher than the words ἐπειδή κτλ.

at VI 19. (Perhaps the odd reference at ii 47 is not to the Cynics,

but to τὰ Κυνικά.)

We are now in a position to compare the view endorsed by

Diog. Laert. that Zeno was first and foremost the pupil of the Cynic

Crates with his scattered references to other views. We have noticed

above (p. 315) that in the Suda article on Socrates the Stoa, through

Zeno, is linked up with a Socratic school practising dialectic. In Diog.

Laert. VII, this type of affiliation is also represented.

Apart from Crates (cfr. above, p. 318), three other teachers are

mentioned at VII 2 (= SVF I 1, p. 3, 12 f.; cfr. Meg. fr. 2D.;

Socr. fr. II O 4, V H 38 G.): Stilpo (of Megara; according to τινες);

Xenocrates (not in Heinze or Isnardi Parente) «during ten years,

according to Timocrates (?) in his Dio»; and Polemo (fr. 85 Gig.;

no source given, not even an anonymous one).

Next, Diog. Laert. at VII 2-3 (SVF I 1-2, p. 3, 14-25; Socr. fr.

V H 38 G.) gives two rival accounts of Zeno’s conversion to philosophy.

The Stoics Hecaton (the pupil of Panaetius: fr. 26 Gomoll) and

Apollonius of Tyre in the first book of his On Zeno claimed that

he studied the books of «the ancients». The anonymous account fol-

lowed in some detail at VII 2-3 gives the famous story of the ship-

wreck, what then happened at the bookseller’s, and the encounter

with Crates. This continues with a description of the time Zeno was

Crates’ disciple (VII 3); presumably, the anecdote at VII 12, the end,

about Zeno carrying money around for Κράτης ὁ διδάσκαλος (SVF

I 3, pp. 4, 38-5, 1; not in Giannantoni) originally belongs in this

context. The story of Zeno’s life is brought to a preliminary stop

— 321 —

at VII 4 (first sentence): ἕως μὲν οὖν τίνος ἤχούσε τοῦ Κράτητος

Apparently, Hecaton and Apollonius (VII 2) wanted to play down

the Cynic connection. From Philodemus, On the Stoics chs. 2-7 ⁴³ (partly

at Hipp. fr. 5 Gig. and Socr. fr. V B 126 G.; snippets at SVF I 42, 590,

hi Ant. 67), we know that the obscenity and immorality attributed

to the Politeia (cfr. Diog. Laert. VII 4; 32-4) were a rather hot issue

both in Stoic circles and outside the school, and that some denied

it was genuine. Indeed, on the authority of the rhetorician Isidorus

«of Pergamum» (1st cent. BCE) Diog. Laert. tells us that Athenodorus

(Cordylion) the Stoic (1st cent. BCE), director of the library «at

Pergamum», expunged those passages from Zeno’s works which — pre-

sumably for their crudely Cynic contents — displeased the Stoics (VII

34; not in SVF or Hülser). At VII 32-4, Diog. Laert. cites some

shocking details — extracts at SVF I 222, 226, 257, 259, 267, 268 —

after the Skeptic Cassius (Gr. Emp. fr. 286 Deichgräber) ⁴⁴. As Wila-

mowitz pointed out a long time ago ⁴⁵, similar criticisms of views

held by Chrysippus are to be found at VII 187-9 (cfr. SVF I 254,

III 685, 744, 747). We shall see that the doctrinal links between Cynics

— 322 —

and Stoics emphasized by Diog. Laert. are wholly different from the

things criticized by Cassius and Isidorus ⁴⁶.

A further snippet of information from Apollonius of Tyre’s bio-

graphy has been preserved at VII 24 (SVF I 278; Meg. fr. 169 D.,

Socr. fr. no 4, fr. VII 38 G.). Here we are told that Crates tried

to drag away Zeno from Stilpo, and find the quotation of the rebuke

Zeno addressed to Crates on the occasion. Whether this story entails

that Crates attempted to win back Zeno or (oddly, for a Cynic) to

win him is not wholly clear; presumably, the former. But at any rate

Apollonius, in view of the apophthegm he reported, must have tried

to prove that Stilpo was a more important influence upon Zeno than

Crates, and he should therefore be included among the τινές mentioned

at VII 2 who added Stilpo.

We must also include Heraclides Lembus, i.e., presumably, Sotion

(cfr. fr. 9 Wehrli), ap. Diog. Laert. II 120 (not in SVF; fr. 106 Hülser;

Meg. fr. 167 D.; Socr. fr. II O 4 G.) τούτου [scil., Στίλπωνος] φησὶν

Ἡρακλείδης καὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα ἀκοῦσαι τὸν τῆς Στοᾶς κτίστην.

In the bios of Stilpo, this is an isolated notice in the final chapter.

It is not clear that according to Heracleides / Sotion Stilpo was more

important than Crates (as he was according to Apollonius of Tyre).

Against this suggestion is the common and not unfounded assumption

that the Succession at I 13-5 is originally Sotion’s and that it is Sotion’s

arrangement which is followed by Diog. Laert. most of the way ⁴⁷.

Sotion is known to have referred to other teachers besides the one

relevant to his diadochical system (cfr. fr. 27 Wehrli ap. Diog. Laert.

IX 21). In an earlier section of the bios of Stilpo, II 113-4 (not in

SVF or Hülser; Meg. fr. 164 A, 165 D.; Socr. fr. II O 3 G.) Diog.

Laert. gives us — at least in part after Philippus of Megara — a long

list of pupils Stilpo won over from his rivals. The last to be men-

tioned is Zeno, II 114: καὶ δὴ καὶ Ζήνωνα τὸν Φοίνικα [the ethnicon

suggests a source quoted rather than Diog. Laert.’s pen] μετὰ τούτων

— 323 —

ἀφείλετο — which intimates that Zeno’s former teacher’s loss (Crates’,

presumably) was Zeno’s gain and at any rate that the separation was

final. This, of course, is also implied by Diog. Laert. at VII 4 (cfr.

supra, p. 321): τελευταῖον δὲ ἀπέστη [scil. τοῦ Κράτητος], a

strong term, cfr. VII 167 (SVF I 442, p. 93, 15) on Dionysius: ἀπόστας

δὲ τοῦ Ζήνωνος κτλ.

For Zeno’s connection with Polemo (VII 2; Polem. fr. 85 Gig.)

Diog. Laert. elsewhere gives no authority either. At VII 25, Zeno’s

atyphia is illustrated by the story (Polem. fr. 88 Gig.; SVF I 5, p. 6,

4 f.) that, when already an advanced philosopher, he also went to

hear Polemo’s lectures and that the latter then snubbed him by ac-

cusing him of stealing his doctrines and clothing them in Phoenician

garb. Schwartz and others need not be right in connecting this account

Previously (supra, p. 320 f.), I have recalled the rival versions of

Zeno’s conversion to philosophy at VII 2-3. More notices concerned

with this matter have been appended (in the way typical of Diog.

Laert. ⁵⁴) at VII 4-5 (cfr. SVF I 2, p. 4,7-11; Socr. fr. V H 38 G.).

First, Zeno’s apophthegm on the occasion of his apostasy from Crates

is quoted (φασιν etc.), of which others (οἱ δὲ) affirm that it was

uttered when he had become Crates’ pupil. This little piece links up

well with what immediately precedes; Zeno’s aphorism interprets the

shipwreck (for which see the main account at VII 2) as a fortunate

event. The shipwreck provides the peg on which the next bits are

hung: others (ἄλλοι) state that he heard of the disaster when already

at Athens and give another, insipid version of Zeno’s statement (also

printed at SVF I 277). Other authorities (ἔνιοι), apparently denying

that the ship was wrecked, say Zeno first sold his cargo at Athens

and then turned to philosophy. Finally, Demetrius of Magnesia ⁵⁵, quoted

much later, VII 31-2 (Dem. fr. 22 Mejer; cfr. SVF I 6, p. 7, 10 f.,

Socr. fr. V H 37 G.), apparently joins the anti-shipwreck party and

even seems to give an account comparable to that of Hecaton and

Apollonius at VII 2 (cfr. supra, p. 320 f.) by informing us that Zeno’s

father had brought him home many books « of Socratics » from

his trips to Athens so that his education had been excellent already

at Citium. He adds that this is why he came to Athens and became

a pupil of Crates (ἐλθόντα εἰς ’Αθήνας Κράτητι παραβαλεϊν ⁵⁶).

Demetrius thus follows the tradition which made Crates the person

— 325 —

who was important to Zeno; in other respects, however, he seems

to have been influenced by those who wanted to play down this

relationship.

The last specific version of Zeno’s affiliations to be found in

Diog. Laert. (although not in the summary at VII 2) is that of Hip-

pobotus at VII 25 (Hipp. fr. 10 Gig., who gives too much to Hippobotus;

cfr. SVF I 5, p. 6, 3-4, Meg. fr. 103 D., Socr. fr. II F 3 G.). This

makes Zeno the pupil of the famous logician Diodorus Cronus. The

fragment has been wedged in between Apollonius’ story about Crates

and Stilpo (cfr. supra, p. 322) and the anonymous story about Polemo

(cfr. supra, p. 323). Accordingly, also here the (immediate) context

is concerned with Zeno’s teachers; the stories involved have been

exploited in order to illustrate Zeno’s lack of pompousness and love

of learning, traits of his character here depicted in the larger context.

Hippobotus says: ξυνδιέτριψε δὲ καὶ Διοδώρῳ [...], παρ’ ᾧ καὶ τὰ

διαλεκτικά ἐξεπόνησεν. I have no compunction in attributing to Hip-

pobotus also the following anonymous fragment, to be found at VII

16 (SVF I 4, p. 5, 29 f., Meg. fr. 104 D., Socr. fr. II F 3 G.) Context:

«he loved problems and was much interested in the finer logical

points of all sorts of questions». The fragment runs: ἐπιμέλως δὲ

καὶ πρὸς Φίλωνα τὸν διαλεκτικὸν διεκρίνετο [scil., Ζήνων] καὶ

συνεσχόλαζεν αὐτῷ· ὅθεν καὶ θαυμασθῆναι ὑπὸ Ζήνωνος τοῦ νεω-

τέρου [τοῦ ἐταίρου Reiske, Ζήνωνος ΧΧΧ τοῦ Susemihl] οὐχ ἧττον

Διοδώρου τοῦ διδασκάλου αὐτοῦ. No compunction because: 1) Dio-

dorus Cronus is mentioned both times and there are no other refer-

ences to Diodorus in Zeno’s biography but these two, and: because 2)

the same motif, Zeno’s dialectical apprenticeship, is at issue: VII 25

τὰ διαλεκτικὰ ~ 16 τὸν διαλεκτικόν. That Hippobotus did not

recognize (or did not refer to) a Dialectic “sect” (cfr. supra, p. 313)

need not have prevented him from calling someone a dialectician. As

is already apparent from Reiske’s and Susemihl’s diagnostic conjectures,

this text contains a famous crux. Who is this « younger Zenos » by

whom Philo — or is it Diodorus — is admired? Various suggestions

have been submitted, e.g., the other Zeno listed according to Hip-

pobotus among Zeno’s pupils at VII 38 (SVF I 38, p. 14, 4 f., Hipp.

— 326 —

fr. 11 Gig.) ⁵⁷· But in the context where it is found the statement

then remains odd. It may be argued, fairly enough, that at VII 16

only Zeno of Citium can be meant. But then it remains puzzling why

he should be said to be «the younger» — younger than whom, Dio-

dorus or Philo? And whom does αὐτοῦ refer to? Emendation, I be-

lieve, is necessary: simply read τὸν νεώτερον (corruption through

perseveration of preceding genitive, possibly also through anticipation

of following genitives). It should be recalled that συσχολάζειν not

only means «to study along with», to be someone’s fellow-pupil,

but also «to attend the classes or lectures of» (cfr. Plutarch Cic. 4, 5

= Posid. T 29 E.-K., 10 Th.). A νεώτερος is a “pupil”, i.e., a younger

member of a school, or of a loose group of persons teaching and

studying ⁵⁸. The word ὅθεν now acquires point: «He [scil., Zeno]

used to dispute very carefully with Philo the dialectician and even

attended his lectures. Consequently, Zeno’s admiration for the younger

man [scil., Philo] was as great as his admiration for his [Philo’s]

teacher Diodorus ».

Hippobotus’ Diodorus (and Philo) presumably did not make it

into the Successions literature; this, at any rate, would explain why

Diodorus does not turn up in VII 2. Heracleides’ / Sotion’s Stilpo,

not Diodorus, was mentioned in the biography of Apollonius of Tyre

and by Philippus of Megara. The fact that Hippobotus argued that

Crates of Thebes was the pupil not of Diogenes the Dog but of a

mysterious person called Bryson ⁵⁹ the Achaean or son of Achaeus

— 327 —

(ap. Diog. Laert. VI 85; Hipp. fr. 8 Gig., Meg. fr. 205 A D., Socr.

fr. V H 1 and fr. II S 5 G.) and that, as we have noticed, he did not

speak of a Cynic hairesis, shows that his position as to Zeno’s affi-

liations must have been peculiar. We do not know what he may have

said about other teachers of Zeno, for instance about Stilpo, provided

he spoke about him. What is at any rate clear is that (just as the

system of sects and Successions at Suda s.v. Σωκράτης) he underlined

Zeno’s dialectic ⁶⁰. We may assume that Stilpo of Megara according

to the authorities cited by Diog. Laert. is also mentioned in relation

with Zeno’s dialectic. In Diog. Laert. (see the bios, II 113-20) Stilpo

is a logician; about his diluted Cynisizing ethics ⁶¹ we are informed

in a different source (cfr. Socr. frr. II O 31 ff. G.). Polemo presumably

was made responsible for aspects of Zeno’s ethics not reducible to

the Cynic example. The main link, in Diog. Laert., remains that with

the Cynics according to the Succession; other affiliations to some

extent are left to take care of themselves. Most remarkably, the systems

reported in Diog. Laert. do not provide a suitable teacher for Zeno’s

physics; perhaps the reference to his study of the books of the ancients

in Hecaton and Apollonius of Tyre (VII 2) originally also was intended

to fill this gap, although its main purpose seems to have been to play

down the link with Crates. Numenius fr. 25 des Places ap. Eusebium,

P.E. XIV 5, 11 (SVF I 11, p. 8, 10 f., Socr. fr. V H 39 G.), who is

here dependent upon a tradition or traditions similar to those found

in Diog. Laert. ⁶², mentions not only Xenocrates Polemo Crates Stilpo

but also «the doctrines of Heraclitus» (not, however, to account for

Zeno’s physics). Should one assume that Zeno heard Xenocrates and/

or Polemo lecturing on Timaeus, which Platonic dialogue certainly has

— 328 —

tο be taken into account for Zeno’s physics ⁶³? However, in the present

context one should not be concerned with what really may have hap-

pened, but with what was said to have happened ⁶⁴. In Diog. Laert.,

the origins of Zeno’s physics are left without an explanation, and

those of his logic are implicit rather than explicit. In the logical

doxography at VII 41 τὸ δὲ λογικὸν μέρος-83, Zeno’s name is never

mentioned, although according to 38 he was the first to divide philo-

sophy into three parts (SVF I 45) and according to 40 he began the

exposition of philosophy with the logical part (SVF I 46) ⁶⁵. The

arrangement according to affiliation and Succession, at least as pre-

sented by Diog. Laert., allows for a strong link (or several alternative

links) at one or more particular points but to a certain extent breaks

down when one expects it to account for the doctrines as a whole.

For this deficiency, one cannot hold Diog. Laert. responsible.

We should now take a closer look at the community of doctrines

or koinonia (for the term cfr. Sext. pyrrh. hyp. I 213, 216) bet-

ween Stoics and Cynics and which is to be distinguished from the

embarrassing Cynisizing connections found in the works of the early

Zeno and in some works of Chrysippus (cfr. supra, p. 321 ff., infra,

p. 343 ff.). This koinonia supports Diog. Laert.’s construction of the

Succession in bks. VI-VII and for obvious reasons only pertains to ethics.

— 329 —

As is (or should be) familiar, von Arnim ⁶⁶ argued that the (post-

Posidonian) doxography of Stoic placita (VII 38-160) placed by Diog.

Laert. in the bios of Zeno, one of our more important sources for

Stoic thought, was put together by Diog. Laert. from three different

kinds of sources: 1) general doxographical surveys; 2) laudationes, i.e.,

clusters of references to the views and books of individual Stoics; 3)

a detailed description of logic (VII 49-82) derived from Diocles’ Epi-

drome. As to the laudationes, von Arnim pointed out that in some

instances these fit in with their context to such a degree that it is

not possible to argue that they have been inserted. In other cases,

however, to be found in all three sections of the doxography, the

clusters of references disturb the exposition in a bad way. Against

von Arnim, Michelangelo Giusta (for the ethical part) and Jørgen

Mejer argued that the Stoic doxography including the laudationes and

(so Mejer) the Diocles fragment was taken by Diog. Laert. from an

earlier source ⁶⁷; as to the Diocles fragment, Mejer suggested that a

new section begins at VII 55 ⁶⁸. However, if — as Mejer argues —

the whole of VII 38-160 comes from an intermediate source, the pro-

blem of its analysis is merely pushed one stage further back, which

is hardly satisfactory. The Diocles fragment as circumscribed by von

Arnim was further analysed by U. Egli, who discerned four main

ingredients ⁶⁹. To this special problem I shall revert in the next section,

pp. 351 ff.

— 330 —

It should be conceded that von Arnim’s argument that some lauda-

tiones do not particularly fit their context is plausible. However, I believe

that for the others, or at least one or more of the others, one should

not submit that it cannot be proved that they do not belong, but

rather should try to prove that they do. It will be recalled that

von Arnim hardly strayed beyond bk. VII (cfr. supra, p. 299 f.). But

the Cynic doxographies in bk. VI are very important for the ethical

part of the Stoic doxography in bk. VII. A fully complete comparison

of the ethics of bks. VI and VII cannot be carried out here; it will,

however, become clear that I agree with F. Decleva Caizzi’s argument

that the Cynic doxographies in bk. VI have been largely Stoicized ⁷⁰.

In bk. VII, there is at least one laudatio, viz. the cluster of defini-

tions of the telos at VII 87-9, which not only fits its context but is

also in a crucial way linked up with an important passage in bk. vi.

This connection is indispensable for an attempt at what Schwartz

called Quellenriecherei. The importance of the telos in ethical theory

enhances the value of this link.

After a short paragraph on the subdivision of ethics (VII 84

= SVF III 1), which does not concern us here ⁷¹, the subject itself

begins with the “logical basis of Stoic ethics” ⁷² in natural impulse

(horme) and oikeiosis; in fine it is said that for rational beings (τοῖς

λογικοῖς) «the life according to Reason rightly becomes the life ac-

cording to Nature» (VII 85-6 = SVF III 178). After the laudatio, the

— 331 —

exposition, at VII 90 ff., continues with the subject of Virtue; the

cluster of references ⁷³ at 87-9 fits its surroundings because it is con-

cerned both with the life according to Nature and that according to

Virtue. The laudatio lists the telos-definitions of: 1) Zeno (SVF I 179),

said to be followed by Cleanthes in his Peri hedones (SVF I 552),

Posidonius (fr. 185 E.-K., 426 Th.), and Hecaton in his Peri telon

(fr. 1 Gig.); 2) that of Chrysippus, followed by a substantial explanation

of what he meant (Posid. fr. 427 Th.) which seems to be indebted

to Posidonius ⁷⁴ (SVF III 4; cfr. Posid. ap. Gal. PHP V, pp. 326,18-

328,21 De Lacy = fr. 187, pp. 170,2-171,40 E.-K.; fr. 417, pp.

337,14-338,5 Th.; part of Galen’s text is printed at SVF III 12).

This is followed: 3) by the definitions of Diogenes (SVF III D. 45)

and Archedemus (SVF III Arch. 19). I have added the SVF numbers

not merely for the sake of convenience but also as a reminder that

von Arnim’s habit of cutting up texts may prevent one from noticing

the purport of a larger section. Book-titles are given for Zeno Cleanthes

Hecaton Chrysippus; it is noteworthy that Aristo Herillus (cfr. infra,

p. 336 Antipater Panaetius are not included. The section on natural

impulse and the natural life of rational beings (VII 85-6) is not merely

continued by the laudatio at 87 f., but in a way elucidated by it, for 87

starts with the word διόπερ ⁷⁵: «This is why Zeno was the first, in

— 332 —

his On the Nature of Man, to affirm that the telos is “to live in

agreement (ὁμολογουμένως) with Nature”, which means: “to live

according to Virtue” (ὅπερ ἐστι, κατ’ ἀρετήν ζῆν), for Nature guides

us towards Virtue». The full title of the book, according to the

catalogue at VII 4 (SVF I 41, p. 14, 29) is Περὶ ὁρμῆς ἢ περὶ ἀνθρώπου

φύσεως. To be sure, there is, at 85, an explicit reference to a book

by Chrysippus (SVF III 178) to whom the oikeiosis theory at 85-

προσίεται presumably belongs. Yet the full title of Zeno’s book (quoted

with shorter title at 87) fits 86 οὐδέν τε-87, the beginning, like a

glove. Those who hold that oikeiosis cannot be attributed to Zeno

should at least take into account that in his On Impulse, or On the

Nature of Man, he may have constructed a scala naturae resembling

Aristotle’s in the De anima, plants (horme), animals (horme + aisthesis),

men (horme + aisthesis + logos). This context shows that “Nature”

in Zeno’s definition at 87 means Nature as, according to a higher

dispensation (cfr. 86, τελειοτέραν προστασίαν), it manifests itself in

rational beings, or “Human Nature” as it really is and should be.

At VII 89, we are told that Cleanthes (SVF I 552) interpreted the

formula in the sense that one should live in accord with universal

(κοινήν) Nature, not with individual (ἐπὶ μέρους) Nature, whereas

according to Chrysippus one should live in accord with both (SVF

III 4, p. 4, 8 f.). But, to return to the laudatio at 87: « [...] Again,

to live according to Virtue is the equivalent (πάλιν δ’ ἴσον ἐστὶ τὸ

κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν τῷ) to “living according to one’s experience of the

events which occur according to Nature”, as Chrysippus says in the

first book of his Peri telon» (SVF III 4).

What should be emphasized is that the formula “to live according

to Virtue” is not a part of the definitions quoted, but serves to explain

them, and is in its turn explained by them ⁷⁶. Diog. Laert. most clearly

and explicitly states that both the definition of Zeno (and of those

who are said to follow him) and that of Chrysippus are equivalent to

the general formula (and so of course to one another). The significant

difference which after all remains between these two definitions shows

that το κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν is a formal formula which in order to

— 333 —

become operational needs further elucidation. In the parallels in other

authors to Diog. Laert.’s laudatio this formula is far less prominent,

viz. in the laudationes in Arius Didymus ap. Stobaeum (if it is Arius

Didymus ⁷⁷), Cicero, and Clement of Alexandria ⁷⁸; in the criticism of

Chrysippus formulated by Posidonius (fr. 187 E.-K., 417 Th.) ⁷⁹ which

is an important although neglected parallel it is not found at all.

Arius Did. ap. Stob, II, pp. 75, 7-76, 15, lists definitions and

persons, but unlike Diog. Laert. he does not refer to books. Here,

as is well known, a different definition is attributed to Zeno: τὸ

ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν, explained as καθ’ ἕνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον ζῆν

(SVF I 179), and Cleanthes is said to have added τῇ φύσει (SVF I 552)

and others to have provided other articulations. Those further listed

are Chrysippus, SVF III 12; Diogenes, SVF III D. 44; Archedemus,

SVF III Arch. 20; Antipater, SVF III Ant. 57 (two definitions; Antipater

is not in Diog. Laert.’s cluster). As to Zeno’s definition, Rist ⁸⁰ is

probably right that we do not have to choose between Diog. Laert.’s

and Arius’ version. To his arguments one may add that the context

in Diog. Laert. and the full tide of Zeno’s book quoted at Diog. Laert.

VII 87 support Diog. Laert.’s version (supra, p. 332). Moreover, Zeno

also wrote a Περὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν βίου (VII 4, SVF I 41, p. 14, 28).

Zeno therefore may have used both definitions, and Arius probably

sins by attributing the shorter formula only and by being fussy about

Cleanthes’ presumed addition; note that the shorter formula plays an

important part in Posidonius’ criticism of (Antipater’s and) Chrysippus’

definitions of the telos cited supra ⁸¹. The shorter formula with its

— 334 —

explanation as ap. Arius Did. is liable to be understood in a personalist

and even crudely Cynisizing sense, which would explain Cleanthes’

point ap. Diog. Laert. 89 that not individual but common Nature

should be followed. Presumably, Cleanthes opted for Zeno’s less

ambiguous definition which included the words τῇ φύσει. Furthermore,

it is interesting to acknowledge that the shorter Zenonian definition

as reported by Arius would not have suited the context in Diog. Laert.

It is, however, quite apposite in Arius’ context, for Arius does not

derive the Stoic telos from natural impulse and oikeiosis ⁸². On the

other hand, immediately before beginning his laudatio with Zeno’s

definition, Arius (p. 75, 7 ff.) presents the (Stoic) definition of Man

and says that the whole of human Virtue and of happiness consists in

ζωὴν ἀκόλουθον [...] καὶ ὁμολογουμένην φύσει. But Virtue is not

the issue in Arius’ sequel; he has dealt with it already near the

beginning of his résumé

(ap. Stob, II, pp. 57 f., esp. p. 59 ff.), and

Diog. Laert.’s formula τὸ κατ’ ἀρετήν ζῆν does not turn up in his

cluster of Stoic telos-definitions. But he knows that it exists and is

equivalent, cfr. p. 77, 16-19 (SVF III 16): the telos is happiness,

τοῦτὸ δὲ ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν

(Zeno’s definition according to Arius), ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν

(Cleanthes’ definition according to Arius). Again, at p. 78, 1-5 (SVF

III 16), τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν and a number of other formulas are

said to amount to the same thing (ἰσοδυναμεῖ) — δι’ ὃ καὶ τὸ Στωϊκὸν

τέλος ἶσον δύνασθαι τῷ κατ’ ἀρετὴν βίῳ. It is clear that, for Arius

as for Diogenes, τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν is a convenient general formula.

In the Peripatetic section of the doxography ap. Stob, (which really

seems to be by Arius Didymus ⁸³) the formal formula is even attributed

to the Peripatetics (pp. 126, 17 f.; 131, 5 f.), but followed by an

important qualification which brings it close to Antiochus’ definition

of the telos ap. Cic. Varro 19 f., and de fin. V 26-7 f. ⁸⁴, and, be it

— 335 —

noted, with Potamo’s at Diog. Laert. I 21. Without such qualifications,

τῷ κατ’ ἀρετὴν [...] βίῷ is attributed to the Peripatetics at p. 145, 9.

Furthermore, near the beginning of the ethical excerpts in Stobaeus,

the formula is attributed to Plato, II p. 50, 1-6. Plato is here said

to have proposed many descriptions of the telos, all of which however

amount to the same thing: εἰς δὲ ταὐτὸ καὶ σύμφωνον [no diaphonia

in Plato!] συντέλει τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν. This makes it absolutely

clear that the formula is a very formal one indeed. It would fit most

philosophers (except, presumably, the Epicureans and Cyrenaics), but

would need to be further specified in each particular case.

Cicero’s laudationes ⁸⁵ are a bit slovenly; names are often lacking,

and no book-titles are given. Several times, however, a form of the

formal formula is found linked up with the definition of the Stoic

telos. At de fin. II 33-4 (SVF III 14), the laudatio is part of a

doxographic discussion concerned with oikeiosis, prima naturalia, telos.

The Stoics say the telos is “consentire naturae” [cfr. ὁμολογουμένως

τῇ φύσει], quod esse volunt “e virtute” [cfr. κατ’ἀρετήν] id est

honeste "vivere” [ζῆν; for Zeno, cfr. ibid., 35 = SVF III 14];

quod ita interpretantur (Chrysippus’ definition then follows, but his

name is not mentioned). Cfr. also de fin. IV 14 (SVF III 13): first

Chrysippus’ definition without his name; then Zenonis [...] "convenien-

ter naturae vivere” (SVF I 179), then Archedemus’ definition without his

name. A cluster of Stoic /e/oi-definitions without any names is to

be found at de fin. III 31 (SVF III 15). Again, at de fin. IV 43 (not in

SVF), we have Stoici [...] finem bonorum in una virtute ponunt.

Cicero appears to have known much doxographical information by heart;

on the other hand, his lack of detailed precision should also be accoun-

ted for by the genre (dialogue not treatise).

The Stoic laudatio in Clement is found in a fairly long and

fairly dry doxographical survey of the various views of the philosophers

on human happiness and the telos, strom. II 127, 1-133, 7. Be it

noted that, at II 128, 3(-5), Aristotle is credited with the definition

τὸ ζῆν κατ’ ἀρετήν, just as the Peripatetics in Arius Didymus, and

— 336 —

with similar appended qualifications (cfr. supra, p. 335). The Stoic

laudatio which follows at II 129, 1-7 (no book-titles) mentions Zeno:

τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν (SVF I 180); Cleanthes: τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ

φύσει ζῆν (SVF I 552). Then we have part of Diogenes’ definition;

his name and a few other words have been restored by editors (cfr.

SVF III D. 46), but in view of the fact that Zeno is only credited

with the general formal formula which in Clement he shares with

Aristotle and of the further fact that in Cicero names occasionally

are lacking so that definitions appear to coalesce, one should reject

this restoration of the text of Clement. The list continues with the

definitions of: Antipater (SVF III Ant. 58); Archedemus (SVF III Arch.

21); Panaetius (fr. 96 van Straaten); Posidonius (fr. 186 E.-K., 428

Th.); Aristo (SVF I 360); Herillus (SVF I 419). In Diog. Laert., the

definitions of Aristo and Herillus are not in the laudatio at VII 87-9,

but in their respective biobibliographies: VII 160 (Aristo, SVF I 351),

and VII 165 (Herillus, SVF I 411). Diog. Laert.’s arrangement is

motivated; according to him (cfr. VII 160 ἃ δὲ τινες ἐξ αὐτῶν

διενέχθησαν ~ VII 167 καὶ οὗτοι μὲν οἱ διενεχθέντες and note that

such is also Cicero’s view ⁸⁶) Aristo and Herillus are dissident Stoics

(cfr. also the brief characterizations in the list of Zeno’s pupils at

VII 27 = SVF I 38, not repeated in von Arnim’s chapters devoted to

Aristo and Herillus). Clement is in a position to include these dissidents

because he wants to argue against the pagan philosophers’ views of

the telos anyway. Numerous views of philosophers other than Stoics

cited at strom. II 127, 1-133, 6, are found in a similar form in Cicero’s

De finibus, but this is by the way (the apparatus of Stählin-Früchtel

does not refer to Cicero).

The general formula also occurs elsewhere, e.g., according to

Plut. comm. not. 1060 E (SVF III 139), Chrysippus in the first book

of his On Exhortation (not a verbatim quote) said that living happily

consists in τῷ κατ’ ἀρετὴν βιοῦν.

The parallels to Diog. Laert.’s laudatio at VII 87-9 show that,

although the general formula τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν is also found elsewhere,

— 337 —

Diog. Laert. is our only source to underline in its laudatio that the

definitions of both Zeno and Chrysippus are equivalent to it ⁸⁷. The

fact that the cluster of definitions variously also occurs elsewhere of

course shows that, theoretically, it could have been added in or by

Diog. Laert., but I hope to have argued sufficiently that in view of

his context this is implausible (supra, p. 331 f.). Proof that this if

not the case is forthcoming from a comparison with a related passage

in Diog. Laert. VI to be found in the general survey of Cynic placita

(κοινὴ ἀρέσκοντα VI 103) which concludes this book, VI 104 ⁸⁸ (not

in SVF, cfr. fr. 138 Hülser; Ant. fr. 22 D.C., Socr. fr. V A 98G.):

ἀρέσκει δ’ αὐτοΐς καὶ τέλος εἶναι τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν — ὡς

Ἀντισθένης φησίν ἐν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ — ὁμοίως τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς, ἐπεὶ

καὶ κοινωνία τις ταῖς δύο ταύταις αἱρέσεσίν ἐστιν. ὅθεν καὶ τόν

Κυνισμὸν εἰρήκασι σύντομον ἐπ’ άρετήν ὁδόν. καὶ οὕτως ἐβίω καὶ

Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεύς.

The idea that Cynicism is a «short cut towards Virtue» (attributed

to the Cynics by Plut. amat. 759 D, and Gal. de cuiusl. anim. pecc. 3)

was stated by Apollodorus in his Ethics ap. Diog. Laert. VII 121 (SVF

II Ap. 17; all three texts at Socr. fr. V A 136 G.). Apollodorus, loc. cit.,

prescribed κυνιεῖν δ’ αὐτόν (scil. τὸν σόφον) — cfr. also Arius Didymus

ap. Stob, II, p. 114, 24 = SVF III 638 — whereas Epicurus in the

second book of his Peri Bion had said οὐδὲ κυνιεῖν (scil., τὸν σόφον,

ap. Diog. Laert. X 119 = fr. 14 Usener, [1] 119 Arrighetti). In view of

these opposed views of the feasibility of κυνιεῖν as stated in Diog. Laert.

VII and X, locc. citt., one is tempted to think of a synkrisis deriving from

the Peri haireseon literature ⁸⁹. Note that, at VI 104, Cynicism and

— 338 —

Stoicism are said to be «two haireseis» which have something in

common; we are not merely dealing with personal relationships as

represented by the Succession, but with doctrinal continuities.

Several points are important in this brief text (VI 104), or at any

rate crucial for a better understanding of Diog. Laert.’s aims and the

sources he used, or rather the traditions represented thereby. First,

the final sentence «and this is how Zeno of Citium, too, lived»

VII 1-31 lived according to Virtue (cfr. e.g., the decrees quoted VII 10 f.

= SVF I 7-8, p. 7, 25-7, [...] παρακαλῶν ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν [...], παράδειγμα

τὸν ἴδιον βίον ἐκθείς ἅπασιν ἀκόλουθον ὄντα τοῖς λόγοις οἷς διελέγετο,

almost to good to be genuine). The occasionally crude (although not

immoral: immorality is linked with the words criticized at 32 ff.) Cynic

colouring of some of Zeno’s witticisms and actions, however, should

also be taken into account.

The telos-formula cited from Antisthenes’ Heracles (presumably,

the Heracles maior; cfr. also Diog. Laert. VI 2 = Socr. fr. V A 85 G.)

and attributed as a general placitum to both Cynics and Stoics is the

blanket-formula found at VII 87. Be it noted that the doxographies in

Cic. de fin., and Arius Did. ap. Stob, studied above do not refer to

Antisthenes, and that Clement, strom. II 21, 130 (Ant. fr. 77 A D.C.,

Socr. fr. V A 111 G.) appropriately attributes to Antisthenes ἀτυφία

as the definition of the telos and not, as Diog. Laert. τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν

ζῆν ⁹⁰. That, I believe, shows that the attribution in Diog. Laert. VI 104

is a special thing.

In Diog. Laert., we do not hear what further explanation was

— 339 —

provided by Antisthenes or what his view of virtue amounted to ⁹¹.

Although the word arete occurs frequently in the placita of Antisthenes

at VI 10-1 and in the further maxims of Antisthenes quoted from

Diocles at VI 12, it is not further described there either. The similarity

between Antisthenes’ (and the Cynics’) view of Virtue and that of the

Stoics can only have been partial. In bk. VI, we have nothing cor-

responding to the definitions in the laudatio (inclusive of its further

explanations apart from the κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν) at VII 87-9. But the

appeal to a book composed by Antisthenes is absolutely similar to the

appeals to Stoic books at VII 87. The inference that the passage quoted

from VI 104 and the exposition at VII 87 f. must have been derived

from the same source cut up by Diog. Laert.’s scissors, i.e. a source

of the Peri haireseon type containing laudationes, seems inescapable.

The references to the Heracles here and at VI 105 (for which see im-

mediately infra) are the only references to a book in the general Cynic

doxography of bk. VI, the end, and the special doxography of Antisthenes

at VI 10 ff. What should further be emphasized is that at VI 104 the

appeal is to Antisthenes not Crates or Diogenes. The community of

doctrines (koinonia) at issue here is not concerned with the embar-

rassing things Zeno wrote «near the Dog’s tail» (for which see supra,

p. 321 f., and infra, p. 343 f.) but with dignified ethics. It would

appear that in this grave context, viz. a context where the telos and

Virtue are concerned, Antisthenes was a more serious asset for the

diadoche than Crates or Diogenes.

The other reference in the general Cynic doxography, at VI 105

(Ant. fr. 23 D. C., Socr. fr. V A 99 G.), confirms this inference (Anti-

sthenes and his Heracles again):

ἀρέσκει δ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι, καθά φησιν Ἀν-

τισθένης ἐν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ, καὶ ἀναπόβλητον ὑπάρχειν.

— 340 —

That «Virtue can be taught (διδακτὴν)» is stated not only as Anti-

sthenes’ first tenet in his general placita quoted after an anonymous

source, not Diocles ⁹², at VI 10 (Ant. fr. 69 D.C., Socr. fr. V A 134 G.),

but is also the subject of a laudatio containing names and book-titles

at VII 91:

διδακτήν τ’ εἶναι αὐτήν, λέγω δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷπρώτῳ

Περὶ τέλους φησί [SVF III 223] καὶ Κλεάνθης [SVF I 567]

καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τοῖς Προτρεπτικοῖς [fr. 2 Ε.-Κ., 435 B Th.] καὶ

Ἑκάτων [fr. 8 Gomoll].

Furthermore, that «Virtue cannot be lost» (ἀναπόβλητον — VI 105,

quoted supra) is the view of Cleanthes not Chrysippus. Their arguments

are given at VII 127 (SVF I 568 — cfr. also VII 128 = SVF I 569 —;

SVF III 237). No book-titles in this case, and a dissensio between Stoic

scholarchs. The Cynics, apparently, side with Cleanthes or conversely.

Note that Zeno is not mentioned at VII 91 or 127. It should be further

pointed out that VII 127 begins with an interesting synkrisis between

Stoics and Peripatetics which recalls much of the argument of Cicero’s

De finibus III-V and suggests provenance from the Peri haireseon litera-

ture ⁹³: ἀρέσκει δ’ αὐτοῖς μηδὲν μεταξὺ εἶναι ἀρετῆς καὶ

κακίας, τῶν Περιπατητικῶν μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κ α -

— 341 —

κίας εἶναι λέγοντων τὴν προκοπήν (not in SVF). According to this

passage, the Stoics hold that there is no condition of the soul that

would be intermediate between Virtue and Vice. On the other hand,

according to the Stoics there are things (actions, events) intermediate

between good things and bad things: the adiaphora, which are further

subdivided; this further division constitutes a very characteristic and

difficult part of Stoic ethics (cfr. SVF I 191-196, III 147-168) and, as

is well known, was not accepted by Aristo ⁹⁴. The general Stoic theory

of adiaphora etc. in Diog. Laert. is at VII 102-6, a passage which

according to von Arnim ⁹⁵ at 102-4 contains laudationes which badly

interrupt and disturb the exposition, but it would seem that von Arnim

exaggerates. I must refrain from discussing this passage and would

like instead to concentrate on Aristo, whose definition of the telos as

we have noticed (supra, p. 336) is given not in the general doxography

but in his biobibliography at VII 160 (SVF I 351): Ἀ [...] τέλος

ἔφησεν εἶναι τὸ ἀδιαφόρως ἔχοντα ζῆν πρὸς τὰ μεταξὺ ἀρε-

τής καὶ κακίας κτλ. Strictly speaking, this has been cava-

lierly formulated: for one should not live in this way as regards the

conditions of the soul which are intermediate between Virtue and Vice,

but in respect of those things, or aspects of life, which are intermediate

between things good and evil. Interestingly, the same inaccuracy occurs

in a general Cynic placitum at VI 105 where we find a reference to

Aristo (not in SVF; fr. 138 Hülser; Socr. fr. V A 135, p. 370, 19 f. G.):

τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἀδιάφορα λέγουσιν

ὁμοίως Ἀρίστωνι τῷ Χίῷ. The point of this statement obviously is

that the Cynic view of the adiaphora is not the common Stoic one (for

which see VII 102-6), but Aristo’s, who did not distinguish between

things to be preferred and things not to be preferred (VII 160 = SVF

I 351, continued: μηδ’ ἡντινοῦν ἐν αὐτοῖς παραλλαγὴν ἀπολείποντα,

ἀλλ’ἐπίσης ἐπὶ πάντων ἔχοντα). From the wording, including the

inaccurate μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, it is clear that the connection

between VI 105 and VII 160 is not less close than that between the

— 342 —

other passages in bks. VI and VII dealing with dignified ethical doctrines

which have been discussed above. Note that the Cynic view reported

at VI 105 has been Stoicized, because the term ἀδιάφορα is Stoic not

Cynic ⁹⁶. It is noteworthy, but this is by the way, that the inaccurate

formula as at VI 105 and VII 160 can be paralleled from else-

where, see the important account at Sext. Emp. M. XI 63 f. (SVF

I 361, p. 83, 13 τὰ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἀδιάφορα; p. 83, 27-8,

τοῖς μεταξύ ἀρετής καὶ κακίας πράγμασιν), and adv. Math. VII 12

(SVF I 356, p. 80, 25-7). Seneca’s account, ep. 94, 5 ff., is more

accurate (SVF I 359, p. 81, 21: pecuniam nec bonum nec malum, and

esp. p. 81, 31 ff: virtutem unicum bonum hominis adamaverit,

turpitudinem s o l u m malum fugerit, reliquia omnia [...] scierit

esse mediam partem, nec bonis adnumeranda nec malis);

cfr. also Cic. leg. I 55 (SVF ι 367, p. 84, 36 f.). As is clear from these

passages in Seneca and Cicero, the inaccurate formula found at Diog.

Laert. VI 105 and VII 160, and in Sextus, finds its origin in the fact

that Virtue itself was considered a good, and Vice an evil.

The other reference to Aristo in the general Cynic placita is at

the beginning of the exposition, VI 103 (SVF I 354 — von Arnim’s

only excursion into bk. VI —, Socr. fr. V B 368 G.): ἀρέσκει οὐν

αὐτοῖς τὸν λογικὸν καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν τόπον περιαιρεῖν, ἐμφερῶς

Ἀρίστωνι τῷ Χίῷ, μόνῳ δὲ προσέχειν τῷ ἠθικῷ. Compare, from

Aristo’s biobibliography at

VII 160 (SVF I 351, p. 79, 11 f.): τὸν τε

φυσικὸν τόπον καὶ τὸν λογικὸν ἀνῄρει κτλ. Again, the wording is

virtually identical; note that the parallel accounts at SVF I 352, 353,

356, speak of τα φυσικά and φυσικὴν ... θεωρίαν. That the Cynic

placita begin with this reference to Aristo is significant: logic and

physics are discarded, continuity between Cynics and Stoics is in the

field of ethics. We have noticed above ⁹⁷ that Zeno’s affiliations as

emphasized by Diog. Laert. also put the continuity in the field of ethics

in the first place. Neither Diog. Laert. nor our other sources attribute

to Aristo Cynicizing doctrines of an embarrassing nature. The purport

— 343 —

of the two references to Aristo at VI 103 and 105 is that Cynicism

is an uncomplicated ethical system, that of the reference to «the life

in accord with Virtue» and to Antisthenes and Zeno at VI 104 is that

this simple ethics was a highly moral affair, for which the view of the

telos to be found in Antisthenes’ Heracles set the pattern.

In the general doxography of Stoic ethics in bk. VII, there are

only two references to Cynical views which, as we shall see, are criti-

cized elsewhere. The first of these follows upon Apollodorus’ statement

that the Wise Man is to be a Cynic ⁹⁸, VII 121: γεύσεσθαί τε (scil.,

τὸν σοφόν] καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων σαρκῶν κατὰ περίστασιν (SVF I 254,

III 747), where the mitigating κατὰ περίστασιν should be noted. The

second is to be found in a laudatio at VII 131 (SVF I 269 + III 728):

«they also hold that among the Wise there should be a community

of wives with free choice of female partners, as Zeno says in his

Politeia and Chrysippus in his Peri politeias — and as also Diogenes

the Cynic [not in Giannantoni] and Plato say». Possibly, the reference

to Plato to some extent neutralizes that to Diogenes. However, from

these two passages it would appear to follow that it would be unwise

to regard the ethical doxography as a monolithic whole.

We have noticed above ⁹⁹ that according to Diog. Laert. certain

Stoics rejected Zeno’s Politeia and other works as spurious, or attemp-

ted to remove the more embarrassing sections. Now there is, apart

from those in the general placita studied in the present section, one

other reference to a work written by a Cynic which is to be found

in a doxographic context, viz. to Diogenes’ tragedy Thyestes at VI 73

(Socr. fr. V B 132 G.). This play contained a curious “Anaxagorean”

argument in favour of cannibalism. The text continues: «[...] if the

tragedies are really his and not the work of his pupil Philiscus of

Aegina [or of Dasiphon the son of Lucianus, who according to Favo-

rinus in his Miscellaneous History (fr. 72 Barigazzi) wrote them after

the death of Diogenes]» ¹⁰⁰. The quotation from Favorinus may be

— 344 —

attributed to Diog. Laert. himself ¹⁰¹, and so the passage I have included

between square brackets clearly is an addition cleverly inserted. This

Philiscus of Aegina in also mentioned at VI 80, in the note concluding

Diogenes’ bibliography: «Satyrus adds that the sorry tragedies are by

Philiscus of Aegina, a pupil of Diogenes» (Socr. fr. V B 128 G.;

cfr. also the passages from Julian printed ibid.). It would appear that

in the account followed by Diog. Laert., the reference to Thyestes was

accompanied by a note concerned with its dubious authenticity which

sufficiently interested Diog. Laert. and so triggered off the insertion.

The point itself should be compared with that about the genuineness

of Diogenes’ Politeia in Philodemus’ On the Stoics (see further infra,

p. 348 f.) and with the discussion concerned with certain works of

Zeno at VII 32 ff., a passage to which I shall now turn. Together with

VII 187-9 ¹⁰², it represents a view about the relation between Cynics

and Stoics which is entirely different from that concerned with the

common telos and related matters studied so far ¹⁰³.

At VII 32-34, the little known Skeptic Cassius, and Isidorus

of Pergamum, are quoted for their criticisms of certain doctrines held

by Zeno; according to Isidorus, Athenodorus the Stoic and others

disapproved of these works, or at least of certain passages, and declared

them spurious or expunged certain sections (34). These critics quote

chapter and verse, i.e., provide a laudatio: there are two explicit re-

ferences to Zeno’s Politeia (SVF I 259, 222), one to a book called

Erotike techne (not in SVF; not in the bibliography at Diog. Laert.

VII 4, which only lists a work called Techne — perhaps the text at

VII 4 should be emended to <Ἐρωτική> τέχνη), and one to a book

called Diatribai (not in SVF, but cfr. SVF I 250) which is not in the

bibliography either. Athenodorus represents a Stoic current that rejec-

ted the cruder forms of Cynicism for moral reasons. Cassius’ angle

need not have been the same as Athenodorus’; as a Skeptic, he will

have been delighted both by the dissensio among the Stoics and by

the fact that some of the views of the early Zeno (VII 32, 33 = SVF I

— 345 —

222, 226) flagrantly contradict the official Stoic doctrine (see, e.g.,

VII 108 = SVF III 495, and VII 120 = SVF III 731). It should be

noted that, at VII 34, the authority of Chrysippus is invoked against

Athenodorus c.s.: «that the Politeia is by Zeno is also affirmed by

Chrysippus in his Peri Politeias» (see SVF III p. 203, 3 f.), cfr. the

point made by Philod, On the Stoics, ch. 6 (infra, p. 349).

At VII 187-8, we have the views of anonymous persons who se-

verely criticized Chrysippus for the immoral and indecent things to be

found in his writings (εἰσὶ δὲ οἳ κατατρέχουσι τοῦ Χρύσιππου ὡς πολλὰ

αἰσχρῶς καὶ ἀρρήτως ἀναγεγραφότος). These critics also quoted chap-

ter and verse, i.e., provided a laudatio. Five titles of books by Chrysip-

pus are given. In the first work to be quoted, Peri ton archaion physio-

logon (SVF II 1071), he presented an ekphrasis of an indecent painting

(Diog. Laert. does not give us the details, which however we know from

other sources, cfr. SVF II 1073, 1074) which perhaps didn’t even exist

because it is not mentioned by the important historians of painting.

In his Politeia (SVF III 744), and right at the beginning of his Peri

ton me di heauta haireton (SVF III 744), he promoted incest — a very

Cynic interest. In bk. iii of his Peri dikaiou (SVF III 747), he advised

the consumption of dead human bodies — also a Cynic suggestion.

The last quote, from bk. ii of his Peri biou kai porismou (SVF III 685),

contains a doctrine that is not immoral, although it is close to the

views of Aristo (and the Cynics?) ¹⁰⁴ about the adiaphora. But it fla-

grantly contradicts a view also expressed by Chrysippus and known

from elsewhere, viz. from. Plut. stoic. rep. 1043 e and 1047 F (both

texts at SVF iii 693). I assume that at VII 189 we have the remains

of a Skeptic argument from diaphonia.

The argument, both as to its contents and as to its form, is remar-

kably similar in VII 32-4 and 187-9. One small, but unique, point is

most revealing. At VII 33, Zeno is said to have affirmed something in

his Politeia in a passage « of about 200 lines (κατά τούς διακοσίους

<στίχους>)». At VII 187, Chrysippus is said to have affirmed something

in his Peri ton archaion physiologon in a passage «of about 600 lines

— 346 —

(κατὰ τοὺς ἐξακοσίους στίχους)». Accordingly, the source from which

this information derives emphasizes that, in both cases, the scandalous

views of Zeno and Chrysippus were not obiter dicta, but received ex-

tensive treatment. Furthermore, both these critical passages which,

after all, are of a doxographic nature, have been appended: the first

to the biography of Zeno, the second to that of Chrysippus. The pas-

sage about Zeno has been inserted between the account of his death

and the paragraph on the homonyms, that about Chrysippus comes at

the very end of the biography and is only followed by the bibliography

which presumably was transcribed last because of its extraordinary

length. The most plausible assumption is that Diogenes cut up an

indictment of Cynicizing Stoic morality in malam partem, and inserted

the pieces at or near the end of these two biographical sections ¹⁰⁵.

We are therefore entitled to speak of two different views concerned

with the continuity between Cynics and Stoics, viz. one (the tradition

preferred by Diog. Laert.) emphasizing dignified ethics, the other (sort

of tucked away by him) immoral and obscene ideas. What we have

here are the traces of an ancient polemic, in which both camps quoted

chapter and verse (laudationes). In order to contradict the critics, one

could choose among several options: a) one could quote passages, and

even construct a diadoche (Antisthenes!), concerned with the telos in

bonam partem; b) embarrassing works could be athetized; c) youth

could be an excuse (see infra). That laudationes were an important

weapon in the hands of ancient polemists (personal diffamation was

another ¹⁰⁶) is apparent from the arguments pro and contra Epicurus

to be found in bk. X. Here, the contrasting traditions are set out by

Diog. Laert. in a straightforward way (cfr. infra, App. I ¹⁰⁷) and not

as deviously as in bk. VII.

— 347 —

Proof that two traditions concerning the Stoics existed is available.

Panaetius (ap. Cic. De off. I 99 and 126-9) criticized those Cynicizing

Stoics who lacked verecundia (αἰδῶς) (cfr. also de off. I 148 ¹⁰⁸). Cic.

de fin. III 48, mentions the two currents in Stoicism, and a sort of

revisionism seems to be implied by Arius Didymus ap. Stob. II, p. 114,

24-5 (not in SVF). Seneca presents the Graeco-Roman Cynic Demetrius

in a very decent Stoic manner, omitting aspects that are embarrassing ¹⁰⁹.

Epictetus diatr. III 22, presents the “true” Cynic in a very dignified

Stoic light and sets him off against the sordid Cynic; even his Diogenes

has become largely moral in the dignified Stoic sense ¹¹⁰. It is clear that

Athenodorus and the other Stoics mentioned by Diog. Laert., VII 34,

belong to the current represented by Panaetius ap. Ciceronem and

later by Seneca and Epictetus. But the severe attacks against immoral

Cynic aspects of Early Stoicism exemplified at Diog. Laert. VII 32-4

— 348 —

and 187-9 seem to have originated with the Epicureans, who presu-

mably took their revenge for the Stoic criticism of Epicurus (one does

not know, however, which side began the hostilities). This, at any

rate, is what would appear from Philodemus’ On the Stoics, already

briefly referred to previously ¹¹¹. I have gratefully used Dorandi’s

splendid edition and commentary ¹¹².

In Phil. de Stoic. 21 ch. 1, we have the fragmentary remains of

(Stoic?) attacks against Epicurus, to which Philodemus replies, mostly,

with a spirited counter-attack. He ridicules the attempts of revisionist

Stoics who tried to excuse the embarrassing doctrines of the Politeia

by insisting on the fact that Zeno was young when he wrote it or that,

for this reason and in a sense, this work is not by the real Zeno (ch. 2).

He also attacks the argument that the Stoics are not responsible for

what Zeno then wrote: he is after all the founder of Stoicism (ch. 3).

There is a fragmentary sentence at the beginning of ch. 3, col. XIII

(not in SVF or Hülser), which has been restored by Koerte ad pro-

babilem senteniam: [λέγουσι γὰρ ὅτι ὑπὸ Σωκράτους ἡ ἀγωγ]η̣ τὴν

ἀρχὴ[ν καὶ Ἀντισ]θ̣ένους καὶ Διογένους συνέσ̣τη, διό̣ καὶ Σωκρατικοὶ

καλεῖσθαι θέ[λ]ο̣υσιν. Presumably, the revisionist Stoics (or some

among them) constructed a Succession Socrates-Antisthenes-Diogenes-

Zeno, but not only played down Zeno’s Politeia but, as clearly appears

from the sequel according to Dorandi’s convincing explanation, also

argued that Diogenes’ Politeia was spurious ¹¹³. At any rate, Zeno is

the real founder of the Stoic school and those who deny him destroy it

(ch. 3). The following point discussed by Philodemus (ch. 4) is of

great interest in our context, because it is clear that the (or some)

revisionist Stoics rejected the Politeia but accepted Zeno because of

his discovery of the telos, ch. 4 col. XIV (not in SVF or Hülser):

τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς ἀποδέχονται τὸν Ζήνωνα δ ι ὰ τ ὴ ν τ ο ῦ τ έ -

λους εὕρεσιν οἱ Στωϊκοί κατατετολμηκότων ἐστι˙ καὶ γὰρ

— 349 —

τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν δογμάτων θαυ̣μάζουσιν αὐτοῦ. καὶ τῶν ἀμήχανων

ἐστὶν τοῦ τέλους ἐ[νδεχομ]ένου μὴ κ[α]ὶ τἆλλα συμφώνως ἀπο-

δίδοσθαι. καὶ τῷ τ̣έλει δὲ ἀκόλου̣θόν ἐ̣στι τὰ διὰ τῆς Πολιτείας

ἐ̣κκείμεν̣α π̣ρ̣[ο]σ̣δέχεσθαι.

The telos discovered by Zeno can only be the famous formula or for-

mulas discussed above ¹¹⁴; we have noticed that those who wanted to

discard the embarrassing Cynic strains in Zeno’s philosophy, or at any

rate ignored them, put the telos first and foremost and constructed a

link with the telos of Antisthenes ¹¹⁵. Philodemus of course is guilty

of misrepresentation: although the revisionist Stoics also accept the

other doctrines of Zeno and not merely his telos-formula, they definitely

exclude the Politeia. His point that the contents of the Politeia agree

with the telos-formula must have infuriated his opponents, but we have

noticed supra that «to live in accord with Nature» is compatible with

a personalist interpretation ¹¹⁶.

Other Stoics, Philodemus continues, naively accept the Politeia

but exclude the passage on the διαμηρίζειν (ch. 5). Others, again,

argue that the Politeia of Diogenes (which has so much in common

with that ascribed to Zeno) is spurious, but these persons disagree with

the real Stoics (ch. 6). A very long list of laudationes follows, which

proves that Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Antipater, stated that Diogenes’

Politeia is genuine. Cleanthes did so in a work titled Peri stoles (text

at SVF I 590 not good). Not less than 9 titles are given for Chrysippus:

Peri poleos kai nomou; Politeiai; Peri politeias; Peri ton me di heauta

haireton; Pros tous allos noountas ten phronesin, bk. 1; Peri tou kata

physin biou; Peri tou kalou kai tes hedones, bk. 4; Peri dikaiosynes,

bk. 3; Peri tou kathekontos, bk. 6. We have noticed above ¹¹⁷ that

in his Peri politeias Chrysippus had said that Zeno’s Politeia is genuine

(Diog. Laert. VII 34); according to Philodemus, what he said in the

same work about a doctrine of Diogenes amounts to the same conclusion

— 350 —

about Diogenes’. Furthermore, of the 9 Chrysippean titles quoted by

Philodemus, 2 (and possibly 3, if the Peri dikaiou is the same work

as the Peri dikaiosunes ¹¹⁸) occur in the passage criticizing Chrysippus’

immoral Cynicizing views at Diog. Laert. VII 187-9, viz. Politeia and

Peri ton me di heauta haireton. Philodemus adds that the majority of

the evil doctrines contained in Diogenes’ Politeia are also to be found

in his tragedies — a remark which throws some light on their athetesis

according to some authorities cited by Diog. Laert. VI 73 and 80 ¹¹⁹.

Finally, Philodemus points out that also Antipater of Tarsus in his

Kata ton haireseon compared the Politeia of Zeno with that of Dioge-

nes (SVF III Ant. 67). In ch. 7, a sort of “Lasterkatalog”, Philodemus

enumerates the immoral doctrines shared by Zeno and Diogenes and

those who agree with them. Numerous details are the same as those

to be found in Diog. Laert. VII 32-4 and 187-9, as well as in the

report about Diogenes’ doctrines at VI 72-3; similar details and quotes

are also at Sext. Emp. pyrrh. III 245-8 ~ adv. math. XI 189-93.

What is important about this long fragment of Philodemus is not

merely that he provides important parallels for the two currents in

Stoicism, but also that his own argument belongs with the tradition

which criticized the Early Stoa for its immoral Cynic theories. Some

of the laudationes in ch. 6 also add the specific doctrine involved.

Philodemus and his anti-Stoic sources belong with the tradition also

represented by Diog. Laert. VII 32-4 and 187-9. Whether or not Diog.

Laert. found these two opposed views in the same immediate source

is immaterial. Antisthenes’ (restored) name occurs only once in Philo-

demus, viz. in the Succession claimed by some Stoics ¹²⁰. The real Cynic

villain is Diogenes the Dog. In Diog. Laert., the emphasis is different

and the tradition that is followed underlines the connection with Anti-

sthenes, quoting the latter’s Heracles. Because Antisthenes’ position at

— 351 —

the beginning of the Cynic-Stoic Succession is almost certainly a later

construct ¹²¹, this difference between Philodemus (who however, as we

have seen, knows the other position) and Diog. Laert. is of capital

importance. It would appear that to the revisionist current in Stoicism

Antisthenes proved a real asset. The genuine historical line, presumably,

is Diogenes-Crates-Zeno (the young Zeno). Those who put Antisthenes

first could argue that Zeno developed what was really important in

Cynicism, or they could reject works both by Diogenes and by Zeno.

The vitality of the historical tradition constructed in this way is also

apparent from the inclusion of Aristo and the emphasis on the rejec-

tion, by the Cynics and Aristo, of physics and logic (VI 103) ¹²². A late

Stoic such as Epictetus had little use for either physics or logic.

In Diog. Laert., the opposition between the two views of Stoicism

is only present in the background: the unfavourable tradition is placed

in the context of the biographies of Zeno and Chrysippus. Although

he strived to be neutral, Diog. Laert. clearly has his preferences. The

result, in places, is rather flat, but I would like to express disagreement

with Bouvard et Pécuchet and submit that it is the historian’s duty

to «gonfler ce qui est plat».

The Logical Doxography and the Diocles Fragment.

The structure and composition of the logical doxography at VII

41 τὸ δὲ λογικόν μέρος-83 καὶ ὧδε μὲν αὐτοῖς ἔχει τὸ λογικὸν

present a vexing problem. From Diog. Laert.’s concluding words at

VII 83 one could not have inferred that in the previous chapters both

a general and a more detailed account had been given, the latter

covering much the same ground as large chunks of the general expos-

ition. But looking back at VII 48, Diog. Laert. states that up to now

he has provided a summary (48, κεφαλαιωδῶς, cfr. 38, ἐπὶ κεφαλαίων)

and that henceforward things will be discussed in detail (κατὰ μέρος);

— 352 —

in what follows, he wishes to transcribe verbatim (ἐπὶ λέξεως ¹²³) a

passage from Diocles’ Epidrome. The introductory sentence (or sen-

tences), ἐν οὖν τοῖς [...] λέγων οὕτως, is (are) unfortunately far from

clear. It is to be deplored that the apparatus in the most recent critical

edition, by Egli ¹²⁴, is incomplete: it was Cobet not Diels who corrected

δοκεῖν into the δοκεῖ accepted by Diels, Hicks, Egli although not by

Nietzsche and H. S. Long ¹²⁵. Egli fails to point out that the εἴπωμεν

preferred in his text was conjectured by Cobet, who was followed by

Bahnsch, Hicks, H. S. Long, whereas the mss, followed by Nietzsche

and Diels, have εἴποιμεν. Egli’s ταῦτά τε follows the majority of the

mss; it is also read by Nietzsche and Diels, whereas Hicks and H. S.

Long prefer ταῦτ(α). Furthermore, Nietzsche and H. S. Long put a full

stop after κεφαλαιωδῶς, which would seem to be more plausible if

— 353 —

more, the infinitive δοκεῖν is not objectionable in itself; Diels presum-

ably is right that only if one writes τε one should alter to δοκεῖ. On

the other hand, if δοκεῖν is kept, a δοκεῖ should be supplied ad sen-

tentiam with the ensuing καὶ τάδε which otherwise is left in the air.

I agree with Barnes’ argument that Diels will be right (as against

Nietzsche) that καὶ αὐτά represents a καὶ ἅ; yet this is not necessarily

the only option open to us.

Diels’ translation of the difficult sentence(s) may be quoted

because it provides a convenient point of departure: «in logicis igitur

et haec placent quae summatim exposui [placent summatim would have

been more exact] et ut singillatim quoque persequar etiam haec, quae

quidem ad institutionis artem Stoicorum pertinent [quae ad artem

isagogicam pertinent would have been more exact] quaeque Diocles

in philosophorum percursione ad verbum sic ponit» ¹²⁷.

Now Diels, von Arnim ¹²⁸, Egli ¹²⁹, and other scholars have as-

sumed, on the basis of this or a very similar translation and inter-

pretation of the difficult sentence, that the whole of VII 49-82, or

the logical singillatim section, is by Diocles. Egli even adds 83, but

von Arnim correctly pointed out ¹³⁰ that VII 83 resumes the account

at 46 αὐτήν [...] διαλεκτικήν ff., which is interrupted at 48 ἀνδρὸς

εἶναι.

Now von Arnim, in his analysis of the composition of Diog.

Laert.’s Stoic doxography, insisted that in the section which he took

to be by Diocles the laudationes with one exception fit their context:

«bene se habere et vacare iis offensionibus quae in physica parte

deteximus, praeter eas quae § 54 [VII 54 κριτήριον — the end] pro-

feruntur de norma iudicii» ¹³¹. Consequently, the cluster of references

at 54 would — in von Arnim’s view — have been inserted by Diog.

Laert. Egli, however, believes that 54 belongs to Diocles, who would

— 354 —

have taken this and similar passages from Posidonius. Other sources

of what would be Diocles’ compilation indicated by Egli are Crinis

and the unknown author or authors of a Stoic logical manual or

manuals ¹³². Von Arnim’s analysis and his attribution of VII 48-82 to

Diocles were criticized by Mejer, who pertinently pointed out that at

55 a new section seems to begin and argues that the preceding chapters

provide an explanation for what is stated in 49 ¹³³. F. H. Sandbach,

who believes that the difficult sentence in 48 is probably corrupt,

reverts to the position of Cobet — who, it would appear, is blindly

followed by H. S. Long — and has the Diocles fragment stop at the

end of 49. A. A. Long suggests that the fragment may continue a

bit farther, but does not specify exactly how far ¹³⁴. It will be clear

that another inquiry into the composition of the logical doxography

is hardly redundant.

First, I would like to point out that it would be unwise to try

to take the difficult sentence in 48 au pied de la lettre, for the simple

reason that it has more feet than one can handle. The text, as we

have noticed, is not certain; furthermore, Diog. Laert.’s references to

sources quoted — whether directly or at one or more removes —

or to subjects to be treated (cfr., e.g., II 47 ¹³⁵) are often notoriously

clumsy. In other cases, it is impossible to say where exactly a given

abstract is supposed to end (cfr., e.g., VIII 36, the beginning). One

cannot, therefore, be certain that all that follows after 48 up to 82

really is Diocles.

Secondly, it should be recalled that in the 19th century scholars

such as V. Rose and F. Nietzsche believed that the whole logical

doxography from VII 41 derives from Diocles. Actually, Nietzsche

— 355 —

argued that Diog. Laert. as a whole (or at any rate to a large extent)

is merely a sort of Diocles with revisions and additions ¹³⁶. In as far

as Diels’ refutation is based upon an acute linguistic interpretation of

the difficult sentence at VII 48, it is not fully satisfactory, but his

remark that the reference to Diocles at VII 48 should be compared

to that at VI 12 (where, as a glance at VI 11 proves, a new section

begins) is fully cogent ¹³⁷. Bahnsch’s refutation of Rose — and, by

implication, of Nietzsche — is entirely to the point ¹³⁸ : he compared

the “contents” of the longer and the short accounts and so proved

that they cannot both derive from the same source. Nietzsche’s attempt

to refute Bahnsch ¹³⁹ is wholly unconvincing; he admits that the contents

of the two accounts derive from different sources, but argues that it

was Diocles who combined them. This is to put the cart before the

cart before the horse. However, from Bahnsch’s analysis it does not

follow that all of VII 48-82 is by Diocles; yet this is what he appears

to have assumed.

On the other hand, Bahnsch made an important observation not

heeded by later scholars ¹⁴⁰: «in priori expositione [viz. the brief

section] nonnulla plenius, quam in posteriori [viz. the detailed

section]». This is both odd and interesting, because, at first blush,

one would expect the opposite to be true. Bahnsch did not further

pursue this aspect of the matter; what follows is indebted to his

analysis, although I may say that, working from the source itself,

I had completed my own before finding it anticipated. The chapters

from the brief account to be compared are 41 τὸ δὲ λογικόν-46

ἔκτυπον (41-49 = fr. 33 Hülser) and, from the detailed account, 49

ἀρέσκει,-82 the end ¹⁴¹. For 46 αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διαλεκτικήν-48 ἀνδρὸς

— 356 —

εἶναι (continued in 83), which mostly deal with dialectic and the Stoic

Sage, have no parallel in the κατὰ μέρος section.

At VII 41, the λογικὸν μέρος of philosophy according to ἔνιοι

is subdivided the normal way ¹⁴² into two disciplines, dialectic and

rhetoric. But some (τινες) add two more parts, one concerned with

definitions, the other with canons and criteria (τινὲς δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ

ὁρικὸν εἶδος (καὶ add. Pohlenz) τὸ περὶ κανόνων καὶ κριτηρίων; not

in SVF). Some (ἔνιοι), we are told, reject the definitory part. These

other disciplines belonging to to logikon meros are hardly ever ref-

erred to in the scholarly literature ¹⁴³. As we shall see, for our present

purpose these are of outstanding importance.

Next, at VII 42 (not in SVF), we are told what are the issues

dealt with in these disciplines concerned 1) with canons and criteria,

and 2) with definitions. The former is a means of discovering the

truth, ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ τὰς τῶν φαντασιῶν διαφορὰς ἀπευθύνου-

σιν. The latter also is a means of recognizing the truth, inasmuch as

things (pragmata, what is the case) are apprehended by means of

concepts (ennoemata) ¹⁴⁴.

— 357 —

With a brief definition of rhetoric, followed by two definitions

of dialectic (SVF II 48), the exposition reverts to the two main

disciplines into which (according to the ἔνιοι, at 41) the logical part

of philosophy is subdivided. The first definition of dialectic to some

extent resembles that of rhetoric ¹⁴⁵; the second really is one of logic

in our sense of the word and runs ἐπιστήμην ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν

καὶ οὐδετέρων. This, of course, is Posidonius’ definition (cfr. fr. 188

E.-K., 454 Th., ap. Diog. Laert. VII 62). This provides a t.p.q. for

the brief account. Two different subdivisions of rhetoric are next

(42 καὶ τὴν μὲν-43 ἐπίλογον = SVF II 295). Because the κατὰ

μέρος section does not deal with rhetoric, I shall not return to what

is said about this logical discipline at VII 42-3.

At VII 43 τὴν διαλεκτικήν-44, the general exposition now turns

to dialectic proper ¹⁴⁶. There are two subdivisions: 1) τὸν περὶ τῶν

σημαινομένων (τόπον) and 2) (τὸν περὶ) τῆς φωνῆς τόπον. In the

kata meros section, however, the order is inversed: first Phonetics,

then Semantics (as I shall henceforth for the sake of convenience

designate these two topoi). This difference points to different sources

for the brief and the more detailed sections, or at any rate to different

traditions responsible for the varieties in arrangement. Note that Chry-

sippus’ bibliography, though in some ways closer to the brief account

than to the kata meros section, does not correspond completely to the

former. In the brief account, we first have Semantics (including ar-

guments) then Phonetics; in the bibliography, we first have the prag-

mata (SVF II, p. 5, 4), then the lexeis (SVF II, p. 6, 7), and then a

section on arguments (cfr. SVF n, p. 6, 31). Note that, in the biblio-

graphy, the distinction between Semantics and Phonetics is not rigid,

for the section on lexeis also deals with the κατ’ αὐτὰς λόγον and

with certain arguments. It is therefore incorrect to argue, with Egli

and Hülser, that the sequence at VII 43-4 agrees with that of Chry-

— 358 —

sippus’ bibliography ¹⁴⁷ ; moreover, we have already noticed that the

occurrence of Posidonius’ definition of dialectic at VII 42 proves that

the brief account as a whole cannot be early.

At VII 43-4, the Semantic and Phonetic subdivisions of Dialectic

are then further subdivided, the first topos being treated first. Here

we are in for a small surprise: the first sub-topos of the semantic

topos is περὶ φαντασιῶν, a subject of which we have just learned

that according to some authorities it (does not belong to the semantic

topos but) constitutes an eidos of its own. I shall revert to this

complication. The other items dealt with according to the semantic

topos are summarized in an extensive table of contents up to 44

θερίζοντας. Here we are obliged to jump to the κατὰ μέρος exposition.

At VII 63, ἐν δὲ τῷ [...] ὑπτίων (not in SVF; cfr. fr. 696 Hülser)

the contents of the semantic topos are also summarized. But, as Bahnsch

already pointed out long ago, the summary in the brief account (43-4)

is much longer and far more complete than that in the κατὰ μέρος

version (63)! It should be added that the list at 43-4, although

rattled of a bit confusedly, perfectly matches (with a few exceptions,

cfr. infra, p. 359) the ground covered in 63-82, that the language

used in both tables is absolutely similar, and that accordingly the

table in the κατὰ μέρος section is merely a compressed version of

that in the brief account ¹⁴⁸.

— 359 —

The second sub-topos (or -discipline) of dialectic to be described

at 44 is τὸν προειρημένον [cfr. 43; important as a Laertian

cross-reference] περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς φωνῆς. This deals with the ἐγγράμ-

ματος φωνή (cfr., in the κατὰ μέρος section, 56-7; SVF III D. 20)

and the τοῦ λόγου μέρη (cfr. 57-8; SVF II 147, III D. 21, 22) as

well as with soloecism (cfr. 59, in fine; SVF III D. 24), barbarism

(cfr. 59, in fine; SVF III D. 24), poems (cfr. 60; not in SVF), amphi-

boliai (cfr. 62; SVF III D. 23), and the intonation of the voice and

music (both, as Bahnsch pointed out, lacking in the detailed section).

By and large, the contents of the phonetic topos as outlined at 44

are treated at 50-60 A and 62 ad finem.

But at 44 there is more: according to some authorities (κατὰ

τινας), the phonetic topos als dealt with: definitions, division, and

peculiar expressions (lexeis). We should remember that according to

the τινες mentioned at 41, definitions are to be dealt with in an

eidos of their own, although ἔνιοι rejected this part; presumably, the

latter added it to or included it in the phonetic topos (cfr. infra, p. 367).

In the κατὰ μέρος account, definitions are dealt with at 60 (SVF

II 226, III Ant. 23), division at 61 (SVF III D. 25); but lexeis are

lacking. The detailed exposition, in other words, appends most of

the further contents included by the τινας at 44. What should be

pointed out, however, is that the κατὰ μέρος treatment of the phonetic

topos is also concerned with genera and species, which according to

43, as Bahnsch already pointed out, do belong elsewhere, viz. with

the semantic topos (genera and species constitute the exceptions indi-

cated supra, p. 358, viz. those items on the table of contents of the

semantic topos which are not found in the corresponding section of

the κατὰ μέρος account, but in another section thereof ¹⁴⁹).

— 360 —

Next, in 45, the usefulness of syllogistic is stressed; this issue

is not discussed in the κατὰ μέρος section. What is in 45 is a prelude

to 46 αὐτήν δὲ-48 ἀνδρὸς εἶναι+83. Next, argument (logos) is

defined; at greater length, this definition also occurs later, at 76

(SVF III Crin. 5). But nothing in the κατὰ μέρος section corresponds

to the definition of proof that comes next at 45 (these definitions

at 45 are SVF ii 235).

Finally, we have another discussion of phantasia (45 τὴν δὲ-46

ἒκτυπον, SVF II 53); it will be recalled that this subject was already

found in the eidos concerned with canons and criteria (41, 42) and

also (alternatively) briefly referred to as the first sub-iopoi of the

semantic topos (43). In what is Zeno’s way (cfr. SVF I 58, 59) it

is explained at τύπωσιν ἐν ψυχὴ. Then the cataleptic phantasia is

briefly described: τὴν γινομένην ἀπο ὑπάρχοντος κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ

ὑπάρχον ἐναπεσφραγισμένην καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένην (cfr. also SVF I

59); next we find important information about two different kinds

of phantasiai that are not cataleptic. To some degree, this passage

corresponds to 49-54 in the κατὰ μέρος section. Note that 46 τὴν

γινομένην [...] ἐναπομεμαγμένην is almost identical with the descrip-

tion of phantasia at 50, [...] ἡ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατὰ τὸ ὑπάρχον

ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναποτετυπωμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη; the

word αὐτὸ is not at 50, whereas the words καὶ ἐναποτετυπωμένη

are lacking at 46. Furthermore, the sentence οΐα ούκ αν γένοιτο άπο

— 361 —

μὴ ὑπάρχοντος that immediately follows at 50 is not found at 46;

since this is believed to be a further qualification subsequently added

to the definition to fortify it against Arcesilaus’ criticism ¹⁵⁰, it is inter-

esting to have a definition without this further qualification (but

with description of phantasiai that are not cataleptic) at 46.

We should now turn to the detailed account itself in order to

make the comparison more stringent, and ask ourselves to which

parts and subdivisions and further subdivisions of subdivisions of the

general exposition the parts and subdivisions and further subdivisions

of the detailed exposition correspond, and how far this correspondence

goes.

Take the first sentence quoted from Diocles at VII 49:

ἀρέσκει τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς τὸν περὶ φαντασίας καὶ αἰσθήσεως π ρ ο -

τ ά τ τ ε ι v λόγον, καθότι τὸ κριτήριον, ᾧ ἡ ἀλήθεια τῶν πραγ-

μάτων γινώσκεται κτλ. (SVF I 52).

«To put in the forefront» (προτάττειν) in the context of the κατὰ

μέρος section means: to treat before Phonetics (55 ff.) and Semantics

(63 ff.). This is not the arrangement according to the table of contents

of the semantic topos at 43 according to which the phantasiai from

which the lekta arise are treated as the first sub-topos of Semantics.

(Note that the corresponding table at 63 and the account at 63 ff.

omit the phantasiai. There is only one brief sentence at 63: φασὶ δὲ

τὸ λεκτὸν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ φαντασίαν λογικὴν ὑφιστάμενον. Logike

phantasia is defined at 51; otherwise, the sentence at 63 is closer

to the table at 43, cfr. ἐκ τούτων ὑφισταμένων λεπτῶν. In VII 49-53,

the word lekton does not occur.) The arrangement actually followed

by Diog. Laert. accepts an autonomous third (or rather first) sub-

discipline of logic besides the dialectical sub-disciplines Phonetics and

Semantics. This agrees with the division of to logikon meros ac-

cording to the τινες mentioned at 41, who added τὸ περὶ κανόνων

καὶ κριτηρίων (εἶδος) as a further part which served to establish

the truth and in which the different kinds of phantasiai were inve-

— 362 —

stigated (42). From what is said at 41, one could not have expected

that this part could come first, but according to Diocles (49) it was

the general (!) Stoic practice to begin with the theory of knowledge.

Indeed, VII 49-54 is a very precise, detailed and important exposition

of the different kinds (cfr. 42) of phantasiai there are (and of the

formation of concepts), although it is frustratingly brief about the

criterion (54) ¹⁵¹. One need not go into the details of 49-53; what

I want to claim, however, is that this section constitutes the Diocles

fragment (as would appear, from 50 paraphrazed rather than tran-

scribed). VII 54 cannot be included, because it is unlikely that Diocles

would have treated the phantasiai, katalepsis, and concept-formation in

such detail and have been so infuriatingly brief about the cataleptic

phantasia and the criterion ¹⁵². After all, the general account at 46

At VII 50, the Diocles fragment contains a reference to Chry-

sippus which may but need not have been inserted by Diog. Laert.

(note that what follows, νοείται κτλ., is very Zenonian, cfr. supra,

p. 360), viz. a further explanation of what is meant by typosis:

τουτέστιν ἀλλοίωσις, ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ Περὶ ψυχῆς

ὑφίσταται [...] γίνεσθαι (SVF II 55). Phantasia as typosis in the

— 363 —

soul should, according to Chrysippus, not be understood in a crudely

materialist way (cfr. further SVF II 56). This epistemological point

was not made by Chrysippus in a work concerned with the logical

part of philosophy, let alone with the introduction thereto, but in a

psychological, i.e., physical, treatise.

The tantalizingly disappointing treatment of the criterion at 54

consists of a laudatio; it will be recalled that according to von Arnim

this cluster of quotations had been inserted by Diog. Laert., and

according to Egli been taken by Diocles from Posidonius. Egli’s view

may be discounted, and — unlike von Arnim and others — I do not

believe that the Diocles fragment is resumed at 55. But von Arnim

must be right to the extent that at 54 Diog. Laert. switches ¹⁵³ to

another (kind of) source. Instead of copying out or paraphrasing

Diocles’ account of the criterion and of the cataleptic phantasia, which

as one may reasonably assume will have been as detailed and precise

as that of the phantasiai at 49-53 (for some of these details see Cic.

Varro 41 f. = SVF I 60), he moved to a source containing laudationes.

This is also clear from the final sentence of 53, which is a summary

serving as a transition marker: τοιάδε τινὰ καὶ περὶ φαντασίας

καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ νοήσεως δογματίζουσι. The list at 54 is interesting

in itself. The cataleptic phantasia is defined (much more briefly than

at 46 ¹⁵⁴) as being ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος. Diog. Laert. continues: καθά φησι

Χρύσιππος [SVF II 105] ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ [von Arnim, δωδεκάτῃ mss]

τῶν Φυσικῶν καὶ Ἀντίπατρος [SVF III Ant. 18] καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος

(SVF III Αp. 3). For Anipater and Apollodorus, regrettably, no book-

titles are given. That cited for Chrysippus confirms the point made

supra (this page) a propos his On the Soul: the locus classicus for

the cataleptic phantasia was not found in a logical but in a physical

treatise of Chrysippus. The catalogue of Chrysippus’ works contains

several titles which indicate epistemological topics (ap. Diog. Laert.

VII 201, SVF II 17, p. 9, 24-30); as A. A. Long has pointed out, it

— 364 —

can hardly be an accident that this list is found among Chrysippus’

ethical works ¹⁵⁵. The decision to begin with the theory of knowledge

(common practice according to Diocles) must have been made by later

Stoics; it was endorsed by Diocles and determined Diog. Laert.’s

order of presentation. It also determines the order of subjects in SVF

I and II and in much of learned literature. But it conveys a false

impression of Chrysippus’ priorities. Chrysippus (if the beginning of

his catalogue may be assumed to have authority) began ¹⁵⁶ with formal

logic in our sense of the word. Which entails a surprizing anticipation

of the views of modern logicians.

To return to the list at 54: a different view of the criterion

held by Boethus is next (SVF III B. 1). Then a different view of

Chrysippus himself is recorded: διαφερόμενος πρὸς αὑτόν he said in

the first book of his Περὶ λόγου (listed in the ethical part of the

catalogue cited supra, SVF II 17, p. 9, 29) that aisthesis and prolepsis

are the criteria. Although it would perhaps be as rash to infer that

in his On Reason he did not speak of the cataleptic phantasia as to

claim that he may have done so, it is (as von Arnim already pointed

out) at any rate most remarkable that he is said to have been «dis-

agreeing with himself» ¹⁵⁷. Von Arnim adduces a similar formula from

Diog. Laert. VII 139 (two different accounts given by Chrysippus in

one and the same work). One is of course reminded of Plutarch’s

arguments in his anti-Stoic treatises, esp. stoic. rep.; Posidonius, how-

ever, also used to argue that Chrysippus is inconsistent (see the

fragments in Galen’s PHP). It is therefore noteworthy that again

— 365 —

another criterion held by « some of the more ancient Stoics» (SVF

I 631) is cited from Posidonius’ Περὶ κριτηρίου (fr. 42 E.-K., 460

Th.). But there is no positive argument that the whole cluster at 54

derives from Posidonius.

It should by now be clear that the εἰσαγωγικὴ τέχνη, the

discipline introducing dialectic mentioned by Diog. Laert. at VII 48,

is “epistemology”, or the eidos (41-2) dealing with canons and criteria.

Emendation ¹⁵⁸ is not called for. We may assume that this independent

eidos grew out of the first sub-topos of Semantics, viz. that dealing

with the phantasiai mentioned at VII 43.

Dialectic proper starts at 55 (τῆς δὲ διαλεκτικῆς θεωρίας); Jørgen

Mejer ¹⁵⁹, I believe, was right when he pointed out that 50-3 belong

with 49 and that a new subject is got under way at 55. Already in

54, Diog. Laert. has broken his promise or forgotten his announcement

that from now on he is going to transcribe Diocles for the details

of the logikon meros, if, that is, one is right in assuming that this

is what he announced. But the sentence at issue, as we have seen,

is difficult and unclear, and I would propose that we interpret it

by taking Diog. Laert.’s actual procedure as our touch-stone ¹⁶⁰. At

VII 48, he first says that he has given a general account, then that

he would also like to expound things kata meros, and thirdly that

he will also discuss the «introductory discipline» after Diocles’ Epi-

drome. It does not follow that 55-82, albeit κατὰ μέρος, are from

Diocles (83, a left-over of the general part which comes last, is

certainly not by Diocles). The laudatio at 54 may be attributed, if

only for economy’s sake, to the more detailed source used at 55-82,

which as it seems was not as specific as Diocles’ exposition. This

would entail that for the logical doxography Diog. Laert. used at least

three different sources. Presumably, one should attribute the summary

statements at 55 τῆς δὲ διαλεκτικῆς [...] τόπου, 63 ἐν δὲ τῷ [...]

— 366 —

ὑπτίων, and 76 καὶ ἄλλαι δέ [...] λέγομεν to Diog. Laert. He must

have made a real effort to provide detailed information about the

logical part of Stoic philosophy, which is important for one’s appreci-

ation of his personality as an author interested in philosophy.

Although in the general section at 43-4 Semantics had been

described before Phonetics, the more systematical detailed exposition

treats Phonetics first. Typically, Diog. Laert. says (that he does so

because) the majority of the Stoics agree (55 συμφώνως δοκεῖ τοῖς

πλείστοις) to «begin» dialectic with the phonetic topos, which now

follows, cfr. the concluding words at 62, ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ περὶ φωνῆς

θεωρίᾳ τοιαῦτα λέγεται τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς. I have already compared

the contents of 55-62 with the table of contents at 44 (supra, pp.

359 ff.). It should be acknowledged that the exposition of the defi-

nition of phone, of engrammatos phone, of lexis, of the parts of logos,

and of style and poetry, is fairly orderly and systematical. M. Frede

has argued convincingly that this section represents the «elements of»

Stoic «grammar», which developed out of the treatment of «dic-

tion» ¹⁶¹. The exposition itself, however, is more compressed than the

treatment of the phantasiai in the Diocles fragment at 49-53. What

follows at 60 ὅρος -62 πέπτωκε is both more disorderly and even more

compressed ¹⁶². I cannot here go into the details; note, however, that the

two definitions of horos in the little laudatio at 60 refer to the first

books of Antipater’s On Definitions (SVF III Ant. 23) and Chrysippus’

On Definitions (SVF II 226), i.e., to a type of treatise that is not

concerned with the logikon meros of philosophy only. This fans one’s

suspicion that the jumble of definitions that follows in the later part

— 367 —

of Diog. Laert.’s treatment of Phonetics derives from a collection of

horoi, or rather from the horikon eidos described at VII 41-2. The

definition of ennoema given at 61 A is not really needed after the

extensive treatment in 49-53. Furthermore, the whole little section on

genus and species (and, presumably, division) does not, as we have

noticed above (p. 359), belong with Phonetics but with Semantics

according to the table at VII 43. It would be false to assume that

Phonetics entails a discussion of concepts, because these either belong

with autonomous epistemology (49-53, 41-2) or with the first sub-

topos of Semantics (43). The definition of ennoema at VII 61 is the

vulgate Zenonian one (61 ἀνατύπωμα ~ 45 τύπωσις) and lacks

Chrysippus’ distinguo (50). Its intrusion in the appendix to Phonetics

at 60 ὅρος-62 can be explained: the definition of genus that precedes

involves the use of the term ἐννοημάτων. The horikon eidos, moreover,

according to VII 42 is concerned with truth because διὰ [...] τῶν

ἐννοιῶν τὰ πράγματα λαμβάνεται. Note that the appendix begins

with the definition of horos and similar terms. We may therefore

assume that the appendix to Phonetics represents the horikon eidos

which some posited as a separate discipline (41-2) and others appended

to Phonetics (44 καὶ περὶ ὅρων etc.). The section on amphibolia at

VII 62 may be a Nachtrag to Stoic grammar (one would have expected

it either before or after the section on poiesis and poiema, 60). As

a part of Phonetics, the section on genera and species is of course

illplaced, because genera and species are conceptual rather than linguistic

items.

In the first section of Diog. Laert.’s Phonetics, 55-9, Diogenes

of Babylonia is mentioned not less than six times (SVF III D. 17, 18,

20, 21, 22) and the relevant title is given twice: 55 and 57, Περὶ

φωνῆς. Although von Arnim attributes more to Diogenes than would

seem to be justifiable (cfr. SVF ΙΙΙ D. 20, 23, 24, 25), much of this

section indeed seems ultimately to go back to his book ¹⁶³; he appears

to have been the first Stoic to write a special treatise Περὶ

φωνῆς.

Note that he also wrote a separate Διαλεκτικὴ τέχνη, SVF ΙΙΙ D. 26

— 368 —

ap. Diog. Laert. VII 71. The assumption that all references to Diogenes

in the grammatical section, VII 55-9, refer to the phonetic treatise is

a safe one. Other names mentioned are those of the early post-

Chrysippean Stoics Archedemus (with book-title, also Π. φωνῆς, 55

= SVF ΙΙΙ Arch. 6) and, twice, Antipater (55 = SVF ΙΙΙ Ant. 16;

57 = SVF ΙΙΙ Ant. 22). The second time, a book-title is added for

Antipater: Περὶ λέξεως καὶ τῶν λεγομένων. Accordingly, Antipater

treated Phonetics and Semantics together in one treatise, whereas

Diogenes had written two separate treatises, and Archedemus a separate

treatise on Phonetics. The definition of the poem at 60 is cited from

Posidonius’ Περὶ λέξεως εἰσαγωγή (fr. 44 E.-K., 458 Th.), clearly a

phonetic treatise as well. Unlike the treatises On Definitions cited at

60, the works by Diogenes, Archedemus, Antipater (for its first part),

and Posidonius, clearly belong with the phonetic topos.

In these laudationes at 55-9, Chrysippus is cited twice. The first

time at 55 = SVF ΙΙ 140 (together with Archedemus + title, Diogenes,

Antipater), where he is said to have stated that phone is corporeal in

the second book of his Physics. A definition given by Diogenes

Archedemus Antipater in “logical” works consequently was given by

Chrysippus in a “physical” work. The catalogue of his works at VII

192 (SVF ΙΙ 14) shows that he discussed the subjects treated in the

introductory treatises of Diogenes, Antipater (first part), Archedemus,

and, presumably, Posidonius, but did so in a series of major works

collected in the λογικοῦ τόπου περὶ τὰς λέξεις καὶ τὸν κατ’ αὐτὰς

λόγον. This catalogue, moreover, treats part of formal logic first (VII

190-2 = SVF ΙΙ 13-14, λογικοῦ τόπου τοῦ περὶ τὰ πράγματα). This

is confirmed by the other passage in the phonetic section of Diog. Laert.

where Chrysippus’ name is found (unfortunately without book-title),

viz. in the laudatio at VII 57 — SVF ΙΙ 147, which is about the parts of

logos. Here, as we have noticed, Diogenes’ Περὶ φωνῆς and Antipater’s

Περὶ λέξεως καὶ τῶν λεγομένων are mentioned as well. Cfr. the

catalogue at VII 192 (SVF ΙΙ 14, p. 6, 17-20, where however Chrysippus

speaks of στοιχεία not μέρη). Yet it should be added that the

distinction between the semantic and the phonetic parts does not seem

to have been applied by Chrysippus in a pedantical way; the first

title at VII 192 = SVF ΙΙ, p. 6, 17 f. is περὶ τῶν στοιχείων τοῦ λόγου

— 369 —

καὶ τῶν λεγομένων, the second and third are about λεγομένα only,

the fourth about στοιχείων τοῦ λὸγου only. For Antipater’s title

one can quote Chrysippean partial precedents. One may of course also

cite Chrysippus’ definition of Dialectic (see infra), which lists both the

phonetic and the semantic components, and in that order. Which

subjects were treated in Chrysippus’ introductory monobiblos τέχνη

διαλεκτικὴ πρὸς ᾽Αρισταγόραν (Diog. Laert. VII 190 = SVF ΙΙ 13,

p. 5, 2) one cannot know. But I think the evidence suggests that the

material found in the κατὰ μέρος phonetic section of Diog. Laert.

goes back, in as far as the manner of presentation is concerned, to

Chrysippus’ successors. Introductory treatises presenting the vast

material treated in numerous extensive works by Chrysippus were

needed, and a certain measure of standardization must have been

indispensable for teaching purposes.

As we have noticed, Diog. Laert. at VII 62 rounds off Phonetics

with a transitional sentence indicating its contents (quoted supra, p. 366),

which at the beginning of 63 is followed by a summarizing and

incomplete list of the subjects to be dealt with in Semantics (cfr. supra,

p. 358). In a way that is entirely typical of his method of composition,

Diog. Laert. inserts two definitions of Dialectic in general before

this concluding sentence at 62, in fine. The first of these, as he says, is

Posidonius’ (fr. 188 E.-K., 454 Th.), which as we have seen ¹⁶⁴ is

also quoted, anonymously, at 42. The second, he tells us, is Chrysippus’:

[...] ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππός φησι, περὶ σημαίνοντα καὶ σημαινόμενα (SVF

ΙΙΙ 122). These insertions are a bit awkward, not only because Posidonius’

definition had already been given in the general account, but also because

Chrysippus’ explicitly refers to both Phonetics (σημαίνοντα) and

Semantics (σημαινόμενα), thus covering both what precedes (55-62)

and what follows (63-82). One has a hunch that Posidonius’ definition

would have provided a proper introduction to what follows, whereas

Chrysippus’ would have been more efficient at 55. The reason they

are found where they are actually found, viz. at the end of the

phonetic section (VII 62) is, presumably, that Diog. Laert. had come

— 370 —

across these definitions in one of his sources, and appended them,

as is his wont to do with extra material, at the end of a section ¹⁶⁵.

I can only be very brief about the contents of 63-82, Diog. Laert.

here has copied out his source or sources in more detail. Laudationes

are found at chs. 64, 65, 68, 71, 76, 79. Note that, at 65, a definition

of axioma is quoted from Chrysippus’ introductory treatise Διαλεκτικοὶ

ὅροι (cfr. VII 189 = SVF II 13, p. 4, 40). The definition of the

conditional at 71 is given not only after Diogenes’ introductory treatise

Διαλεκτικὴ τέχνη, but also after Chrysippus’ ἐν ταῖς Διαλεκτικαῖς

(the latter title should perhaps be emended to ἐν τ<ο>ῖς Διαλεκτικ(ο)ῖς

<ὅροις>). The only other title quoted here is Crinis’ Διαλεκτικὴ τέχνη(71 = SVF III Crin. 4). Crinis’ name occurs a few more times:

1) together with those of Archedemus Athenodorus ¹⁶⁶ Antipater (68

= SVF III Crin. 3; the list begins with Chrysippus’ name), and 2)

with the definitions of logos (“argument”) at 76 = SVF III Crin. 5.

Apollodorus’ name is found at 64 (not in the Apoll.-ch. in SVF) and

Chrysippus’, apart from the passages already mentioned, also at 79

(SVF II 241). The Semantics as found in Diog. Laert. thus would

appear to derive from the scholastic treatises of the successors of

Chrysippus and their pupils, as I have also argued for the Phonetics.

The assumption that Diog. Laert.’s Semantics does not consist of

one long transcript from Diocles helps to solve a famous crux, viz.

the meaning of ἐν τῷ πλάτει at VII 76 καὶ ἄλλαι δὲ εἰσι διαφοραὶ

ἀξιωμάτων καὶ μεταπτώσεις αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀληθῶν εἰς ψεύδη καὶ

ἀντισροφαί, περὶ ὧν έν τῷ πλάτει λέγομεν. In the preceding chap-

ters, Diog. Laert. has discussed various sorts of propositions. At 75

πιθανόν-76 υριον he has described the plausible but false (πιθανόν)

proposition, the four modalities some among which may change their

truth-value, and the reasonable (εὔλογον) proposition, which appears

to be a species of the possible. From 76, λόγος δέ ἐστιν, he continues

with argument (logos). The «other differences among propositions

and changes from true to false etc.» mentioned at 76 are not treated

— 371 —

in the κατὰ μέρος section. The table of contents of the semantic topos

in the general section (43-4), although a bit confused, also suggests that

the κατὰ μέρος section could have been more detailed as to this chapter

of Semantics. Hicks translates περὶ ὧν έν τῷ πλάτει λέγομεν by

«which we now go on to describe broadly», which is patently false.

Theiler (see the app. crit. of Egli and Hülser ad loc.) suggested that

(οὔδε) be inserted before τῷ πλάτει. Holwerda ¹⁶⁷, who as others

believes that Diog. Laert. is merely transcribing Diocles, argued that

Diocles’ Epidrome was a brief work and that the reference is to his

Lives of the Philosophers. He quotes late parallels for τὸ πλάτυ

meaning «our more extensive treatment». What is rather awkward,

however, is that a detailed treatment of a very technical part of Stoic

formal logic would have been contained in a biographical work ¹⁶⁸; one

wonders in whose biography it could have been set out - Chrysippus’?

But then also other technical subjects would have been treated there

in similar detail, which would hardly fit the genre. All difficulties

vanish, or so I think, if we attribute the phrase at issue to Diog. Laert.

himself and assume that ἐν τῷ πλάτει is the opposite of κατά μέρος.

Diog. Laert., loc. cit., only lists the further differences and more

refined distinctions among propositions and says that he refrains from

treating these in detail. The words περὶ ὧν έν τῷ πλάτει λέγομεν

mean «which I only mention in general terms».

Accordingly, the logical doxography in Diog. Laert. has preserved

a plurality of traditions concerned with the subdisciplines of logic and

of dialectic, and with their order of presentation. In order to conclude

this part of the present paper, I would like — by way of a summary —

to submit the following hypothesis.

The sequence in the kata meros account, viz. 1) Epistemology 2)

Phonetics (including the appendix at VII 60-2) and 3) Semantics

(including arguments) cannot be Chrysippean. In Chrysippus’ bibliogra-

phy, part of Semantics is placed before Phonetics, another part of

— 372 —

Semantics, viz. that dealing with arguments, after Phonetics, whereas

Phonetics itself includes the treatment of certain arguments. Furthermore,

the epistemological works are listed in the ethical section. To those who

wanted to teach logic in a systematical way, two options were open:

they could (a) either put all of Semantics before all of Phonetics, or

(b) move Phonetics to a position before the two semantic sections

which in Chrysippus’ bibliography are separated by it. Both parties

could claim the authority of the view responsible for the sequence

in the bibliography, although those who put Semantics first certainly

were closer to Chrysippus’ catalogue, whereas the others could quote

the definition of dialectic (cfr. VII 62). Now those who put Semantics

first, according to VII 43-4, began their treatment with Epistemology,

i.e., they had the whole logical curriculum start with the discussion

of phantasiai etc. Others, however, preferred the in itself more systemati-

cal sequence Phonetics-Semantics to be found in the kata meros account

of Diog. Laert. The first to have done so may have been the influential

scholarch Antipater, the successor of Diogenes, because he is the

first and only Early Stoic to have written a treatise Peri lexeos kai ton

legomenon (“On Phonetics and Semantics”, VII 57). My guess is that

the sequence Semantics-Phonetics is the earlier of the two, and that

Archedemus and his followers wanted to preserve epistemology at the

beginning of the logical curriculum and consequently converted it

into a third eidos of logic to be treated before Phonetics. This, at

any rate, would explain Diocles’ statement ap. Diog. Laert. VII 49

that the Stoics were agreed that one should begin with Epistemology.

The prominent position of this philosophical (sub-)discipline in these

later Stoic curricula should presumably be connected with the need to

strengthen the system against the attacks by Carneades and his followers.

If this line of argument is correct, we may even have found the

explanation for Diog. Laert.’s insertion of the Diocles fragment. Diocles

emphasized the symphonia among the Stoics as to the position of

Epistemology. Consequently, the quotation serves as a convenient

bridge between the brief account (: Semantics-Phonetics, with refe-

rences to the other eide that either were or were not included) and

the kata meros account (: Phonetics-Semantics). At VII 54, Diog. Laert.

could switch to the Stoic logical handbook (or the source reporting

— 373 —

what was in this handbook) which served as his basis for the kata

meros account as soon as the section from Diocles on the phantasiai

(treated as first sub-topos of Semantics by those who did not recognize

a separate eidos dealing with canons and criteria) had been transcribed.

Accordingly, the kata meros section provides what, by the time of

Diog. Laert.’s source, had become the standard order of “systematical”

presentation of Stoic logic. The brief account, on the other hand, is

more “historical” in that it furnishes information about the various

forms of presentation that had been provided in the past. One should

compare the report about the parts of philosophy and their order of

didactical presentation at VII 39-41, and note that the brief account

of logic is immediately subsequent to this report.

The appendix to Phonetics in the kata meros section (VII 60 ὅρος-

62) is concerned with topics that were treated in the context of logic

(cfr. Chrysippus’ bibliography) but apparently could not all be said to

belong exclusively to the domains of either Epistemology or Phonetics

or Semantics. Some Stoics choose to establish this remnant as a

separate eidos (the horikon, VII 41-2), whereas others, oddly, added

it to Phonetics (VII 44); the latter procedure appears to have become

standard.

Appendix I: Contrasting Views of Epicurus (Diog. Laert. X).

In pt. 3 of this paper ¹⁶⁹ I have discussed the two opposed

traditions concerned with the Cynicizing antecedents of and elements

in Stoicism, viz. the tradition highlighted and preferred by Diog. Laert.

which argued continuity, from Antisthenes, in the field of dignified

ethics, and another tradition which, as we have noticed, is also

represented by and known to Philodemus, but which in Diog. Laert.

has been confined to the biographies of Zeno and Chrysippus. We have

also taken into account that both parties in this dispute make use of

references and even pile quotation upon quotation (laudationes) in

order to drive their points home. Zeno’s Politeia (and similar works)

— 374 —

were not only criticized by revisionist Stoics, but also by Skeptics and

Epicureans, and so was Chrysippus in so far his cruder Cynic views

were concerned. Furthermore, we have seen that according to Philodemus

the probable charges against some of the Stoics are far worse than the

in his view misguided accusations brought against Epicurus’ hedonism

and the loose way of life of the Epicureans.

In bk. VII, the tradition which blamed Zeno and Chrysippus had

to be largely reconstructed. In bk. X, the matter is wholly clear. Diog.

Laert. first enumerates and quotes those who slandered and criticized

Epicurus not only by blackwashing his way of life but also by quoting

embarrassing passages from his works (X 3 Διότιμος-8 ἀπαίδευτον).

He clearly takes sides, for at X 9 he declares that these opponents

are «raving mad» (μεμήνασι δ’ οὗτοι). Next, he cites evidence to

disprove the slander of Epicurus’ life; authorities in favour of Epicurus

are marshalled and quoted, and passages from Epicurus’ Correspondence

referred to and cited (X 11). What we have here, clearly, are laudationes

on both sides of the issue, just as with the two opposed views concerned

with the Stoics in bk. VII.

At X 12, Diog. Laert. continues: «we shall know this even better

[viz. that Epicurus deserves praise not blame] as we proceed, viz.

from his doctrines and his statements». Consequently, more laudationes

in favour of Epicurus are to follow. However, Diog. Laert. does not

rest content with quoting extracts from the available secondary literature

(for which cfr. X 29: [...] καὶ εἴ τι ἔδοξεν ἐκλογῆς ἀξίως ἀνεφθέγχθαι),

but inserts entire works written by Epicurus, viz. the three Letters

and the Ratae sententiae. This is what he states unambiguously at X 28

ἃ δὲ αὐτῷ-29 εἰδέναι ¹⁷⁰. That bk. x largely consists of works by Epicurus

himself is a fact for which Diog. Laert. has been blamed as an author

and condescendingly praised as an indispensable source. It should be

explained, however, as the result of careful planning. The four works

by Epicurus are laudationes added by Diog. Laert. himself in order to

prove that Epicurus should be praised, not blamed; he may be overdoing

this from our stylistic point of view, but one may feel certain that he

knew what he was doing.

— 375 —

A point which deserves some emphasis is that both the attack

and the defense pertain to Epicurus’ life as well as to his doctrine.

Quotations could serve to prove that he was up to no good or at any

rate a detestable character, and other quotations could be used in order

to prove the exact opposite. The ancient view, of course, is that there

is, or should be, some sort of consistent relation between a philosopher’s

life and his doctrines, so one may use his written statements as evidence

that he was either a good or a bad person, and cite biographical evidence

in order to shore up these quotations. We have noticed supra (p. 338)

that at VI 105 Zeno is said to have actually «lived in accord with Vir-

tue», and have referred to certain passages in his biography which un-

derscore this statement, just as there are other aspects of the story of his

life that seem to be Cynic in a cruder sense. A similar situation prevails

in Epicurus’ case. This is important for the evaluation of the relation

between doxography and biography in Diog. Laert. Slander of a person’s

life is biographical, but the same slander in the form of quotations

(laudationes) soon develops into a critical doxography, just as a bunch

of quotations collected in order to defend a person’s character actually

constitutes a perhaps more factual doxography. By which, of course,

I do not mean to say that laudationes are to be found in polemical

literature only.

That one should speak of a tradition rather than a source in

respect of the criticisms (or slander, if you prefer) to be found at x 3

ff. is clear from the many names of critics of Epicurus mentioned,

although undoubtedly Diog. Laert. got his information from at least

one intermediate source.

The methods used by Epicurus’ opponents are noteworthy. The

Stoic Diotimus ¹⁷¹ adduced «fifty scandalous Letters» as being by

Epicurus, whereas others ascribed to him the «Notes commonly

attributed to Chrysippus» (X 3). The first critic to be mentioned is

a Stoic. Where the letters variously ascribed to Epicurus or Chrysippus

are at issue, we seem to be hearing the echoes of a dispute between

Stoics and Epicureans (comparable to that ap. Philod., On the Stoics)

in which Diog. Laert. — or his source — sides with the Epicureans.

— 376 —

The allegations that works quoted are spurious or should be ascribed

to someone else recall the discussions concerning the Politeia (and other

works) of Zeno and the Politeia and Thyestes of Diogenes the Dog ¹⁷².

Other critics follow suit (X 4): «Posidonius the Stoic and his

school» (fr. 288 E.-K., 290 b Th.), Nicolaus (of Damascus?), an

otherwise unknown Sotion ¹⁷³ who wrote a work in 20 books called

Refutations of Diocles (Diokleioi elenchoi we do not know which

Diocles, but it should be noted that at Diog. Laert. X 10-11 Diocles

(of Magnesia) is cited among the apologists of Epicurus), and Dionysius

of Halicarnassus (II p. 250 Usener-Radermacher). These authors

slandered Epicurus in various personal ways, apparently quoting from

the renegade Epicurean Timocrates ¹⁷⁴ and even exploiting information

given in a book by the faithful Herodotus. Three passages from Epicurus’

letters are quoted in order to prove that he flattered his acquaintances

beyond measure (X 5: fr. 143 Us. = 71 Arr. ¹⁷⁵; fr. 125 Us. = 51

Arr.; fr. 165 Us. = 88 Arr.), and an unclear but apparently unedifying

passage from another letter (X 5: fr. 126 Us.) is cited after the 4th

book of Theodorus’ Against Epicurus. A lot of other letters of the

same ilk are mentioned in a general way (X 6). An important passage

from Epicurus’ Peri telous follows next (fr. 67 Us., cfr. fr. 22.1 Arr.),

together with again a quotation from a letter (fr. 163 Us. = 89 Arr.).

Then another Stoic, viz. Epictetus, is cited, who is said to have expressed

his disapproval of Epicurus in rather strong words. This is the only

time Epictetus is mentioned in the surviving part of Diog. Laert.’s

work, and the reference is important not only because it pertains to

a rather late Stoic ¹⁷⁶, but also because it provides a t.p.q. for Diog.

Laert.’s account of the anti-Epicurean tradition, viz. well into the 2nd

— 377 —

cent. CE. An extract from the renegade Timocrates’ Euphranta then

follows, which work may indeed be the ultimate source up to x 9,

άπαίδευτον. If it is, Timocrates not only gave an unfavourable account

of Epicurus’ life, but also quoted chapter and verse, viz. the work

Peri physeos and the Letters (cfr. fr. 93 Us.). At its end, x 9 contains

the longs list of slanderous terms Epicurus is said to have lavished

on his predecessors and rivals ¹⁷⁷. The extravagant invectives loved by

the master are used in order to discredit his character.

As D. Sedley has plausibly argued ¹⁷⁸, these criticisms (at least

those at x 6-9) may not be pertinent in that they appear to be grounded

in distortion, or devious quotation. What matters in our present context,

however, is that this is how the critics proceeded and that they not

only quoted Timocrates but also Epicurus himself, and rather generously

at that. Sedley argues that in many cases Epicurus’ detractors presented

the evidence in a false light, and adduces the relevant textual proofs.

The interesting thing, however, is that this appears not to have been

the procedure of the defenders of Epicurus, for these quoted other

passages in order to prove the opponents wrong, or (as in the case of

the Diotimus Letters, or of the Notes attributed to either Epicurus

or Chrysippus) argued that the evidence adduced was spurious. Again,

the important point for our present purpose is not whether or not the

criticisms were justified, but what the tradition was. That Epicurus

once in a while expressed himself in such a way that he was an easy

target need not, however, be doubted. Even Sedley has not succeeded

in explaining away all the charges. Revisionist later Epicureans will

have attempted to smother the incriminating material by numerous

counter-quotations.

Laudationes in favour of Epicurus other than the four works

inserted by Diog. Laert. are to be found in various places in bk. X.

At X 31, there are several references pertaining to epistemology; because

— 378 —

this is not an issue at X 3 ff. (just as the Stoic epistemology is not an

issue in Philodemus or at Diog. Laert. VII 32 ff. and. 187 ff.), I shall

not discuss this passage. At X 117-21, we have a survey of the Epicu-

rean views concerned with the Wise Man and with several general

aspects of ethics. It is here (as well as in the ensuing Letter to

Menoeceus and the Ratae sententiae) that we find the arguments contra

those at X 3 ff. At X 118, we have two references to the Epicurean

Diogenes of Tarsus (cfr. X 26); the first is to his Brief Account of Epicu-

rus’ Ethical Doctrines, the second to bk. 12 of another work treating the

same subject — perhaps the ethical section of the Epilektoi Scholai, or

Epilekta, the 1st book of which (dealing with physics) is cited at X 97,

the 5th at X 120, the 17th at X 136, and the 20th at X 138. At X 119,

there is laudatio referring to four works by Epicurus: to his Diaporiai

and to his Peri Physeos (fr. 19 Us.), to his Symposium (fr. 63 Us.), and

to bk. 1 (fr. 8 Us.) and bk. 2 (fr. 14 Us.) of his Peri bion. This last

reference, significantly, is concerned with the maxim ουδέ κυνιεῖν —

which definitely has an anti-Stoic point ¹⁷⁹.

Another important passage is the synkrisis of the Epicureans and

the Cyrenaics at X 136-8 (fr. 1, fr. 452 Us., Socr. fr. IV A 200 G.),

which is complementary to II 86-90 (Socr. fr. IV A 172 G.) and obviously

has its roots in the Peri haireseon literature ¹⁸⁰. At X 136 (fr. 1 Us.),

references to three (or four) works by Epicurus are to be found: to his

Peri haireseos kai phyges, to his Peri telous (quoted by the opponents

according to X 6), to his Peri bion (cfr. X 119), to the Letter to the

Philosophers at Mytilene (quoted by the opponents according to X 7),

and to a Peri haireseon which presumably should be read -eos.

Returning to the synkrisis between Epicurus and the Cyrenaics

at X 136 ff., I would like to call attention to a remarkable passage

(X 137 = fr. 66 Us.) concerned with what we may call the «logical

basis of Epicurean ethics» ¹⁸¹, viz. the fact that living beings φυσικῶς

καὶ χωρὶς λόγου are content with pleasure and shun pain as soon as

— 379 —

they are born. We avoid pain, «just as even Heracles, devoured by

the poisoned robe, cries aloud

‘And bites and yells, and rock to rock resounds,

Headlands of Locris and Eboean cliffs’» (Soph. Trach. 787-8).

Heracles was a Cynic as well as a Stoic hero; we have noticed supra

the importance of Antisthenes’ Heracles for the tradition, favoured

by Diog. Laert., that is concerned with the continuity between Cynics

and Stoics in the field of dignified ethics ¹⁸². The Epicureans, it would

appear, could retort by citing other aspects of the hero’s behaviour,

and it is at any rate quite apposite that the tradition favourable to

Epicurus, which rejected the Stoic criticisms of the hedone-principle,

has preserved this quotation from Sophocles. At X 138, which im-

mediately follows, the Epicurean view of Virtue is described, which is

rounded off with a quotation from Epicurus (fr. 506 Us.) that «only

Virtue is inseparable from Pleasure». This account provides a worthy

counterpart to the Cynic-Stoic construction of the “life in accord with

Virtue” ¹⁸³.

Appendix II: ζῇ Διοκλῆς (VII 75).

In the discussion following the oral presentation of the first draft

of the present paper Jonathan Barnes suggested that the exceptional

use of the proper name Diocles in a Stoic proposition in VII 75 may

be interpreted as a sort of sphragis. This, he added, was already

Nietzsche’s view ¹⁸⁴. Barnes quoted a parallel, viz. Apuleius disserit at

Ap. de int. p. 128, 3 Thomas; cfr. also p. 128, 13-21, and esp. 16-7,

which argues that the proper name may be replaced by the circumlocu-

tion philosophum Platonicum Madaurensem.

— 380 —

Interestingly enough, the use of the proper name Apuleius in the

de int., loc. cit., provided one of the arguments used by scholars in

the 19th cent, to prove that the de int. is spurious. For the relevant

literature one may refer to Beaujeu’s edition of Apuleius’ philosophical

works in the Budé series (he does not include the de int.) and to

Lumpe’s careful discussion in his recent study of the treatise ¹⁸⁵. There

are of course other pseudepigraphous works in the corpus apuleianum,

such as the Asclepius. Lumpe points out that there are crucial linguistic

differences with other books by Apuleius and suggests that perhaps

it was a draft found in his Nachlass and revised for publication.

Schwabe in 1896 already stated that Apuleius disserit neither proves

nor disproves that the treatise is genuine ¹⁸⁶. Sinko in 1906 quoted

the use of his own name in examples by the grammarian Plotius

Sacerdos, but Lumpe neutralizes this argument by a reference to the

use of Sacerdos’ name in an example by Dositheus ¹⁸⁷. What seems

certain is that the de int. cannot be the third book of the De Platone,

for in that case (cfr. the beginning of the second book) the elaborate

point about the three parts of philosophy at its beginning would be

redundant after i 4, the end. It is an independent work — which in itself

does not prove that it is spurious. The odds, however, are against its

being by Apuleius ¹⁸⁸. At any rate, the use of the name Apuleius, or of

— 381 —

Diocles, or of Sacerdos, in an example does not prove that the work

at issue is by Apuleius or Diocles or Sacerdos. One needs other

arguments.

But even if one were to accept that the chapter on modal logic

in Diog. Laert. derives from Diocles, it would not follow that the

whole treatment of Semantics, let alone the whole κατά μέρος-section,

is by Diocles. One may adduce a similar possible sphragis in VII 58.

Here, the definition of the appellative is given after Diogenes of

Babylonia (κατὰ τὸν Διογένην), that of the verb both after Diogenes

(ὡς ὁ Διογένης), and, following others (τινες), in another way. In

between, the definition of the proper name is given, anonymously; two

examples are provided, viz. Socrates, Diogenes. Should one assume that

Diogenes used his own name as a sphragis? If we do, it does not

follow (and can indeed be disproved because of the following τινες

and several other references in the environment of the sphragis) that

the whole Phonetical section is by Diogenes. It seems more likely,

however, that the source who quoted Diogenes (either at first hand or

from a secondary source) used the name as a convenient example;

after all, it occurs several times in the relevant section in Diog. Laert.

before the theoretically possible sphragis.

Finally, if one were to assume that Diocles of Magnesia used his

own name as a sphragis in a logical proposition, one way well ask why

he did so in his chapter on modal logic and not elsewhere, and why,

among the four options available, he chose the possible proposition. At

VII 75, we learn that examples of possible propositions are propositions

that, although false, may change their truth-value. Diocles himself

cannot have given «Diocles is alive» as his example of a possible

proposition, because at the time it was not false but true, i.e., not-

necessarily true. Therefore, as Barnes suggested, he must have written

<οὐχὶ> ζῇ Διοκλῆς, “not: Diocles is alive”, false at the time but due

to change its truth-value. Yet doubt lingers. If we assume Diocles knew

what he was doing which, applying the principle of charity, is what

— 382 —

we should assume, and if we further assume that he hoped to be

read after his demise, he must have known that for a person reading

the book of the late Diocles of Magnesia the statement “not: Diocles

is alive” would be an instance not of a possible but of a necessary

proposition. So if he used the name Diocles, he must have used it as

a token name, the way one uses Dion or Theon or Socrates, i.e. without

reference to himself. The simpler assumption, surely, is that someone

else used “Diocles” as such a name in an example.

My conclusion is that the use of “Diocles” in VII 75 in itself is

neutral, i.e., neither proves nor disproves that the relevant section of

the text is by Diocles, and that the belief that what we have here is

a sphragis entails more difficulties than its opposite. So I stick to my

guns as to the extent of the Diocles fragment argued in pt. 4. One

should not forget, moreover, that Diocles is a not uncommon name.

Diocles of Carystus was a famous physician. Chrysippus addressed two

of his works to a Diocles (catalogue at VII 200 = SVF II 16, p. 9, 13-4).

A Pythagorean Diocles of Phlius is mentioned at VIII 46, and the

name Diocles occurs twice in the will of Strato (V 62, 63). Diocles

of Magnesia is among the auctores rather frequently referred to by Diog.

Laert. on either side of VII 75; if one does not want to assume — as

one probably should — that Διοκλῆς has to be emended to Δίων ¹⁸⁹

(or Διογένης; error arising from abbreviation ¹⁹⁰°), one may argue that

either Diog. Laert.’s source (not: Diocles) or Diog. Laert. himself

put it in ¹⁹¹.